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Abstract
Human learners routinely make inductive inferences, or inferences that go beyond
the data they have observed. Inferences like these must be supported by constraints,
some of which are innate, although others are almost certainly learned. This thesis
presents a hierarchical Bayesian framework that helps to explain the nature, use and
acquisition of inductive constraints. Hierarchical Bayesian models include multiple
levels of abstraction, and the representations at the upper levels place constraints
on the representations at the lower levels. The probabilistic nature of these models
allows them to make statistical inferences at multiple levels of abstraction. In par-
ticular, they show how knowledge can be acquired at levels quite remote from the
data of experience—levels where the representations learned are naturally described
as inductive constraints.
Hierarchical Bayesian models can address inductive problems from many domains
but this thesis focuses on models that address three aspects of high-level cogni-
tion. The first model is sensitive to patterns of feature variability, and acquires
constraints similar to the shape bias in word learning. The second model acquires
causal schemata—systems of abstract causal knowledge that allow learners to discover
causal relationships given very sparse data. The final model discovers the structural
form of a domain—for instance, it discovers whether the relationships between a
set of entities are best described by a tree, a chain, a ring, or some other kind of
representation.
The hierarchical Bayesian approach captures several principles that go beyond
traditional formulations of learning theory. It supports learning at multiple levels
of abstraction, it handles structured representations, and it helps to explain how
learning can succeed given sparse and noisy data. Principles like these are needed
to explain how humans acquire rich systems of knowledge, and hierarchical Bayesian
models point the way towards a modern learning theory that is better able to capture
the sophistication of human learning.
Thesis Supervisor: Joshua Tenenbaum
Title: Associate Professor of Cognitive Science
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Chapter 1
Inductive inference
One of the most striking human achievements is routinely observed in homes around
the world. Take a young child and expose her to light waves, sound waves, and
other patterns of sensory stimulation. Somehow she will learn words, causal relation-
ships and grammatical rules, and will develop abstract knowledge about numbers,
objects, space, time, and the beliefs and desires of others. The acquisition of human
knowledge raises many challenging questions, but many are elaborations of a single
fundamental question: how do learners make inferences that go beyond the data they
have observed? Psychologists and philosophers alike have struggled to understand the
relationship between the “meager input” and the “torrential output” (Quine, 1969).
Inferences that go beyond the available data are sometimes called ampliative or
non-deductive inferences, but I will refer to them as inductive inferences. Some of the
earliest inductive inferences may be inferences about visual scenes. At 4 months of
age, for instance, infants make inductive predictions about the shapes of objects that
are partially concealed by an occluder, and about the trajectories of moving objects
that pass behind an occluder (E. S. Spelke, 1990). Inductive inferences, however, can
be found in almost every domain of cognition. Consider a child who observes her
mother point at a bird and utter the word “swan.” This observation is consistent
with many hypotheses about the meaning of the word: perhaps it refers to the beak
of the bird, or to any object that is white, or to any creature with a long neck. A
single labeled example, however, is often enough for children to grasp the meaning of a
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novel word. Other aspects of linguistic knowledge are also acquired given very sparse
data. To mention one familiar example, children acquire grammatical constructions
that are rarely found in the sentences that they hear (Chomsky, 1980).
A partial explanation of human inductive abilities has been available for many
centuries. Since inductive inferences arrive at conclusions that go beyond the available
data, additional elements are needed to bridge the gap between data and conclusions.
These additional elements might be given different names, but I will refer to them as
inductive constraints. There is room for debate about the nature of these constraints,
but the need for constraints of some sort has been widely recognized by philosophers,
psychologists, statisticians, and machine learning researchers (Keil, 1981; Chomsky,
1986; Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, & Thagard, 1986).
Many ideas about inductive constraints can be traced back to the philosophical
literature. Peirce points out that any set of observations can potentially be explained
by a vast number of hypotheses, and asks how a learner might identify the hypotheses
that turn out to be productive. His answer is that the mind has innate tendencies
which lead it towards appropriate hypotheses: “if men had not come to [Nature]
with special aptitudes for guessing right, it may well be doubted whether in the
ten or twenty thousand years that they may have existed their greatest mind would
have attained the amount of knowledge which is actually possessed by the lowest
idiot” (Peirce, 1931–1935). Other philosophers have demonstrated the need for in-
ductive constraints, and two of these demonstrations are particularly memorable.
Goodman (1955) discusses constraints which help a learner identify lawlike hypothe-
ses, or hypotheses that are supported by their positive instances. For instance, ob-
serving a green emerald supports the hypothesis that “all emeralds are green,” but
does not support the hypothesis that “all emeralds are green if examined before 2050,
or blue if not so examined.” Quine (1960) focuses on the problem of language acqui-
sition, and suggests that the evidence available to learners is insufficient to establish
the meanings of the words in their native language. A common conclusion is that
language learners must rely on constraints which limit the word meanings that they
entertain (Markman, 1989).
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Inspired in part by the philosophical literature, psychologists have argued that
learning depends critically on inductive constraints and have proposed specific con-
straints that may play a role in human learning (Table 1.1). Researchers including
Markman (1989) have explored how children learn novel words, and have identified
several constraints that can help children overcome the challenges identified by Quine.
One of these constraints is the whole object bias: the expectation that novel labels
tend to refer to entire objects (such as swans) instead of object parts (such as beaks),
or object attributes such as size, color, or texture. Chomsky (1986) has suggested that
children are exposed to linguistic data that are relatively sparse, and are able to learn
the grammar of their native language only because they begin with constraints that
limit the class of possible grammars. E. S. Spelke (1990) has studied inductive infer-
ences about the shape and motion of physical objects, and has suggested that these in-
ferences are constrained by abstract knowledge, including the knowledge that objects
tend to follow smooth trajectories through space and time. Other psychologists have
identified constraints that appear to support inferences about space (Landau, Gleit-
man, & Spelke, 1981), number (R. Gelman & Gallistel, 1978), living kinds (Atran,
1998), and the goals and beliefs of others (Wellman, 1990).
Computer scientists and mathematicians have supported these philosophical and
psychological arguments by providing formal demonstrations of the importance of
inductive constraints (Watanabe, 1969; Schaffer, 1994). One well-known result is the
No Free Lunch Theorem which states that there is no learning algorithm that can suc-
ceed in all possible contexts—averaged across all conceivable contexts, no algorithm
can perform better than random guessing (Wolpert, 1995). It follows that even the
most powerful learning algorithm cannot avoid the need for inductive constraints, and
will succeed only if the constraints it incorporates are well-matched to the problem
at hand. The assumptions made by a learning algorithm are often referred to collec-
tively as its inductive bias (Geman, Bienenstock, & Doursat, 1992; Mitchell, 1997),
but these assumptions might equally well be described as inductive constraints.
Although few researchers deny the importance of inductive constraints, there are
fierce debates about the nature and origin of these constraints. A strong empiricist
15
Domain Constraints Reference
Word learning Shape bias Landau, Smith, and Jones (1988)
Whole object bias Markman (1989)
Taxonomic bias Markman (1989)
Principle of contrast Clark (1987)
Predicability M-constraint Keil (1979)
Causal learning Causal schemata Kelley (1972)
Kinship Social schemata D. Jones (2003)
Folk biology Taxonomic principle Atran (1998)
Folk physics Spelke principles E. S. Spelke (1990)
Folk psychology Theory of Mind Wellman (1990)
Spatial reasoning Geometric principles Landau et al. (1981)
Number Counting principles R. Gelman and Gallistel (1978)
Syntax Universal grammar Chomsky (1965)
Phonology Faithfulness constraints Prince and Smolensky (1993)
Markedness constraints Prince and Smolensky (1993)
Music Well-formedness rules Lerdahl and Jackendoff (1983)
Preference rules Lerdahl and Jackendoff (1983)
Table 1.1: Constraints that guide inferences about several domains.
view proposes that only a handful of constraints need to be innate. The constraints
in this class include properties of sensory transducers that determine how sensory
data are represented, and constraints that take the form of a domain-general learning
algorithm. Given this learning algorithm, all remaining constraints are thought to be
learned from sensory input. A strong nativist view challenges the notion of domain-
general learning, and proposes that learning is guided by strong constraints that
are specific to individual domains—for example, that the acquisition of linguistic
knowledge is guided by innate constraints that are specifically linguistic (Chomsky,
1986). Both sides of this debate must face some challenging questions.
The empiricist side must confront the problem of explaining how constraints might
be acquired. At least two issues arise. First, if inductive learning is impossible
without constraints, then any method for learning constraints must rely on meta-
constraints of some sort, and we are faced with the threat of an infinite regress.
Second, even if we grant that constraints might be learned in principle, it is difficult
to understand how they are learned fast enough to be useful. Studies suggest that
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many inductive constraints are available relatively early in development (Mehler et
al., 1988; E. S. Spelke, 1990; Wynn, 1992), and there is a good reason to expect this
result: constraints must be in place relatively early in order to support subsequent
learning. Explaining how constraints can be learned is a difficult enough challenge,
but explaining how they are learned rapidly is even harder.
The difficulty of explaining how constraints might be learned may explain in part
why most discussions of constraints adopt a nativist perspective. Some constraints are
almost certainly innate, but others appear to be learned, and a strong nativist account
must address two challenges. First, how can humans successfully learn about novel
contexts, including contexts that emerged only recently on an evolutionary timescale?
Human reasoning is remarkably flexible, and our ability to reason about fields like
mathematics, chemistry, and molecular biology stands in need of some explanation.
Inductive constraints appear to play a role: for instance, skilled mathematicians rely
on constraints which help them identify which of the many possible approaches to a
problem is most likely to succeed (Polya, 1990). Similarly, most chess positions can be
developed in many different ways, but expert chess players rely on constraints which
prune away all but the handful of possibilities that turn out to be most promising.
The second challenge for a strong nativist view is that some of the constraints
that guide inferences about more fundamental cognitive domains also appear to be
learned (Goldstone & Johansen, 2003). One such constraint is the shape bias—the
expectation that all of the objects in a given category tend to have the same shape,
even if they differ along other dimensions, such as color and texture. Smith, Jones,
Landau, Gershkoff-Stowe, and Samuelson (2002) provide evidence that the shape bias
is learned by showing that laboratory training allows children to demonstrate this bias
at an age before it normally emerges. Other constraints that appear to be learned in-
clude constraints on the rhythmic pattern of a child’s native language (Jusczyk, 2003),
and constraints on the feature correlations that are worth tracking when learning
about artifacts or other objects (Madole & Cohen, 1995).
This thesis develops an approach that draws on ideas from both nativist and
empiricist approaches to development. Consistent with a nativist approach, I ac-
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knowledge that induction is impossible without constraints, and argue that human
inferences are often guided by domain-specific constraints. Consistent with an em-
piricist approach, I focus on learning and argue that domain-specific constraints can
be acquired by general-purpose learning mechanisms. Attempting to reconcile na-
tivism and empiricism is not especially novel, and many psychologists presumably
believe that their own theoretical orientation strikes the ideal balance between these
philosophical traditions. This thesis suggests, however, that the dialogue between
nativism and empiricism can be enriched by models that explain how constraints
might be learned. Suppose, for instance, that we want to decide whether a certain
kind of constraint is learned or innate. A good way to support an empiricist posi-
tion is to provide a formal model that can acquire this constraint. A good way to
support a nativist position is to develop the best possible strategy for acquiring the
constraint, then to show that even this strategy must fail. Both approaches rely on
formal models, and I attempt to show how these models can be developed.
The primary contribution of this thesis is a formal framework that helps to explain
the nature, use and acquisition of inductive constraints. I explore models that include
representations at multiple levels of abstraction, and where the representations at the
upper levels place constraints on the representations at the lower levels. Each model
is a hierarchical Bayesian model, and the probabilistic nature of these models allows
them to make statistical inferences at multiple levels of abstraction. In particular,
they show how knowledge can be acquired at levels quite remote from the data given
by experience—levels where the learning problem can be described as the problem of
learning inductive constraints.
Although I focus on the acquisition of inductive constraints, the larger goal of the
work described here is to develop a comprehensive theory of human learning. Learn-
ing can be broadly defined as the acquisition of knowledge (Simpson & Weiner, 1989),
and learning so defined includes topics like the acquisition of language and mathe-
matical knowledge, the development of folk biology, folk physics, and folk psychology,
and the development of scientific theories. As these topics suggest, the study of learn-
ing can help to explain the origin of human knowledge in all of its forms. Within
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psychology, however, “learning” is sometimes given a technical meaning that is much
narrower than its colloquial meaning. Kimble (1961) for instance, defines learning as
a “relatively permanent change in a behavioral potentiality that occurs as a result
of reinforced practice.” Contemporary psychologists may prefer definitions that are
less explicitly behaviorist, but the link between learning and behaviorism remains
strong. Introductory textbooks, for instance, often include a chapter on learning that
discusses classical and operant conditioning and little else.
A casual glance at an introductory textbook might suggest otherwise, but most
psychologists agree that knowledge acquisition involves much more than the tracking
of simple associations. Developmental psychology has been a particularly rich source
of alternative views. Piaget, for instance, has argued that children create rich and sys-
tematic mental structures to explain their experience (Piaget & Inhelder, 1969), and
other researchers have described learning mechanisms such as “bootstrapping” which
go well beyond stimulus-response learning (Carey, 2004). The study of language
has also led to alternative views of knowledge acquisition, and few contemporary
researchers would argue that language acquisition can be explained by simple asso-
ciative mechanisms. As these examples suggest, alternatives to associationism have
been developed, but these alternatives have not led to the creation of a modern theory
of learning. Traditional learning theory focused on the contributions of researchers
like Thorndike, Pavlov, Hull, Tolman and Skinner (Hilgard & Bower, 1975). Although
traditional learning theory has fallen out of favor, no modern equivalent has risen up
to replace it.
Some psychologists will argue that there are good reasons to abandon the pursuit
of a theory of learning. Traditional learning theory was based on the idea that
a handful of general principles could explain how much of human knowledge was
acquired. Perhaps, however, there can be no general theory of learning. If most forms
of human learning are guided by domain-specific constraints, perhaps psychologists
should aim for multiple theories of learning, one for each domain (Gallistel, 2000).
Even if different kinds of knowledge are acquired in very different ways, it will still
be useful to identify general themes which apply across many different settings. The
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(a) Traditional learning theory
1. Learning takes place at a single level of abstraction.
2. The representations learned are simple, and are often pairwise associations.
3. Animals are more prepared to learn some associations than others, but rich
systems of prior knowledge play little role.
4. Formal models focus on cases where many training examples are observed.
(b) Modern learning theory
1. Learning takes place at multiple levels of abstraction.
2. Representations with rich and systematic structure can be learned.
3. Learning is guided by sophisticated, domain-specific knowledge.
4. Learning can succeed given sparse and noisy data.
Table 1.2: For many psychologists, “learning theory” has come to refer to the study of
simple associative learning. Modern approaches to learning can differ from traditional
learning theory along the four dimensions shown here.
aim is not necessarily to develop a monolithic theory of learning, but to understand the
general principles that support learning in all of its forms. Four principles that seem
particularly important are collected in Table 1.2b. The first principle recognizes that
human knowledge is organized into multiple levels of abstraction, and that learning
can take place at all of these levels. There are different proposals about how knowledge
might be represented, but structured representations are useful for capturing rich
systems of knowledge, and the second principle suggests that these representations
can be learned. Some discussions of learning focus on what can be achieved with a
minimum of prior assumptions, but the third principle recognizes that learning often
relies on systems of domain-specific knowledge, some of which are listed in Table 1.1.
The third and fourth principles are closely related, since systems of prior knowledge
help to explain how humans can learn so much from sparse and noisy data.
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Each principle in Table 1.2b has been emphasized by previous researchers, includ-
ing some of the most prominent opponents of traditional learning theory. The third
and fourth principles, for instance, are compatible with the approach of researchers
like Chomsky who are usually regarded as nativists. The first and second principles
are closely related to the constructivist approach of Piaget, who is much more of an
empiricist than Chomsky, but is not usually regarded as a learning theorist (Hilgard
& Bower, 1975). By developing a framework that incorporates all four principles,
psychologists can lay the foundations of a modern theory of learning—a theory that
incorporates the insights of researchers like Chomsky and Piaget, and that goes well
beyond learning theory as it is traditionally conceived.
The hierarchical Bayesian framework I describe is consistent with all four princi-
ples in Table 1.2b, but this thesis will focus on the first principle. My primary goal
is to explain how inductive constraints might be acquired, and I begin in Chapter 2
by reviewing existing views of inductive constraints and describing the criteria that
a constraint-learning framework should satisfy. Chapter 3 introduces the hierarchical
Bayesian framework that I will adopt, and the following chapters apply this frame-
work to three inductive problems. Chapter 4 explores how constraints related to
feature-variability (e.g. the shape bias) are acquired and used to support categoriza-
tion. Chapter 5 considers the problem of causal learning, and introduces a model
that helps to explain how causal schemata are acquired and used. Causal schemata
can be viewed as systems of causal knowledge that place strong constraints on causal
reasoning. The final application of the hierarchical Bayesian framework considers
how learners might discover which kind of representation is best for a domain. Chap-
ter 6 presents a model that discovers the structural constraints that characterize a
given domain: for instance, the model discovers that anatomical features of biological
species are best explained by a taxonomic tree, political views are best explained by a
linear spectrum, and friendship relations are best captured by a set of discrete cliques.
Although I describe models that acquire some of the constraints listed in Table 1.1,
I do not claim that all or even most of these constraints are learned. There are
formal arguments, however, which suggest that all of these constraints are learnable
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in principle (Solomonoff, 1978; Chater & Vitanyi, 2007). Given enough data that
are consistent with a certain constraint, learners should be able to realize that this
constraint is the best explanation for the data they have encountered. The real
question for psychologists is whether the constraints in Table 1.1 can be learned
given the data typically available to human learners. This thesis provides a necessary
first step towards answering this question. Once we have a clear idea how constraints
can be learned in principle, we can explore how feasible it is for constraints to be
learned in practice.
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Chapter 2
Inductive constraints
Although most researchers agree that induction is impossible without constraints,
there are competing claims about the nature of these constraints. This chapter
presents a taxonomy of constraints, and argues that the constraints which can be
learned correspond to forms of abstract knowledge. I review several existing propos-
als about the acquisition of abstract knowledge, then argue for a hierarchical Bayesian
approach to this problem.
A taxonomy of constraints
Different researchers work with different ideas about what can count as an inductive
constraint. Nelson (1988) assumes that constraints are innate and domain-specific,
and can be distinguished from soft preferences or biases. This thesis takes a more
inclusive view, and suggests that there are many kinds of constraints. Unlike Nelson,
I will suggest that some constraints are learned, some constraints are domain-general,
and some constraints are soft. This section describes some of the dimensions along
which constraints can vary, and identifies the kinds of constraints that can be learned
by the framework I will introduce. Keil (1990), D. L. Medin et al. (1990) and R.
Gelman and Williams (1998) have made previous attempts to chart the space of
constraints, and the taxonomy I present draws on the perspectives of all of these
authors.
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Constraints
Epistemic
Abstract
knowledge constraints
Inductive
Figure 2-1: Epistemic constraints correspond to an abstract kind of knowledge. The
framework developed in this thesis helps to explain how these constraints can be
learned.
Epistemic versus non-epistemic
There is a fundamental distinction between constraints that correspond to an ab-
stract kind of knowledge and constraints that do not. I will refer to constraints of
the first type as “epistemic constraints” (Figure 2-1). Each of the principles of object
perception identified by E. Spelke (1994) is an epistemic constraint. For instance,
the principle of continuity makes a defeasible claim about the world—it states that
“a moving object traces exactly one connected path over space and time” (E. Spelke,
1994). The M-constraint (Sommers, 1963; Keil, 1979) is a second example of an
epistemic constraint, and corresponds to a claim about the possible relationships be-
tween sets of predicates and sets of arguments. As these examples suggest, epistemic
constraints might alternatively be defined as constraints that can be represented as
statements with truth values. Additional examples of epistemic constraints can be
found in Table 1.1.
Non-epistemic constraints include mechanistic constraints of various kinds. Mem-
ory limitations are familiar examples: Newport (1990), for instance, suggests that
some aspects of language acquisition are easier for children than adults because chil-
dren are less able to keep track of the many potentially confusing details that they
hear. Several authors argue similarly that early visual limitations (including poor
acuity) may make object recognition easier rather than harder for infants (Turkewitz
& Kenny, 1982; French, Mermillod, Quinn, Chauvin, & Mareschal, 2002). Note that
memory limitations and perceptual limitations will both shape inductive inferences,
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and will be responsible in part for the beliefs that a learner ends up acquiring. A
non-epistemic constraint will usually have epistemic consequences, but the constraint
itself must not correspond to a form of knowledge about the world.
Although there is an important difference between constraints like the Spelke
principles and constraints like working memory limitations, the distinction between
epistemic and non-epistemic constraints is not always perfectly clear. Constraints
on the architecture of neural networks (Elman et al., 1996) include some borderline
cases. Some of these constraints appear to be non-epistemic—for instance, the fact
that mammalian cortex has six layers rather than seven or eight does not appear to
correspond to any kind of knowledge about the world. Other architectural constraints
might capture knowledge about the world that has been internalized through evolu-
tion. For instance, the particular recurrent structure of an auditory network might be
viewed as implicit knowledge about the temporal properties of a certain kind of sig-
nal. As cases like these suggest, deciding whether a constraint is epistemic or not may
sometimes require elaborate scientific investigation, and tentative decisions about the
status of any given constraint may be overturned by future scientific discoveries.
Even if the boundary between epistemic and non-epistemic constraints turns out
to be fuzzy, there are important differences between these classes of constraints. Since
epistemic constraints can be associated with degrees of belief, it is natural to explore
how these constraints might be learned. After seeing data consistent with an epistemic
constraint, for instance, a learner might become more confident that the constraint
is generally applicable. The idea that non-epistemic constraints might be learned
usually makes less sense—for instance, it is not particularly useful to ask how a
memory limitation might be learned. A strong conjecture is that the class of epistemic
constraints is coextensive with the class of constraints that can be learned. It may turn
out, however, that the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic constraints
is close but not identical to the distinction between constraints that can and cannot
be learned.
Since this thesis explores how constraints might be learned, I will focus almost
exclusively on epistemic constraints. My goal is to characterize the computational
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benefits that epistemic constraints can bring, and the computational principles that
allow these constraints to be acquired. Although this section has suggested that epis-
temic constraints can be represented as statements with truth values, I do not claim
that these constraints are explicitly represented as propositions. Spelke’s principles
of object perception, for instance, can be represented as a set of propositions, and
these propositions may help to explain the visual abilities of an infant, but it does not
follow that these propositions are located somewhere within the infant’s mind. Even-
tually it will be important to consider how epistemic constraints are represented, and
to study the psychological mechanisms that operate over these representations. This
thesis, however, provides a computational investigation of the nature and acquisition
of epistemic constraints.
Domain-general versus domain-specific
Inductive constraints range from general expectations about a broad class of settings
to expectations about a relatively narrow context. Consider, for example, the expec-
tation that stimuli are often composed of modular units, and that the units which
appear in one configuration might appear again in the future. Knowledge this gen-
eral might apply across many domains—for instance, it might lead a learner to break
visual scenes into configurations of visual objects, and auditory scenes into config-
urations of auditory objects (Kubovy & Van Valkenburg, 2001). Within any given
domain, learners will often rely on more specific constraints. For instance, people
have expectations about the characteristic motions of animals and vehicles, and rely
on these expectations when interpreting the content of a visual scene.
This thesis describes a learning framework that will accommodate constraints
at many points along the spectrum from general to specific. The key idea is that
constraints can occupy different levels of abstraction: abstract constraints may apply
across many domains, but less abstract constraints may hold only within a single
domain. Even within a single domain, however, there may be general constraints
(e.g. constraints on the properties of all human languages) and less general constraints
(e.g. constraints on the morphology of a child’s native language). I will therefore focus
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more on the distinction between abstract and specific constraints than the distinction
between domain-general and domain-specific constraints.
Innate versus learned
As suggested in the previous chapter, inductive learning is impossible without con-
straints. It follows that any method for learning constraints must rely on meta-
constraints of some sort. It is natural to ask where these meta-constraints come
from, and we can develop models that explain how they are learned with the help of
meta-meta-constraints. We can continue to push the learning question up to higher
levels, but eventually we must assume that the constraints at some level of abstraction
are fixed from the start. I will refer to these constraints as background assumptions
to distinguish them from constraints that can be learned.
The ultimate goal of this approach is to develop models where each background
assumption corresponds to a form of innate knowledge. Constraint-learning models
will usually fail to reach this goal, but may be useful nonetheless. For instance, a
model that relies on a certain set of background assumptions can become a platform
for future efforts to explain how these assumptions are acquired given new background
assumptions that are simpler, more general, or both. Each of the models I present
should be viewed in this way, and I do not propose that the background assumptions
required by these models are innately provided.
Although it is clear that some inductive constraints must be innate, the nature of
these constraints is a matter for psychological investigation. One important question
is whether these constraints are domain-general or domain-specific (Chomsky, 1980;
Keil, 1981; Elman et al., 1996), and the framework I present does not commit to either
position. It is natural to aim for models that rely on background assumptions which
are as simple and as general as possible, but it may turn out, for instance, that any
adequate model of language learning will need to include background assumptions
that are language-specific.
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Soft versus hard
Some constraints are soft probabilistic expectations that might alternatively be called
biases or preferences, and others are hard constraints that categorically rule out cer-
tain hypotheses. The framework I describe will have room for both kinds of con-
straints. Since I take a probabilistic approach, it will be natural to specify constraints
that make some hypotheses more likely than others. A probabilistic approach, how-
ever, can also incorporate constraints that assign zero probability to some hypotheses.
Even though the world is complicated, simple constraints may still be useful as
long as they are soft. It is obviously not the case that all English words refer to
entire objects, but the whole object bias (Markman, 1989) may still be useful as long
as it can be overruled when necessary. Similarly, the M-constraint (Sommers, 1963;
Keil, 1979) captures a principle which appears to be useful in general, even though
there may be exceptions to this principle (Carey, 1985b). Soft versions of constraints
like these help to explain how human learning can be both highly constrained and
highly flexible. When few observations are available, a learner may make inferences
that are guided almost entirely by soft constraints. Once many observations are
available, these soft constraints can be overruled, and a learner can make inferences
that are guided primarily by the data she has observed. Both patterns of inference are
important: together, they produce a learner who can make strong inductive inferences
when data are sparse, but can learn almost anything given sufficient data.
Enabling versus limiting
There are two very different reasons to take an interest in inductive constraints. For
some researchers, the most pressing goal is to explain how human inferences are so
successful—to explain, for instance, how humans make inferences that go well beyond
the capacities of our best formal models. In many situations, the observations made
by a learner are consistent with a vast number of hypotheses, and the overwhelming
problem is to identify the hypotheses that are most likely to be correct. Inductive
constraints provide a critical part of the solution, since they narrow down the space
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of hypotheses. Researchers who adopt this perspective tend to take a positive view
of constraints, and argue that constraints deserve much of the credit for successful
learning (Keil, 1990; R. Gelman & Williams, 1998). Other researchers begin with the
problem of explaining why human inferences fall short of optimality in some settings.
These researchers adopt a more negative definition of constraints, and reserve this
term for factors (e.g. memory limitations) that rule out useful hypotheses and prevent
learners from reaching optimal decisions.
This thesis will focus on constraints that enable rather than impede learning.
My primary goal is to describe computational theories (Marr, 1982) that help to
explain how people solve challenging inductive problems. Enabling constraints play a
critical role in these theories, since they guide learners towards accurate conclusions
when the available data are sparse or noisy. Computational theories, however, will
never provide a complete account of cognition, and eventually it will be important to
specify the psychological mechanisms that might carry out the computations required
by these theories. Limiting constraints will become important at this stage, since we
will need to explain why people’s inferences sometimes fall short of the predictions
made by computational theories (Anderson, 1991). Here, however, I attempt only to
develop computational theories of human inference, and I leave detailed discussions
of limiting constraints for future work.
Other distinctions
Although I have identified several dimensions which are relevant to psychological dis-
cussions of constraints, constraints may vary along several other dimensions. Many
authors distinguish between constraints on the structure of mental representations,
and constraints on the processes that operate over these representations (D. L. Medin
et al., 1990). A related distinction is made by computer scientists when discussing the
inductive bias of a learning system. The representational bias of a system character-
izes the hypothesis space that will be explored by the learner, and the procedural bias
determines the order in which the hypotheses will be explored (desJardins & Gordon,
1995). Although the distinction between structural and processing constraints may
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be far from clean, I will focus on constraints that are probably best described as
structural constraints.
A comprehensive taxonomy of constraints is likely to include dimensions that I
have not discussed, and should also attempt to capture the relationships between
different dimensions. This section made some effort in this direction—for instance, I
suggested that any constraint that is learned is probably an epistemic constraint—but
other regularities are also apparent (Keil, 1990). If we consider the constraints that
are discussed most often in the psychological literature, enabling constraints tend
to be epistemic constraints, learned constraints are often domain-specific, and soft
constraints are often enabling constraints.
Developing a taxonomy of constraints is useful in part because researchers who
disagree about the value of constraints (Nelson, 1988; Keil, 1990; Behrend, 1990;
Dea´k, 2000) often seem to disagree about the meaning of this term. This thesis has
adopted a very broad definition, and I will continue to use “constraint” to refer to
any factor which bridges the inferential gap between a body of data and an inductive
conclusion. I hope, however, that researchers who disagree with this usage (Dea´k,
2000) will agree that the value of my theoretical claims does not rest on any particular
label used to describe them.
Constraints and abstract knowledge
Any taxonomy of constraints will include many dimensions, but the dimension most
useful for picking out the constraints I will discuss is the distinction between epistemic
and non-epistemic constraints. The framework I describe can model the acquisition
of many different constraints, but each of these constraints must correspond to a
kind of abstract knowledge. An alternative title for this thesis might have been
“the acquisition of abstract knowledge,” and my work is inspired in part by previous
attempts to describe the nature, acquisition and use of abstract knowledge.
Many kinds of abstract knowledge have been discussed by philosophers, psy-
chologists and computer scientists. Some of the most familiar examples are over-
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hypotheses (Goodman, 1955), theories (Carey, 1985a; Wellman & Gelman, 1992;
Kuhn, 1970), schemata (Kelley, 1972; D. E. Rumelhart, 1980), learning sets (Harlow,
1949), scripts (Schank & Abelson, 1977), and frames (Minsky, 1975). Each kind of
knowledge can be viewed as an abstract representation that places constraints on
representations at lower levels of abstraction. For instance, an overhypothesis sets
up a more concrete space of hypotheses, a learning set captures expectations that a
learner brings to a specific learning problem, and a theory captures general principles
that make predictions about specific phenomena that fall under the theory. There are
important differences between these varieties of abstract knowledge, but I will focus
on the similarities rather than the differences. For instance, each kind of abstract
knowledge suggests the need for inferential frameworks that include multiple levels of
abstraction.
Figure 2-2 shows several cognitive domains where knowledge can be organized into
several levels of abstraction. Language (Chomsky, 1957), vision (Han & Zhu, 2005)
and action (Cooper & Shallice, 2000) provide the most familiar examples (Figure 2-2).
We can hear a speech signal and recognize the phonemes and words that it contains.
We may know how a given sentence should be parsed, and we may know a grammar
which allows us to parse many different sentences. In the visual domain, we know
which objects are likely to appear in a street scene or an office scene, we know about
the parts of these objects, and we have some idea about the shapes and the relative
orientations of the surfaces that compose these parts. Our abilities to form plans and
carry them out can also be described at several levels—for instance, we know how to
make coffee, and how to open a packet of sugar.
Figures 2-2c, 2-2e and 2-2f show hierarchies that address three aspects of high-level
cognition. When grouping items into categories, we rely on knowledge about specific
categories (balls tend to be round) as well as general knowledge about patterns of
feature variability (all instances of a given object category tend to have the same
shape). Causal inferences can draw on knowledge about specific entities (Lariam pills
tend to cause headaches) as well as more abstract kinds of knowledge (medications
may cause headaches). Learning structured representations may also require infer-
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Figure 2-2: Systems of knowledge are often organized into several levels of abstrac-
tion. (a)(b)(d) Hierarchies are useful for understanding language, action and vision.
(c)(e)(f) The later chapters of this thesis describe hierarchical approaches to catego-
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ences at several levels of abstraction. The most general problem is to decide whether
the relationships between a set of entities are best captured by a tree, a ring, a set
of clusters, or some other kind of representation. If the entities, say, are believed to
belong to some latent tree structure, the next problem is to identify the specific tree
that best accounts for the available data.
The hierarchies in Figure 2-2 all rely on multiple levels of abstraction, but the
representations at adjacent levels are related to each other in many different ways.
Let Ri be a representation at level i in a hierarchy, where R1 is a representation at the
lowest level. In some cases, Ri is a Ri+1—for instance, a bouncy round object may
be a ball. Ri may also be part of Ri+1—for instance, an object part is a constituent
of an object. Although is a relationships and part of relationships are often used to
construct hierarchies, many other relationships are possible. For instance, a speech
signal is a realization of a string of phonemes, and a structural description can be
built from a grammar.
Since many kinds of relationships between levels are possible, the hierarchies I
consider include examples (e.g. Figure 2-2a) that go beyond simple class-inclusion
hierarchies (Collins & Quillian, 1969). A hierarchy can be defined as a system of
latent variables that captures expectations about the data observed at the bottom
of the hierarchy. In most cases, the levels in the hierarchy will not correspond to
simple summaries of the observable data. Instead, the levels are best viewed as
components of a system which explains the observable data. The role of these levels
is therefore similar to the role of the concepts in a scientific theory. As philosophers
have argued, scientific concepts are more than simple abstractions from experience.
Scientific concepts are components of theories, and it is entire theories that make
contact with experience (Hempel, 1972).
The notion of an abstraction hierarchy is the starting point for the formal frame-
work described in the next chapter. I formalize this notion using nested hypothesis
spaces: X is more abstract than Y if X sets up a hypothesis space that can be
used when learning Y . The framework I describe supports hierarchies with multi-
ple levels of abstraction, and the representations at the upper levels can be viewed
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as epistemic constraints. Since I take a probabilistic approach, Bayesian inference
can explain how the constraints at the upper levels are learned given observations
at the bottom level of the hierarchy. Even though I will focus on relatively simple
constraints, the hierarchical Bayesian approach can help to explain the acquisition
of many kinds of abstract knowledge, including representations that might be best
described as schemata or intuitive theories.
Conceptual approaches to constraint learning
The acquisition of abstract knowledge has been a central concern for epistemolo-
gists and developmental psychologists alike. This section introduces three views of
knowledge acquisition that have been popular in the psychological literature. One
prominent approach grows out of the work of the British empiricists (Locke, 1998;
Hume, 1748), who argued that even our most abstract ideas correspond to combi-
nations of perceptual primitives. Abstract knowledge is thought to emerge when
associative learning mechanisms combine these primitives to create new concepts.
Some kinds of abstract knowledge may correspond to higher-level associations, or
associations between associations (Colunga & Smith, 2003). As discussed in the next
section, connectionist models can be viewed as modern attempts to formalize asso-
ciative learning.
Piaget and his colleagues developed an alternative empiricist approach that em-
phasizes the construction of increasingly abstract cognitive structures (Piaget, 1970;
Piaget & Inhelder, 1969). This constructivist approach suggests that infants begin
with relatively simple perceptual and motor abilities, and move through a series of in-
creasingly complex stages. Each stage is characterized by the kinds of representations
that are available and the operations that can be carried out over these representa-
tions. These computational resources can be viewed as domain-general constraints:
for example, the concrete and formal operations are abstract structures that help
learners to address problems from many different domains. Two mechanisms are
thought to explain how children move from one stage to another: assimilation, or the
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integration of external elements into a structure, and accommodation, or the modi-
fication of a structure by the elements it assimilates. The interaction between these
mechanisms is believed to lead to the emergence of abstract knowledge.
A third view works with the idea that abstract knowledge is embedded in theories,
or rich systems that specify concepts and relationships between these concepts. This
theory-based approach is clearly relevant to the study of scientific knowledge, but
psychologists have proposed that much of our everyday knowledge is organized into
intuitive theories that are similar to scientific theories in important respects (Carey,
1985a; Murphy & Medin, 1985; Wellman & Gelman, 1992; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997).
From this perspective, the problem of understanding how abstract knowledge is ac-
quired turns into the problem of characterizing the process of theory formation. Un-
like associationism and constructivism, the theory-based approach need not explain
how theories are built from raw perceptual primitives: many supporters of this ap-
proach suggest that infants begin with innate theories of several core domains, and
that learning is a matter of moving from one theory to another (Gopnik, 1996; Well-
man & Gelman, 1998). High-level descriptions of theory change are sometimes pro-
vided (Popper, 1935/1980; Kuhn, 1970)—to mention one typical example, Gopnik
(1996) suggests that theory formation is a matter of accumulating counterevidence
to an existing theory, proposing an alternative theory, then searching for evidence for
this new theory. Accounts like this are convincing as far as they go, but understanding
theory change in detail remains a major challenge.
This section has described three influential approaches to the acquisition of ab-
stract knowledge, and these approaches have inspired many of the ideas in this thesis.
Although I draw on previous work from the philosophical and psychological litera-
ture, I take on the challenge of developing computational theories that go beyond
verbal descriptions of the emergence of abstract knowledge. The next section de-
scribes some of the issues that arise when attempting to model the acquisition of
abstract knowledge.
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Figure 2-3: (a) Cognitive models typically make inferences at two levels. Given data
(e.g. contingency data or a set of features), these models learn a latent representation
R2 (e.g. a causal model or a set of network weights) and use this representation to
make inferences about any missing entries in the data (R1). These models always
rely on background assumptions which must be fixed in advance. (b) A constraint-
learning model makes inferences at three or more levels. The model shown here
relies on background assumptions which are fixed, but can learn inductive constraints
(R3), discover a latent representation (R2), and fill in missing data (R1). The models
developed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 are all instances of this schema.
Formal models of constraint learning
Many cognitive models can be seen as instances of the two-level schema shown in
Figure 2-3a. The schema indicates that observable data R1 are consistent with some
underlying structure R2, and that the representations at both levels depend on a set
of background assumptions. These assumptions might equally well be described as
inductive constraints, and include assumptions about the class of possible structures,
the class of possible data sets, and the relationship between structure R2 and the data
observed at level 1. The background assumptions are fixed in advance and grayed
out in Figure 2-3a, but the schema supports inferences at level 1 and level 2.
Some concrete examples may help to explain the schema in Figure 2-3a. Models of
causal learning often work with contingency data (R1), and discover a causal network
(R2) that accounts well for the patterns in the data. All of these causal models rely
on background assumptions of some sort: for instance, Bayesian approaches use a
prior distribution on causal networks, and make some assumptions about how data
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are generated from these networks. All of these models support inferences at two
levels: they learn a causal network R2, and can use this network to make inferences
about any missing entries in the data set R1.
To give a second example, connectionist models often take a collection of features
as input (R1), and learn a set of weights (R2) that accounts well for the data. These
models rely on background assumptions which may include assumptions about the
architecture of the network, the initial state of the network and the parameters that
specify the learning rule (Elman et al., 1996). Since the learned network weights (R2)
support predictions about unobserved features (R1), again the model makes inferences
at two distinct levels.
To give a third and final example, models for multidimensional scaling (MDS) be-
gin with a similarity matrix (R1), and discover a low-dimensional representation (R2)
that accounts well for the data. Again, these models rely on background assumptions
which may or may not be explicitly stated: for instance, MDS models assume in
advance that a spatial representation is appropriate for the data. In principle, MDS
models make inferences at two levels: they discover a representation R2, and can use
this representation to make predictions about any pairwise similarity ratings that are
missing from the data set R1.
From one perspective, any conventional model of learning (Figure 2-3a) acquires
inductive constraints, since it learns a representation R2 which shapes inductive in-
ferences about the unobserved entries in data set R1. The conventional approach,
however, does not provide a general framework for explaining how constraints might
be learned. Many constraints of interest correspond to assumptions about repre-
sentation R2, and the background assumptions in Figure 2-3a will always include
constraints of this sort. To explore how these constraints might be learned, we need
models with at least three levels of abstraction, and the simplest models that satisfy
this criterion are instances of the schema in Figure 2-3b. This schema indicates that
data are generated from some underlying structure, that this structure conforms to a
set of constraints (R3), and that the representations at all levels are consistent with
a set of background assumptions. The background assumptions are fixed in advance
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and grayed out in Figure 2-3b, but the schema supports inferences at levels 1, 2 and
3.
Given any two-level model (Figure 2-3a), we can move to a three-level model by
carving out some of the background assumptions about structure R2 and introducing
them as a level in their own right. Some additional assumptions will need to be added
as we move from two to three levels—in particular, we will need to add background
assumptions that capture expectations about the representation at level 3. The aim,
however, is to achieve a net reduction in background assumptions whenever we add
a level. There is no reason to stop at just three levels, and we can continue to add
levels, again aiming to shrink the set of background assumptions at each stage.
The schema in Figure 2-3b does not explain how all of the constraints that guide
inferences about R2 and R1 might be learned. As in Figure 2-3a, the background
assumptions might equally well be described as inductive constraints, but I have
chosen a different label to distinguish the constraints that are learned (R3) from
the constraints that are not (the background assumptions). Any model of learning
will rely on some set of background assumptions, and the schema in Figure 2-3b
is no exception. This schema, however, can help to explain the acquisition of many
constraints discussed by psychologists, including many of the constraints in Table 1.1.
Whether a given model matches the schema in Figure 2-3b will depend on what
it learns and what it takes as input. Consider, for example, two methods for learning
probabilistic context-free grammars. The first is a supervised model and takes a set of
parse trees as input. The second is an unsupervised model: it takes a set of sentences
(R1) as input, and must discover parse trees for each sentence (R2) and a grammar
(R3) that accounts well for these (unobserved) parse trees. Even though the two
models may discover identical grammars, only the unsupervised model qualifies as a
constraint-learning model. The unsupervised model deserves this description since
the grammar it learns captures constraints which help to solve the inductive problem
of parsing. As required by Figure 2-3b, it makes inferences at three levels: it learns
a grammar and a set of parse trees, and if any of the sentences contain words that
are garbled or unobserved, it can predict what those missing words might be. The
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supervised model does not address the parsing problem, and makes inferences at only
two levels of abstraction: it discovers a grammar, and can use this grammar to fill in
parts of the parse trees that might have been unobserved.
Researchers from several disciplines have developed formal models that help to
explain the acquisition of abstract knowledge. Some, but not all of these models
match the three-level schema shown in Figure 2-3b. These models can be organized
into four broad classes: connectionist approaches, AI approaches, machine learning
approaches, and statistical approaches. Note, however, that these classes overlap,
and that some models are valid representatives of two or more classes.
Connectionist approaches
Connectionist models represent a modern attempt to implement some of the ideas
behind associationism, and some of these models appear to acquire knowledge at
multiple levels of abstraction. A particularly clear example is provided by Colunga
and Smith (2005), who show that a recurrent network can acquire a shape bias for
object categories and a material bias for substance categories. In other words, the
network learns about the features of specific categories (balls tend to be round) and
about the features of categories in general (all instances of a given object category
tend to have the same shape). Constraints on word-learning have also been explored:
for example, Regier (2003) reviews work suggesting that something like the principle
of mutual exclusivity can emerge from associative learning. Finally, I suggested earlier
that the abstract knowledge which guides induction can sometimes be described as an
intuitive theory, and Rogers and McClelland (2004) argue that connectionist models
provide a mechanistic account of many inductive phenomena that are commonly
thought to rely on intuitive theories.
There is at least one kind of connectionist model that matches the three-level
schema in Figure 2-3b. Cascade-correlation models grow in complexity as more data
are encountered: in other words, they learn both the architecture of a network (R3)
and the weights for this network (R2) (Fahlman & Lebiere, 1990; Mareschal & Shultz,
1996). Cascade-correlation models seem particularly appropriate for modeling cogni-
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tive development, and psychological applications of these models are often inspired
by Piaget’s constructivist approach to development (Shultz, 2003). Most connection-
ist models, however, learn at only two levels—a level which includes the data and a
level which specifies the weights of the network. These models match the schema in
Figure 2-3a, and raise the question whether models that make inferences at three or
more levels are necessary to account for the acquisition of abstract knowledge. I take
up this question towards the end of this chapter.
AI approaches
Logic provides a powerful tool for representing inductive constraints, and the artifi-
cial intelligence research community has long been interested in methods for learn-
ing logical representations. Some of these methods can be viewed as techniques for
learning the epistemic constraints that are the focus of this thesis. One class of
methods (Davies & Russell, 1987) aims to identify determinations, or abstract logical
statements that identify patterns of dependency between attributes. For example,
the statement that “people in a given country usually speak the same language” is
a constraint that supports confident generalizations from very sparse data. A visitor
to Brazil, for example, can conclude that Brazilians speak Portugese after meeting a
single Portugese-speaking local (Russell & Norvig, 2002).
Another approach is known as Explanation-Based Learning, or EBL (Mitchell,
Keller, & Kedar-Cabelli, 1986; DeJong & Mooney, 1986). Given a single observation
of a novel concept, EBL systems attempt to identify a schema (or a set of general
rules) that include the individual observation as a special case. Suppose, for example,
that an EBL system is given a single example of a kidnapping narrative—a story
about Mary, who was kidnapped by Bill when she was out running one evening, and
released only when Mary’s father gave three hundred thousand dollars to Bill (DeJong
& Mooney, 1986). An EBL system will attempt to identify general rules that are
true of all kidnapping narratives. For instance, a kidnapping narrative is one where
a person x captures another person y, and x releases y only when associates of y
pay x money. Note that this schema abstracts away from the idiosyncratic details
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of the story provided—kidnapping victims are not always captured while running,
and the ransom can vary from case to case. EBL approaches usually work with a
domain theory, or a collection of background knowledge that is usually expressed as a
collection of logical statements. Although conventional EBL approaches are only able
to learn schemata that are deductive consequences of the background theory, some
systems attempt to combine EBL with inductive learning.
A third approach is known as inductive logic programming, or ILP (Muggleton &
De Raedt, 1994; Quinlan, 1990). Given a set of observations, ILP systems attempt
to find the simplest logical theory that accounts for the data. For instance, given
information about the kinship relations between a large set of people (Andrew is
Alice’s father, Chris is Andrew’s brother, Chris is Alice’s uncle, etc.), an ILP system
attempts to discover logical rules that allow the observations to be concisely expressed
(the brother of one’s father is one’s uncle).
Although methods for learning functional dependencies can learn at three levels
of abstraction, most formulations of EBL and ILP learn only at two levels: the level
of the data, and a level which includes a logical representation of the data. All of
these approaches acquire abstract knowledge, which again raises the question whether
multiple levels (Figure 2-3b) are needed to account for the inferences I wish to explain.
Machine learning approaches
The overlap between the machine learning community and the AI community is sub-
stantial, but these two communities have produced literatures on constraint learning
that are somewhat distinct. Much of the relevant machine learning research is found
in the literature on transfer learning (also known as “lifelong learning,” “multitask
learning,” or “learning to learn”). The idea behind transfer learning is that an agent
who has faced several inductive problems should be able to extract regularities (or in-
ductive constraints) that will help it deal with the next problem it encounters (Thrun
& Pratt, 1998). Transfer learning has been approached from several angles: Ando and
Zhang (2005) and Baxter (1997) provide theoretical analyses of the problem, and there
are many heuristic approaches which have not been given a principled justification,
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but which yield good empirical performance on selected real-world problems (Caru-
ana, 1997).
The problem of learning inductive constraints is also discussed within the small
but growing literature on developmental robotics. The goal of this work is to design
robotic agents that begin with low-level motor and sensory data, and bootstrap their
way to higher-level ontologies that include knowledge about objects, actions, and the
structure of physical space (Kuipers, Beeson, Modayil, & Provost, 2006). Ontological
knowledge of this sort provides strong inductive constraints that can help an agent to
solve specific inductive problems—for instance, knowing that objects persist in time
should help an agent to understand that some specific object of interest still exists
even if it is currently occluded.
Statistical approaches
Bayesian statistics provides a principled framework for understanding inductive in-
ference, and the next chapter shows in some detail how probabilistic models can be
defined over hierarchies that include representations at multiple levels of abstraction.
The resulting models are known as hierarchical Bayesian models (A. Gelman, Car-
lin, Stern, & Rubin, 2003; Tenenbaum, Griffiths, & Kemp, 2006), and these models
support statistical inferences about the representations at all levels of abstraction. In
particular, they show how the abstract knowledge at the upper levels of a hierarchy
can be acquired given observations only at the lowest level.
My approach to constraint learning
As the previous sections suggest, there are several formal approaches to the problem
of learning inductive constraints. I will adopt the hierarchical Bayesian approach,
and this choice can be justified on several grounds.
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Why Bayes?
As Marr (1982), Anderson (1990) and others have emphasized, cognition can be stud-
ied at several levels. Some researchers focus on neural mechanisms, others focus on
cognitive processes, and others attempt to understand the computational principles
that support our cognitive abilities. Ultimately it will be important to understand
cognition at all of these levels, but often it is useful to start at the level of computa-
tional theory. Until we clearly understand the nature of a given cognitive problem,
it is difficult to make useful proposals about the psychological or neural mechanisms
that might contribute to its solution.
Since there are few computational theories of constraint learning in the psycho-
logical literature, our first task is to identify the computational principles that allow
constraints to be learned. Computational theories of cognition do not always rely
on Bayesian methods (Marr, 1982), but computational theories of learning often do.
Bayesian statistics provides a normative account of inference under uncertainty, and
is useful for exploring the principles that allow a learning system to succeed given
sparse and noisy data. Bayesian approaches have previously been used to model
many cognitive abilities, including stimulus generalization (Shepard, 1987), catego-
rization (Anderson, 1990), reasoning (Oaksford & Chater, 1994), causal learning (Gly-
mour, 2001), property induction (Heit, 1998), and word learning (Xu & Tenenbaum,
2007). The models in this thesis are motivated by some of the same goals as these
previous approaches, and share many of their strengths and limitations.
The Bayesian approach offers several advantages over the connectionist approach,
which is the main alternative available in the psychological literature. We have al-
ready seen that models with multiple levels of abstraction are useful for explaining
how constraints are acquired and used (Figure 2-3b). As discussed in the next chap-
ter, Bayesian models naturally handle multiple levels of abstraction. Connectionist
networks do not clearly distinguish between knowledge at different levels of abstrac-
tion, and it is difficult to analyze a successful network and decide which constraints
are responsible for its success, and how they might have been acquired. The connec-
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tionist approach has been useful for developing models of psychological processing,
but is not ideal for developing computational theories of constraint learning.
A second advantage of the Bayesian approach is that it naturally handles struc-
tured representations. Many inductive constraints are thought to emerge from in-
tuitive theories (Keil, 1991), and these theories are perhaps best captured using
structured representations. Other inductive constraints are explicitly formulated as
constraints on structured representations: for example, the M-constraint states that
ontological knowledge is better described by a tree structure than by a set of arbi-
trarily overlapping clusters (Keil, 1979), and Universal Grammar may specify many
constraints that set up a hypothesis space of possible grammars. Some researchers
have explored “structured connectionist models” (Smolensky, 1990; Regier, 1996),
but the connectionist approach has struggled in general to account for inferences that
appear to rely on structured representations.
A third strength of the Bayesian approach is the clarity it brings to the debate
between nativism and empiricism. Bayesian methods make two key contributions to
this debate. First, they provide an upper bound on the abilities of a human learner:
if a Bayesian learner cannot acquire a certain kind of knowledge from a given initial
state, then a human learner must also fail to learn in this situation. Second, the
Bayesian approach requires a modeler to clearly specify the background knowledge
that supports inductive learning. Typically this knowledge is captured by a prior
distribution, and a set of assumptions about how observable data are generated.
A final advantage of the Bayesian approach is its ability to handle noise and
exceptions, and to account for the graded generalizations that are characteristic of
human inferences. Connectionist models share this advantage, but some of the logical
models developed within the AI community have found it difficult to tolerate noise
and exceptions. Models that combine logic and probability are an important excep-
tion (Milch et al., 2005; Kok & Domingos, 2005), but models of this sort tend to be
compatible with the Bayesian approach advocated here.
The greatest limitation of the Bayesian approach is that at best it will provide an
incomplete account of human learning. Understanding the computational principles
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that guide human learning is a good start, but understanding how these principles
are implemented by the mind and the brain will also be important. Successful com-
putational theories can guide investigations of psychological and neural mechanisms,
but understanding these mechanisms in detail will require insights that a Bayesian
analysis is unable to provide.
Why hierarchical Bayes?
Most Bayesian models in the psychological literature match the schema in Figure 2-
3a, and make inferences at only two levels of abstraction. These models are useful
for many purposes—for instance, they help to explain how inductive inferences are
guided by prior knowledge, which can also be described as a collection of epistemic
constraints. My aim, however, is to describe models that simultaneously explain how
inductive inferences rely on constraints and how these constraints might be acquired.
At a minimum, we will need models that match the schema in Figure 2-3b and
distinguish between three levels of abstraction. The next chapter describes how the
hierarchical aspect of the hierarchical Bayesian approach allows us to capture as many
levels as we need for a particular problem.
As mentioned already, some computational methods for acquiring abstract knowl-
edge do not explicitly distinguish between multiple levels of abstraction. Connec-
tionist approaches view abstract knowledge as an emergent property of a learning
system: in other words, abstract knowledge is somehow implicit in the connection
weights learned by the system. Although connectionist networks can capture some
aspects of knowledge acquisition, there are several reasons for working with explicit
hierarchies like the examples in Figure 2-2.
Hierarchies are valuable in part because they provide a clean way to transfer
knowledge from one context to another. As a computer scientist might say, abstrac-
tion is valuable because it promotes reuse. Consider, for instance, the problem of
learning about the causal powers of a collection of medications (Figure 2-2e). One
option is to learn a causal model for each medication separately, but this approach
does not capture the intuition that learning about 10 medications should shape our
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expectations about medication number 11. An alternative approach might learn a
single causal model that describes medications in general, but this approach can-
not acquire specific information about individual medications (e.g. that medication
number 3 is particularly likely to cause headaches). Instead of treating all the med-
ications separately or collapsing them into one big category, we can allow two levels
of abstraction—one for medications in general and one for individual medications—
and carry out inferences at both of these levels (Figure 2-2e). Similar approaches
are useful when learning about many categories (Figure 2-2c), or learning about the
appearance and behavior of many physical objects. In general, hierarchies provide
an appealing solution to the problem of sharing information between related contexts
while maintaining the potentially important distinctions between these contexts.
Connectionist networks have traditionally struggled with the problem of learning
about contexts that are related but distinct. Networks which attempt to handle
several contexts are often subject to catastrophic interference (McCloskey & Cohen,
1989), which occurs when information about a new context interferes with knowledge
that has previously been acquired. When a network is applied to a single context, a
modeler may notice emergent network properties that appear to correspond to forms
of abstract knowledge (Rogers & McClelland, 2004). Unless the network can transfer
these emergent properties to new contexts, however, it is not clear that any abstract
knowledge has actually been acquired.
There are at least two additional reasons to pursue a hierarchical approach. Hi-
erarchies are desirable in some cases because they lead to the simplest explanation
of some phenomenon of interest. Suppose, for instance, that we want to understand
how people decide whether a string of phonemes qualifies as a valid English utter-
ance. It is possible in principle to develop a non-hierarchical model (Figure 2-3a)
that directly characterizes all grammatical strings of phonemes. Chomsky (1975),
however, argues that this project amounts to an “immense and unmanageable” task.
A better approach is to introduce levels for morphemes, words, and phrases, and to
characterize the grammaticality of a phoneme string in terms of all of these levels.
Even if current technology provides no way to directly probe the psychological reality
of the representations at the more abstract levels, linguists can argue for the existence
of these representations by showing how they contribute to the linguistic theory that
is simplest overall. Similar considerations apply in non-linguistic settings, including
the cases shown in Figure 2-2.
Considerations of theoretical simplicity can provide indirect support for a hierar-
chical approach, but direct evidence for multiple levels of abstraction is available in
some settings. Suppose that a learner is exposed to contingency data that provide
evidence about the effects of several different medications (Figure 2-2e). A successful
learner may make statements that reflect representations at all three of the levels in
Figure 2-2e. For instance, the learner may say that “Jane had a headache on June
14” (bottom level), that “Lariam causes headaches” (middle level), and that “medi-
cations cause headaches” (top level). The ability to learn from statements like these
provides further evidence for the existence of multiple levels of abstraction. For in-
stance, a learner who is told that “Lariam causes headaches” is likely to learn about
the causal powers of Lariam much quicker than a learner who is given contingency
data alone. As these examples suggest, verbal reports can provide strong evidence for
the existence of multiple levels of abstraction, and informal analyses can be followed
up by experimental manipulations that explore how inferences change when abstract
knowledge is directly provided.
This section provided several reasons to develop models with multiple levels of
abstraction, but two-level models (Figure 2-3a) may satisfy all of our requirements as
long as the representation at level 2 can distinguish between different sublevels. For
instance, methods for learning logical theories (e.g. ILP) can learn a single represen-
tation that includes both general statements (e.g. ∀x∀y Spouse(x, y) ← Spouse(y, x))
and specific facts (e.g. Spouse(Sally, Andrew)). For our purposes, it will not be crit-
ical to decide whether these general statements should occupy a sublevel within level
2, or should belong to a distinct level in their own right. As long as we agree that
representations at multiple levels of abstraction are needed, there is room for debate
about how best to organize these representations into levels and sublevels.
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My contribution
Previous work in psychology and philosophy raises a fundamental question: how can
inductive constraints be acquired? Previous work in machine learning and statistics
has led to a theoretical approach—the hierarchical Bayesian approach—that explains
how knowledge can be acquired at multiple levels of abstraction. This thesis brings
these two literatures together and argues that the hierarchical Bayesian approach
helps to explain how people learn inductive constraints.
To support this argument, the later chapters of this thesis describe computational
theories that address three aspects of high-level cognition: categorization, causal rea-
soning, and knowledge representation. Computational theories of cognition derive
support in several ways. Like all theories, they should be judged according to their
coherence, elegance, and explanatory power. Like other psychological theories, they
can be evaluated according to their ability to account for behavioral data. Finally,
computational approaches derive support from demonstrations that they can be im-
plemented by psychologically plausible mechanisms. I will focus on the first two
criteria and will leave the third for future investigation.
Statistics and machine learning provide a sound theoretical foundation for models
of human learning, but psychologists can repay the debt by suggesting new problems
for these fields to explore. Although I focus on the psychological implications of
the models I describe, each model may also find applications to machine learning
problems. The first model is a modest extension of a familiar statistical model (the
Dirichlet-multinomial model), but the remaining two models represent more of a
departure from existing statistical models. Understanding human learning is a worthy
goal in its own right, but progress towards this goal should also lead to machine
learning systems that are better able to match the sophistication of human learning.
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Chapter 3
Hierarchical Bayesian models
The previous chapter suggested several criteria that a constraint-learning framework
should satisfy. It must allow representations at multiple levels of abstraction, and
support inferences at all of these levels. It must allow adjacent levels to depend
on each other in many different ways. Finally, it must be able to tolerate sparse
and noisy data. We satisfy all of these criteria by taking a hierarchical Bayesian
approach (Lindley & Smith, 1972; Good, 1980; A. Gelman et al., 2003).
To convert any of the examples in Figure 2-2 into a fully specified model, the
first step is to formalize a set of hypothesis spaces, one for each level of abstraction.
Let Hi be the hypothesis space at level i, and let Ri refer to one of the elements
in this hypothesis space (Figure 3-1a). In Figure 2-2a, for example, the hypothesis
space at level 2 (H2) includes all possible strings of phonemes, and R2 refers to one
particular string of phonemes. Background assumptions are needed to set up the
hypothesis spaces at each level, but are not shown in Figure 3-1. I will adopt the
same convention in all remaining figures: background assumptions are always present
but never shown.
After specifying hypothesis spaces at each level of abstraction, a hierarchical
Bayesian model can be defined by placing a prior distribution P (Rn) on the space
at the top level, and by specifying distributions P (Ri−1|Ri) which indicate how the
representation at each level generates the representation at the next level down. By
specifying different distributions P (Ri−1|Ri) we can capture many kinds of relation-
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Figure 3-1: (a) A hierarchical model with representations Ri at multiple levels of
abstraction. (b) Hierarchical Bayesian models can allow many patterns of dependence
between levels.
ships between adjacent levels, including is a relationships, part of relationships and
many other possibilities. When combined, these distributions define a joint distribu-
tion over the set of representations at all levels:
P (R1, R2, . . . , Rn) = P (R1|R2)P (R2|R3) . . . P (Rn−1|Rn)P (Rn). (3.1)
All of the distributions in Equation 3.1 depend on a set B of background assump-
tions about the hypothesis space at each level and the process by which each level is
generated from the level immediately above. We can make these assumptions explicit
by rewriting Equation 3.1 as
P (R1, R2, . . . , Rn|B) = P (R1|R2, B)P (R2|R3, B) . . . P (Rn−1|Rn, B)P (Rn|B),
but we will keep our notation simple and again adopt the convention that background
assumptions are always present but never shown.
The joint distribution in Equation 3.1 contains enough information to model in-
ferences about any set of levels given observations at any other set of levels. If we
are working with a five level model, for instance, and representations at three of the
levels are known (R1, R3 and R5) then the joint distribution induces a conditional
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distribution P (R2, R4|R1, R3, R5) that can capture inferences about the remaining
two levels in the model.
Hierarchical Bayesian models can include any number of levels, but three levels
are enough to demonstrate the main message of this thesis. We will focus on models
that match the three-level schema shown in Figure 2-3b, and Figures 2-2c, 2-2e and
2-2f show the three instances of this schema that we will consider in detail. Each
model assumes that the relationships between levels form a linear structure, and
Equation 3.1 also makes this assumption. Technically speaking, we have assumed
that each representation Ri−1 is conditionally independent of the representations at
all higher levels given the representation Ri at the next level up. This assumption,
however, can easily be relaxed, and hierarchical Bayesian models can capture many
patterns of dependence between levels, including the case shown in Figure 3-1b. The
joint distribution for this model is
P (R1, R2, R3, R4, R5) = P (R1|R2, R3)P (R2|R3, R4)P (R3|R4, R5)P (R4|R5)P (R5)
and again we can use this distribution to capture inferences about any level in the
model. Many other patterns of dependence are possible, and a hierarchical Bayesian
model can be defined over any acyclic graph.
Inferences supported by hierarchical models
Hierarchical Bayesian models can be used for many purposes. Although Equation 3.1
supports many kinds of inferences, these inferences can be divided into three broad
classes: top-down inferences, bottom-up inferences, and inferences at multiple levels
of abstraction.
Top-down inferences
If the representations at some of the higher levels are fixed, a hierarchical model can
make top-down predictions about the representations at the lower levels. In Figure 2-
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2a, for instance, suppose that a phrase structure grammar is known (R4) and we want
to identify the structural description and sentence (R3) that best account for a string
of phonemes (R2). The posterior distribution P (R3|R4, R2) can be used to model
a top-down inference where observed data (R2) are combined with prior knowledge
(R4) to make predictions about the representation at level 2.
Previous psychological applications of the hierarchical Bayesian approach have
mostly focused on top-down inferences (Tenenbaum et al., 2006). Griffiths (2005)
discusses the case of causal reasoning in detail, and argues that hierarchical Bayesian
models can explain how people make top-down causal inferences given very sparse
data (Figure 2-2e). Similar kinds of top-down inferences can be made about all of
the cases in Figure 2-2.
Bottom-up inferences
If the representations at some of the lower levels are fixed, a hierarchical model can
make bottom-up inferences about the representations at the higher levels. In Figure 2-
2d, for instance, suppose that a collection of pixels is observed (R1) and we want to
identify the scene context (R5) that best explains these observations. The posterior
distribution P (R5|R1) captures our beliefs about the representation at level 5 after
observing data at the lowest level of the model.
Bottom-up inferences about the highest levels in a hierarchical model can help to
explain the acquisition of inductive constraints, and the remaining chapters of this
thesis will apply this idea to the examples in Figures 2-2c, 2-2e and 2-2f. In each
case, we will see how the representation at the top level can be learned given data at
the lowest level of the model.
Simultaneous inferences at multiple levels
Most of the examples so far have showed that inferences at a given level of abstraction
can be guided by information at higher or lower levels of abstraction. Often, however,
a learner will need to make simultaneous inferences about multiple levels of abstrac-
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tion, and information will need to flow back and forth between several levels. For
instance, when viewing a collection of pixels (R1) a learner may need to extract sur-
faces (R2) and object parts (R3), recognize objects (R4) and identify the scene context
(R5). The objects identified (R4) may constrain the surfaces that are extracted (R2)
and vice versa, which means that bottom-up approaches and top-down approaches
will not succeed. Instead, we need an interactive approach that allows representations
at several levels to jointly constrain each other. A hierarchical Bayesian model meets
this description, and the posterior distribution P (R2, R3, R4, R5|R1) can be used to
model interacting inferences about many of the levels in Figure 2-2d.
Several psychologists have argued that human inferences are characterized by in-
teractive processing over several levels of abstraction. The TRACE model of speech
perception includes levels that correspond to acoustic features, phonemes, and words,
and allows information to propagate from acoustic features up to words, and from
words down to the acoustic features (McClelland & Elman, 1986; McClelland, Mir-
man, & Holt, 2006). Interactive processing is also discussed by vision researchers,
who argue that the visual pathway includes feedback connections which allow infer-
ences at higher levels to influence early visual areas (Lee & Mumford, 2003; Ullman,
1995). Interactive approaches like these have their detractors (Fodor, 1978; Norris,
McQueen, & Cutler, 2000), but formal models of interactive processing can bring
clarity to both sides of this debate.
Different patterns of learning can emerge when a model learns simultaneously
about many levels of abstraction. Depending on the task and the data set, learning
may be faster at the lower levels than the upper levels, equally rapid at all levels, or
faster at the upper levels than the lower levels. The next chapter provides concrete
examples of all three cases. Cases where learning is fastest at the upper levels of a
model are especially interesting, and may help to explain how inductive constraints
are acquired relatively early in development.
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Choosing a hierarchy
Figure 2-2 shows hierarchies which capture several kinds of abstract knowledge, but
we have seen no general recipe for constructing these hierarchies. This thesis will
focus on problems where a hierarchy is specified in advance, and the main point of
interest is whether inferences over this hierarchy can capture the kinds of inferences
made by human learners. There are, however, informal principles that help modelers
decide which hierarchies to explore, and that may ultimately help to explain how
these hierarchies emerge over the course of cognitive development.
The previous chapter identified several reasons for working with explicit hierar-
chies like the examples in Figure 2-2. The same ideas provide criteria for choosing
between competing hierarchies, including hierarchies with different numbers of levels.
First, we should be sensitive to cases where learners transfer knowledge from one
context to another. Cases like this provide evidence for a level of abstraction that
captures the elements that are shared across the two contexts. Second, we should aim
for the simplest possible model that will account for the data: in other words, levels
should be added to a hierarchy whenever they increase the overall simplicity of a
model. I suggested, for instance, that the simplicity of a model that characterizes the
grammaticality of phoneme strings can be increased by adding levels corresponding
to morphemes, words and phrases. Finally, we should look for direct evidence of the
existence of certain levels. Successful learners, for instance, may make statements
which indicate that they have made inferences at several levels of abstraction.
Deciding which of several hierarchies to prefer is a special case of the problem of
choosing between scientific theories, and can be addressed in principle by standard
theories of confirmation. The Bayesian approach to confirmation is one candidate,
although philosophers continue to debate the strengths and weaknesses of this ap-
proach (Earman, 1992). The final chapter of this thesis discusses the steps needed to
develop a Bayesian framework that identifies the best hierarchy for a given problem.
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Other hierarchical approaches
As Figure 2-2 suggests, hierarchical approaches are prominent in the psychological lit-
erature (Greenwald, 1988), and have been used to explore language (Chomsky, 1957),
memory (Bartlett, 1932), vision (Fukushima, 1980; Marr, 1982), action (Cooper &
Shallice, 2000), categorization (Collins & Quillian, 1969), social behavior (Heider,
1958) and many other topics. Most of these hierarchical approaches are compatible
with a hierarchical Bayesian approach and can be modeled within the framework I
described. I illustrate by focusing on two well-known hierarchical approaches: Chom-
sky’s view of language acquisition, and previous work on multilevel neural networks.
Hierarchical approaches in linguistics
Chomsky (1975) suggests that the study of linguistics amounts to the abstract study
of “levels of representation,” and argues for an approach that distinguishes at least
six levels: phonemes, morphemes, words, syntactic categories, phrase structure, and
transformations. According to Chomsky, a set of linguistic levels should specify the
representations that can occur at each level, and the compatibility relationships that
connect representations at different levels. A grammar is a system of rules that allows
representations at each of these levels to be recovered given a phonetic spelling, or a
string of units at the lowest level. Some aspects of this approach differ from the hier-
archical Bayesian approach: for instance, I allow compatibility relationships between
levels to be probabilistic, but Chomsky describes these relationships as determinis-
tic rules. Despite some superficial differences, the hierarchical Bayesian framework
is consistent with Chomsky’s basic proposal that sentences have structured repre-
sentations at multiple levels of abstraction, and that different kinds of compatibility
relationships specify how the representations at different levels depend on each other.
A Bayesian approach to learning is mostly consistent with the view of learning
presented in Chomsky’s early work. According to Chomsky (1975), “linguistic theory
characterizes a system of levels, a class of potential grammars, and an evaluation pro-
cedure with the following property: given data from language L and several grammars
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with the properties required by linguistic theory, the procedure of evaluation selects
the highest-valued of these.” Given this evaluation procedure, a language learner can
“select the highest-valued grammar of the appropriate form compatible with available
data.” A hierarchical Bayesian account of learning matches this basic pattern. Given
a hierarchy of levels where a grammar Rn appears near the top and phonetic data R1
appear at the bottom, grammar learning can be captured by an “evaluation proce-
dure” that identifies the grammar that maximizes P (Rn|R1).
1 I have not described an
algorithm which implements this evaluation procedure, but the hierarchical Bayesian
approach can be evaluated without committing to a specific mechanism for searching
the space of grammars.
Although Chomsky’s view of learning appears closely related to my own, he often
describes this view using language that is inconsistent with the terminology I have
chosen. For instance, he argues that a child’s knowledge of language “goes far beyond
the presented primary linguistic data and is in no sense an ‘inductive generalization’
from these data” (Chomsky, 1965). I prefer to say that a child’s knowledge of language
goes far beyond the primary linguistic data and is therefore an inductive generalization
from these data—in other words, if linguistic data contained enough information to
fully specify a grammar, then grammar learning would be a deductive rather than
an inductive problem. Disagreements like these are of little consequence and indicate
only that certain phrases (e.g. “inductive generalization”) can be used in different
ways. Chomsky’s preferred usage helps to emphasize that language learning must
go well beyond enumerative induction or any of the bottom-up learning methods
that are traditionally linked with empiricist approaches. My preferred usage focuses
on the distinction between deduction and induction, and acknowledges that there is
much more to learning than the simple bottom-up methods dismissed by Chomsky
(Table 1.2).
As this brief excursion into linguistic theory suggests, the hierarchical Bayesian
1Chomsky describes a grammar as a body of knowledge that determines a system of levels. To
accurately capture this idea we need to allow the grammar Rn to directly influence the representation
at each of the lower levels, but a model like this is entirely consistent with the hierarchical Bayesian
approach (see Figure 3-1b).
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framework incorporates several ideas that have been part of cognitive science from the
very beginning. Hierarchical approaches have been explored for many years, and it
has long been clear that learning can be understood computationally as the problem
of searching for a representation that maximizes some measure of goodness. The
advantage of the hierarchical Bayesian approach is that it can handle soft probabilistic
relationships between representations at different levels, that it provides a principled
method for dealing with uncertainty, and that it helps to explain which “measure of
goodness” is relevant to a given learning problem. When learning representation R
from data D, the measure of goodness should always be P (R|D), or the posterior
probability of R given the data.
Multilevel neural networks
As presented here, the hierarchical Bayesian approach relies on three central ideas.
First, multiple levels of abstraction are needed to capture human knowledge. Second,
the representations at each level and the relationships between levels can be rich and
complex. Third, probabilistic inference helps to explain how the representations at
all levels are acquired and used. We have just seen that linguists have long argued
for the first two claims, but have tended to resist the third. Research on multilevel
neural networks has emphasized the first and third claims, but not the second.
Inspired in part by the structure of visual cortex, vision scientists have suggested
that pattern recognition can be achieved by a multilevel network where the repre-
sentations at the higher levels become increasingly invariant to changes in position
and other transformations (Fukushima, 1980). Several groups of researchers have de-
scribed probabilistic multilevel networks that are motivated by similar ideas (Lee &
Mumford, 2003; Hinton, Osindero, & Teh, 2006; D. George & Hawkins, 2005). There
are significant differences between the networks proposed by different researchers,
but all of them share two properties: the representations at each level are formalized
as feature vectors, and the relationships between feature vectors at adjacent levels
tend to be the same across the entire hierarchy. Models of this sort are compatible
with the hierarchical Bayesian approach described in this chapter, and may help to
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explain some aspects of cognition, including visual perception. Importantly, how-
ever, the hierarchical Bayesian approach can handle grammars, logical theories, and
other representations that are richer than feature vectors. The hierarchical Bayesian
approach also handles cases where adjacent levels are related to each other in very
different ways: for instance, a hierarchical language model should acknowledge that
the relationship between a string of phonemes and a sentence is qualitatively dif-
ferent from the relationship between a structural description and a phrase structure
grammar.
Each individual component of the framework I described has been extensively
explored in the psychological literature. There are models that rely on hierarchies,
models that incorporate richly structured representations, and models that explain
learning in terms of Bayesian inference. This section reviewed some well known ap-
proaches that combine two of these ideas. Few models, however, combine all three
ideas, and this thesis proposes that all three are needed to account for human cogni-
tion.
Belief formation or belief fixation?
By now it should be clear that hierarchical Bayesian models can make inductive
inferences at multiple levels of abstraction, but some readers will wonder whether
these models can really discover abstract knowledge. Terms like discovery and belief
formation are sometimes reserved for cases where a system comes up with a hypothesis
(e.g. a concept or a theory) that is qualitatively new (Reichenbach, 1938; Fodor, 1980).
Terms like justification or belief fixation are used for cases where a system chooses
between two or more pre-existing hypotheses. For instance, a system that starts out
with few preconceptions about language may form a new belief when it realizes that
English sentences are hierarchically structured. A system that starts out with two
possible grammars and identifies the candidate that best accounts for a corpus has
only adjusted the weights of two pre-existing beliefs.
At first sight, Bayesian models may seem like accounts of belief fixation rather
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than belief formation. Any Bayesian model begins with a hypothesis space, and
“learning” is a matter of identifying the element in this space that best accounts for
the data. Since a Bayesian learner can never step outside its hypothesis space, in one
sense it can only perform belief fixation, since it must begin with all the hypotheses
that it will ever need (Suppes, 1966).
Bayesian models, however, are best viewed as operating at a level of explanation
where the distinction between belief formation and belief fixation breaks down. From
a computational perspective (Marr, 1982), every learning system relies on a fixed
hypothesis space which represents the abstract potential of the system. If we imagine
all streams of input that the system could possibly receive, the hypothesis space
includes all states of knowledge which the system could possibly reach. Even systems
that appear to recruit new representational resources must implicitly rely on a fixed
hypothesis space. For instance, constructivist neural networks grow by adding new
units (Fahlman & Lebiere, 1990), but the fixed hypothesis space in this case includes
all configurations that can be reached by adding new units.
Since every learning system relies on a fixed hypothesis space, every system is
computationally equivalent to a method of belief fixation. The distinction between
belief formation and belief fixation must therefore distinguish different ways in which
a computational theory can be implemented. For instance, an implementation that
entertains only a few hypotheses at a time may be said to form a new belief every
time it generates a hypothesis that has never previously been entertained. An imple-
mentation that has access to the entire hypothesis space (for instance, that explicitly
considers all possible hypotheses whenever it needs to make a prediction) might be
better described as a model of belief fixation.
The primary goal of this thesis is to develop computational theories that explain
how constraints can be learned. Each of these theories can be implemented in many
ways: some implementations will seem like models of belief formation, and others will
seem like models of belief fixation. Once we commit to a specific implementation,
we can decide whether or not it succeeds as an account of belief formation. Here,
however, I focus almost entirely on the level of computational theory.
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Summary
This chapter introduced the hierarchical Bayesian approach and showed how prob-
abilistic models can be defined over hierarchies with multiple levels of abstraction.
These hierarchies can incorporate richly structured representations, and the repre-
sentations at different levels can be related to each other in many different ways.
Statistical inference over these hierarchies can be used to learn about the representa-
tions at any level of abstraction, and I showed how these models support top-down
inferences, bottom-up inferences, and simultaneous inferences about multiple levels
of abstraction.
The next three chapters of this thesis describe hierarchical Bayesian models that
address three aspects of high-level cognition: categorization (Figure 2-2c), causal rea-
soning (Figure 2-2e) and knowledge representation (Figure 2-2f). The representations
at the upper levels of each model can be viewed as inductive constraints, and we will
see how these constraints can be acquired given data at the bottom levels of these
models.
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Chapter 4
Learning about feature variability
Imagine that a child is visiting the zoo with her parents, and that her mother points
at something and utters the word “wombat.” The child might be excused for thinking
that the word refers to any object that is furry and brown, to the corner of the nearest
enclosure, or to the snout of the animal that is currently hiding in the corner of the
enclosure (Quine, 1960). There are an indefinite number of more exotic hypotheses—
for instance, the word could refer to burrowing marsupials when used on Tuesday and
to teapots when used on any other day of the week (Goodman, 1955). Although the
space of logically possible hypotheses is vast, a single labeled example is often enough
for young children to make accurate inferences about the meaning of a novel word.
Inferences like these must be supported by strong inductive constraints, and models
of constraint learning can help to explain how children become such proficient word
learners.
The problem of word learning is a natural target for a hierarchical approach since
it appears to involve inferences at two or more levels of abstraction. Children need
to learn about individual categories—for example, they need to discover that balls
tend to be round, and that teacups tend to have a handle. Children also need to
acquire more abstract knowledge about categories in general. One instance of more
The work in this chapter was carried out in collaboration with Amy Perfors and Joshua Tenen-
baum. The chapter is a revised version of Kemp, Perfors, and Tenenbaum (2007) and is reproduced
with permission.
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abstract knowledge is the shape bias, or the expectation that the members of any given
category will tend to have the same shape, even if they vary along other dimensions
such as color or size. The shape bias supports inferences from very sparse data: given
a single labeled example of a novel category, young children will extend the category
label to similarly-shaped objects ahead of objects that share the same texture or
color as the exemplar (Heibeck & Markman, 1987; Landau et al., 1988). This chapter
describes a hierarchical Bayesian model that acquires inductive constraints like the
shape bias.
Learning the shape bias is one instance of the more general problem of learning
about feature variability. The general problem can be introduced using an example
given by Goodman (1955). Suppose that S is a stack containing many bags of marbles.
We empty several bags and discover that some bags contain black marbles, others
contain white marbles, but that the marbles in each bag are uniform in color. We
now choose a new bag—bag n—and draw a single black marble from the bag. On its
own, a single draw would provide little information about the contents of the new bag,
but experience with previous bags may lead us to endorse the following hypothesis:
H: All marbles in bag n are black.
If asked to justify the hypothesis, we might invoke the following constraint:
C: Each bag in stack S contains marbles that are uniform in color.
Goodman refers to C as an overhypothesis, but C can also be described as an epistemic
constraint. C is a constraint since it limits the possible hypotheses about the marbles
in each bag: for instance, the marbles in bag n could be uniformly black or uniformly
white, but may not be mixed in color. Once this constraint has been acquired, a
learner can make confident predictions about bag n after seeing exactly one marble
sampled from this bag.
Although Goodman did not give a formal account of how overhypotheses might be
acquired, a simple hierarchical model helps to explain how constraints like C might
be learned. Consider a model with three levels (Figure 4-1a). Level 1 records ob-
servations that have been made by drawing marbles from one or more bags. Level
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Figure 4-1: (a) A categorization model that formalizes the intuition behind Figure 2-
2c. Each category is shown as a bag of colored marbles. Individual marbles represent
category exemplars, and θi is the color distribution for category i. α and β place
constraints on the {θi} variables: β is the color distribution across all categories, and
α represents the variability in color within each category. (b) A categorization model
with two ontological kinds meant to correspond loosely to objects and substances.
α1 represents knowledge about feature variability within the first ontological kind
(object categories are homogeneous in shape but not in material), and β1 captures
the characteristic features of the entities belonging to the first kind (objects tend to
be solid).
2 specifies information about the color distribution of each bag, and Level 3 speci-
fies information about bags in general. For instance, Level 3 may indicate that the
contents of each bag tend to be homogeneous in color.
A Dirichlet-multinomial model provides one way to formalize the hierarchical ap-
proach in Figure 4-1a (A. Gelman et al., 2003). Suppose we are working with a set
of k colors. Initially we set k = 2 and use black and white as the colors. Let yi
indicate our observations of the marbles that have been drawn from the ith bag in
the stack. If we have drawn 5 marbles from bag 7 and all but one are black, then
y7 = [4, 1]. Let θi indicate the true color distribution for bag i: if 60% of the marbles
in bag 7 are black, then θ7 = [0.6, 0.4]. Formally, we assume that yi is drawn from a
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Figure 4-2: The Dirichlet distribution serves as a prior on θ, the color distribution of
a bag of marbles. Assume that there are two possible colors—white and black—and
let θ1 be the proportion of black marbles within the bag. Shown here are distributions
on θ1 when the parameters of the Dirichlet distribution (α and β) are systematically
varied. When α is small, the marbles in each individual bag are near-uniform in color
(θ1 is close to 0 or close to 1), and β determines the relative proportions of bags
that are mostly black and bags that are mostly white. When α is large, the color
distribution for any individual bag is expected to be close to the color distribution
across the entire population of bags (θ1 is close to β1).
multinomial distribution with parameter θi: in other words, the marbles responsible
for the observations in yi are drawn independently at random from the ith bag, and
the color of each depends on the color distribution θi for that bag.
The representation at level 3 captures knowledge about the distribution of the
θi variables. We will assume that this knowledge can be captured using using two
parameters, α and β (Figure 4-1a). Roughly speaking, α captures the extent to which
the marbles in each individual bag are uniform in color, and β captures the color
distribution across the entire stack of bags. Formally, we assume that the vectors
θi are independently drawn from a Dirichlet distribution with scale parameter α
and mean β. Figure 4-2 shows how the distribution on θ changes as α and β are
systematically varied. When α is small, the marbles in each individual bag are near-
uniform in color, and β determines the relative proportions of bags that are mostly
white and bags that are mostly black. When α is large, the color distribution for any
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individual bag is expected to be close to β, the color distribution across the entire
population of bags.
To complete the model in Figure 4-1a, we need to formalize our a priori ex-
pectations about the values of α and β. We use a uniform distribution on β and
an exponential distribution on α, which captures a weak prior expectation that the
marbles in any bag will tend to be uniform in color. The mean of the exponential
distribution is λ, and the value of this variable is specified by one of the background
assumptions. All simulations described in this chapter use λ = 1. Using statistical
notation, the entire model can be written as
α ∼ Exponential(λ)
β ∼ Dirichlet(1)
θi ∼ Dirichlet(αβ)
yi |ni ∼ Multinomial(θi)
where ni is the number of observations for bag i.
So far, we have assumed that we are working with a single dimension—for Good-
man, marble color. Suppose, however, that some marbles are made from metal and
others are made from glass, and we are interested in material as well as color. A
simple way to deal with multiple dimensions is to assume that each dimension is
independently generated, and to introduce separate values of α and β for each di-
mension. When working with multiple features, we will often use α to refer to the
collection of α values along all dimensions, β for the set of all β vectors, and y for
the set of counts along all dimensions.
To fit the model to data we assume that counts y are observed for one or more
bags. Our goal is to compute the posterior distribution p(α,β, {θi}|y): in other
words, we wish to simultaneously discover level 3 knowledge about α and β and level
2 knowledge about the color distribution θi of each individual bag i. Figures 4-3b and
4-3c show posterior distributions on log(α), β and θi for two sets of counts. We can
approximate the distribution p(α,β|y) using numerical integration or a Markov chain
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Figure 4-3: Generalizations made by the model in Figure 4-1a. (a) Prior distributions
on log(α), β and θi indicate the model’s expectations before any data have been
observed. (b) Posterior distributions after observing 10 all-white bags and 10 all-
black bags. The model realizes that most bags are near-uniform in color (α is small),
and that about half of these bags are black (β1 is around 0.5). These posterior
distributions allow the model to predict that the proportion of black marbles in the
new, sparsely observed bag (θ new1 ) is very close to 1. (c) Posterior distributions after
observing 20 mixed bags inspired by the obesity condition of the Barratos task. The
model realizes that around 25% of marbles are black (β1 is around 0.25), and that
roughly 25% of the marbles in each individual bag are black (α is high). These
posterior distributions allow the model to predict that the new, sparsely observed
bag is likely to contain more white marbles than black marbles (θ new1 is not close to
1).
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Monte Carlo (MCMC) scheme. Inferences about the θi are computed by integrating
out α and β:
p(θi|y) =
∫
α,β
p(θi|α,β,y)p(α,β|y)dαdβ.
To compute some of the model predictions in this chapter we implemented a sampler
that uses Gaussian proposals on log(α), and proposals for β that are drawn from
a Dirichlet distribution with the current β as its mean. The results in Figure 4-6
represent averages across 30 Markov chains, each of which was run for 50,000 itera-
tions (1000 were discarded as burn-in). The model predictions in Figures 4-3, 4-5,
4-4 and 4-7 were computed using numerical integration. Note that both inference
schemes (MCMC and numerical integration) are merely convenient ways of comput-
ing the predictions of our computational theory. Any computational theory can be
implemented in many ways, and the particular implementations we have chosen are
not intended as models of cognitive processing.
Modeling inductive reasoning
Since Goodman, psychologists have confirmed that children (Macario, Shipley, &
Billman, 1990) and adults (Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson, & Kunda, 1983) have knowledge
about feature variability and use this knowledge to make inductive leaps given very
sparse data. This section provides an initial demonstration of our model using data
inspired by one of the tasks of Nisbett et al. (1983). As part of this task, participants
were asked to imagine that they were exploring an island in the Southeastern Pacific,
that they had encountered a single member of the Barratos tribe, and that this
tribesman was brown and obese. Based on this single example, participants concluded
that most Barratos were brown, but gave a much lower estimate of the proportion of
obese Barratos (Figure 4-4). When asked to justify their responses, participants often
said that tribespeople were homogeneous with respect to color but heterogeneous with
respect to body weight (Nisbett et al., 1983).
To apply the Dirichlet-multinomial model to this task, we replace bags of marbles
with tribes. Suppose we have observed 20 members from each of 20 tribes. Half the
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Figure 4-4: Generalizations about a new tribe after observing 1, 3, or 20 obese,
brown-skinned individuals from that tribe. Human generalizations are replotted from
Nisbett et al. (1983). For each set of observations, the Dirichlet-multinomial model
learns a distribution over the feature proportions θnew for a new tribe (Figure 4-3).
Plotted here are the means of those distributions. A single observation allows the
model to predict that most individuals in the new tribe have brown skin, but many
more observations are needed before the model concludes that most tribe members
are obese.
tribes are brown and the other half are white, but all of the individuals in a given
tribe have the same skin color. Given these data, the posterior distribution on α
indicates that skin color tends to be homogenous within tribes (i.e. α is probably
small) (Figure 4-3b). Learning that α is small allows the model to make strong
predictions about a sparsely observed new tribe: having observed a single, brown-
skinned member of a new tribe, the posterior distribution on θnew indicates that
most members of the tribe are likely to be brown (Figures 4-3b and 4-4). Note
that the posterior distribution on θnew is almost as sharply peaked as the posterior
distribution on θ11: the model has realized that observing one member of a new tribe
is almost as informative as observing 20 members of that tribe.
Suppose now that obesity is a feature that varies within tribes: a quarter of the
20 tribes observed have an obesity rate of 10%, and the remaining quarters have rates
of 20%, 30%, and 40%. Obesity is represented as a second binary feature, and the
posterior distributions on α and β (Figure 4-3c) indicate that obesity varies within
tribes (α is high), and that the base rate of obesity is around 25% (β1 is around
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Figure 4-5: Generalizations of a conventional Bayesian model that learns only at
the level of θ (α and β are fixed). The model does not generalize correctly to new,
sparsely observed bags: since α and β are fixed, observing 20 previous bags provides
no information about a new bag, and the posterior distributions on θ new1 are identical
in cases (b) and (c).
0.25). Again, we can use these posterior distributions to make predictions about a
new tribe, and now the model requires many observations before it concludes that
most members of the new tribe are obese (Figure 4-4). Unlike the case in Figure 4-3b,
the model has learned that a single observation of a new tribe is not very informative,
and the distribution on θnew is now similar to the average of the θ distributions for
all previously observed tribes.
Accurate predictions about a new tribe depend critically on learning at both level 2
and level 3 (Figure 4-1a). Learning at level 2 is needed to incorporate the observation
that the new tribe has at least one obese, brown-skinned member. Learning at level 3
is needed to discover that skin color is homogeneous within tribes but that obesity is
not, and to discover the average rate of obesity across many tribes. Figure 4-5 shows
inferences drawn by an alternative model that is unable to learn at level 3—instead,
we fix α and β to their expected values under the prior distributions used by our
model. Since it cannot adjust the α and β variables, this alternative model cannot
incorporate any information about the 20 previous tribes when reasoning about a new
tribe. As a result, it makes identical inferences about skin color and obesity—note
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that the distribution on θnew is the same in Figures 4-5b and 4-5c. Note also that
the mean of this distribution (0.75) is lower than the mean of the distribution in
Figure 4-3b (0.99)—both models predict that most members of the new tribe have
brown skin, but our model alone accounts for the human judgment that almost all
members of the new tribe have brown skin (Figure 4-4).
Learning the shape bias
The Barratos task does not address an important class of inferences made by human
learners: inferences about new feature values along known dimensions. Based on the
data in Figure 4-1a, a learner could acquire at least two different constraints: the first
states that the marbles in each bag are uniform along the dimension of color, and the
second states that the marbles in each bag are either all white or all black. One way
to distinguish between these possibilities is to draw a single green marble from the
new bag. A learner with the first constraint will predict that all marbles in the new
bag are green, but a learner with the second constraint will be lost.
There are many real-world problems that involve inferences about novel features.
Children know, for example, that animals of the same species tend to make the same
sound. Observing one horse neigh is enough to conclude that most horses neigh,
even though a child may never have heard an animal neigh before (Shipley, 1993).
Similarly, by the age of 24 months children show a shape bias: they know that shape
tends to be homogeneous within object categories. Given a single exemplar of a novel
object category, children extend the category label to similarly-shaped objects ahead
of objects that share the same texture or color as the exemplar (Heibeck & Markman,
1987; Landau et al., 1988).
The model in Figure 4-1a deals naturally with inferences like these, and I il-
lustrate using stimuli inspired by the work of Smith et al. (2002). In their first
experiment, these authors trained 17-month olds on two exemplars from each of four
novel categories. Novel names (e.g. “zup”) were provided for each category, and
the experimenter used phrases like “this is a zup—let’s put the zups in the wagon.”
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Category 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4
Shape 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4
Texture 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Color 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Size 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
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Figure 4-6: Learning the shape bias. (a) Training data based on Smith et al. (2002).
Each column represents an object: for instance, the first two columns represent two
“zups.” There are 10 possible shapes, textures and colors, and 2 possible sizes. (b)
First-order generalization was tested by presenting the model with exemplar T1, and
asking it to choose which of three objects (a shape match, a texture match and a
color match) was most likely to belong to the same category as T1. (c) Second-order
generalization was tested using T2, an exemplar of a category that was not seen during
training. (d) Model predictions for both generalization tasks. Each bar represents
the probability that a choice object belongs to the same category as the test exemplar
(probabilities have been normalized so that they sum to one across each set of choice
objects). The model makes exact predictions about these probabilities: we computed
30 estimates of these predictions, and the error bars represent the standard error of
the mean.
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Within each category, the two exemplars had the same shape but differed in size,
texture and color (Figure 4-6a). After eight weeks of training, the authors tested
first-order generalization by presenting T1, an exemplar from one of the training cat-
egories, and asking children to choose another object from the same category as T1.
Three choice objects were provided, each of which matched T1 in exactly one feature
(shape, texture or color) (Figure 4-6b). Children preferred the shape match, showing
that they were sensitive to feature distributions within a known category. Smith et
al. (2002) also tested second-order generalization by presenting children with T2, an
exemplar from a novel category (Figure 4-6c). Again, children preferred the shape
match, revealing knowledge that shape in general is a reliable indicator of category
membership. Note that this result depends critically on the training summarized by
Figure 4-6a: 19-month olds do not normally reveal a shape bias on tests of second-
order generalization.
We supplied the model with counts yi computed from the feature vectors in Fig-
ure 4-6a. For example, y1 indicates that the data for category 1 include two observa-
tions of shape value 1, one observation of texture value 1, one observation of texture
value 2, and so on. The key modeling step is to allow for more values along each
dimension than appear in the training set. This policy allows the model to handle
shapes, colors and textures it has never seen during training, but assumes that the
model is able to recognize a novel shape as a kind of shape, a novel color as a kind of
color, and so on. We allowed for ten shapes, ten colors, ten textures and two sizes:
for example, the shape component of y1 indicates that the observed exemplars of
category 1 include two objects with shape value 1 and no objects with shape values
2 through 10.
Figure 4-6d shows the patterns of generalization predicted by the model. Smith
et al. (2002) report that the shape match was chosen 88% (66%) of the time in
the test of first-order generalization, and 70% (65%) of the time in the second-order
task (percentages in parentheses represent results when the task was replicated as
part of Experiment 2). The model reproduces this general pattern: shape matches
are preferred in both cases, and are preferred slightly more strongly in the test of
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first-order generalization.
Smith et al. (2002) also measured real-world generalization by tracking vocabulary
growth over an eight week period. They report that experience with the eight exem-
plars in Figure 4-6a led to a significant increase in the number of object names used
by children. The Dirichlet-multinomial model helps to explain this striking result.
Even though the training set includes only four categories, the results in Figure 4-6b
show that it contains enough statistical information to establish or reinforce the shape
bias, which can then support word learning in the real world. Similarly, the model
explains why providing only two exemplars per category is sufficient. In fact, if the
total number of exemplars is fixed, the model predicts that the best way to teach the
shape bias is to provide just two exemplars per category. I illustrate by returning to
the marbles scenario.
Each point in Figure 4-7a represents a simulation where 64 observations of marbles
are evenly distributed over some number of bags. The marbles drawn from any given
bag are uniform in color—black for half of the bags and white for the others. When 32
observations are provided for each of two bags (Figure 4-7b.i), the model is relatively
certain about the color distributions of those bags, but cannot draw strong conclusions
about the homogeneity of bags in general. When two observations are provided for
each of 32 bags, (Figure 4-7b.ii), the evidence about the composition of any single bag
is weaker, but taken together, these observations provide strong support for the idea
that α is low and most bags are homogeneous. When just one observation is provided
for each of 64 bags, the model has no information about color variability within bags,
and the posterior distribution on α is identical to the prior on this variable, which
has a mean value of 1. If the total number of observations is fixed, Figure 4-7a
suggests that the best way to teach a learner that bags are homogeneous in general
is to provide two observations for as many bags as possible. The U-shaped curve in
Figure 4-7a is a novel prediction of the model, and could be tested in developmental
experiments.
Although the Dirichlet-multinomial model provides some insight into the findings
of Smith et al. (2002), it does not account for all of their results. Their second
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Figure 4-7: (a) Mean α values after observing 32 white marbles and 32 black marbles
divided evenly across some number of homogenous bags. The model is most confident
that bags in general are homogeneous (i.e. α is low) when given 2 samples from each
of 32 bags. (b) Three possible outcomes when learning occurs simultaneously at level
2 and level 3. (i) After observing 2 homogeneous bags, the model is more certain
about the variables at level 2 than the variables at level 3. (ii) After observing pairs
of marbles from 32 homogeneous bags, the model is fairly certain about levels 2 and
3. (iii) After observing pairs of marbles from 32 bags (5 white pairs, 22 mixed pairs,
and 5 black pairs), the model is more certain about level 3 than level 2.
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experiment includes a no-name condition where children received the same training
as before (Figure 4-6a) except that category labels were not provided. Instead of
naming the training objects, the experimenter used phrases like “here is one, here is
another—let’s put them both in the wagon.” Children in this condition showed first-
order but not second-order generalization, which supports the view that the shape
bias reflects attention to shape in the context of naming (Smith, Jones, & Landau,
1996). An alternative view is that the shape bias is not specifically linguistic: shape is
important not because it is linked to naming in particular, but because it is a reliable
cue to category membership (Ward, Becker, Hass, & Vela, 1991; Bloom, 2000). The
Dirichlet-multinomial model is consistent with this second view, and predicts that
learning in the no-name condition should not have been impaired provided that chil-
dren clearly understood which training objects belonged to the same category. This
discrepancy between model predictions and empirical results calls for further work on
both sides. On the modeling side, it is important to develop hierarchical models that
allow an explicit and privileged role for linguistic information. On the empirical side,
it seems possible that children in the no-name condition did not achieve second-order
generalization because they did not realize that each pair of identically-shaped ob-
jects was supposed to represent a coherent category.1 Observing associations between
similarly-shaped objects may have led them only to conclude that shape was a salient
feature of each of these objects, which would have been enough for them to pass the
test of first-order generalization.
Learning constraints fast
As mentioned in Chapter 1, there are empirical and theoretical reasons to believe that
many inductive constraints are available relatively early in development. Any attempt
to argue that these constraints might be learned must therefore explain how they can
1For those who support an essentialist view of categories (D. Medin & Ortony, 1989; Bloom, 2000),
the issue at stake is whether the identically-shaped objects were believed to have the same essence.
A shared name is one indication that two objects have the same essence, but other indications are
possible—for example, children might be told “Here’s one and here’s another. Look, they are both
the same kind of thing. I wonder what they’re called.”
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be learned very rapidly. Our analysis of the task in Smith et al. (2002) suggests
one potential explanation: constraints may be available early because they can be
extracted from very small amounts of training data. We saw, for instance, that two
exemplars from each of four categories are enough to allow the Dirichlet-multinomial
model to discover a version of the shape bias. The hierarchical Bayesian approach
suggests a second explanation that may apply in some cases. When learning occurs
simultaneously at multiple levels of abstraction, “abstract-to-concrete” trajectories
can emerge: in other words, the representations at the upper levels can be acquired
before the representations at the lower levels are firmly in place. Abstract-to-concrete
learning may help to explain how children acquire inductive constraints early enough
to guide subsequent learning at lower levels.
The Dirichlet-multinomial model (Figure 4-1) can be used to demonstrate the
basic notion of abstract-to-concrete learning. At least three outcomes are possible
when learning proceeds in parallel at levels 2 and 3. Figure 4-7b.i shows a case
where the learner is more confident about concrete knowledge (level 2) than abstract
knowledge (level 3): note that the distributions for the two individual bags (θ1 and θ2)
are more tightly peaked than the distributions on α and β, which capture knowledge
about bags in general. Figure 4-7b.ii is a case where the learner is relatively confident
about the values of the variables at both levels. Figure 4-7b.iii is a case where the
learner is more confident about abstract knowledge (level 3) than concrete knowledge
(level 2). In this case, two observations are provided for each of 32 bags: 22 of the
observed pairs are mixed, and there are 5 white pairs and 5 black pairs. The model
is now relatively uncertain about the color distribution of any individual bag, but
relatively certain about the values of α and β.
The diagrams in Figure 4-7b show static snapshots of a learner’s state of knowl-
edge. Figure 4-8 shows developmental trajectories where the second state in Figure 4-
8a corresponds to Figure 4-7b.i, and the second state in Figure 4-8b corresponds to
Figure 4-7b.iii. In Figure 4-8a, the inductive constraint (level 3) is acquired after
some of the category means (level 2) are learned with high confidence. This tra-
jectory matches the common intuition that constraints are acquired by abstracting
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over more concrete forms of knowledge. For instance, Smith et al. (2002) describe a
four-step account of word-learning where learners acquire the shape bias by realizing
that many of the categories they have already learned are organized by shape. In
Figure 4-8b, the inductive constraint is acquired before any single category mean is
securely known. Note that both trajectories in Figure 4-8 suggest that the inductive
constraint supports top-down inferences about novel categories once it has been ac-
quired. The crucial difference between the two is whether some variables at level 2
must be securely known before learning can take place at level 3.
Both trajectories in Figure 4-8 are consistent with a hierarchical Bayesian ap-
proach, and the trajectory that emerges in any particular situation will depend on
the task and the available data. It may turn out that the four-step account of Smith
et al. (2002) is accurate, and that Figure 4-8a provides the best description of the
emergence of the shape bias. Figure 4-8b, however, may apply to situations where
a child has access to a large number of sparse or noisy observations—any individ-
ual observation may be difficult to interpret, but taken together they may provide
strong support for a general conclusion. For example, a hierarchical Bayesian model
of grammar induction may be able to explain how a child becomes confident about
some property of a grammar even though most of the individual sentences that sup-
port this conclusion are poorly understood. Similarly, a hierarchical approach may
explain how a child can learn that visual objects are cohesive, bounded and rigid
(E. S. Spelke, 1990) before developing a detailed understanding of the appearance
and motion of any individual object.
Discovering ontological kinds
The Dirichlet-multinomial model in Figure 4-1a is a simple hierarchical model that
acquires something like the shape bias, but to match the capacities of a child it
is necessary to apply the shape bias selectively—to object categories, for example,
but not to substance categories. Selective application of the shape bias appears
to demand knowledge that categories are grouped into ontological kinds and that
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Figure 4-8: Two developmental trajectories that can emerge from a hierarchical
Bayesian approach. In each trajectory, a learner acquires an inductive constraint
(e.g. the shape bias) after receiving data at level 1 of the model (information about
the features of several categories). The learner starts out by observing exemplars from
the first three categories (the first three category means are drawn in red), and later
observes exemplars from five additional categories. Filled circles indicate cases where
the learner is near-certain about the value of a category mean or confident that she
has discovered the inductive constraint. (a) The inductive constraint is discovered
after the learner is near-certain about some of the category means (cf. Figure 4-7b.i).
(b) The inductive constraint is discovered before the learner is confident about the
values of any of the category means (cf. Figure 4-7b.iii). Both trajectories indicate
that the inductive constraint supports inferences about novel categories once it has
been acquired.
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there are different patterns of feature variability within each kind. Before the age
of three, for instance, children appear to know that shape tends to be homogeneous
within object categories but heterogeneous within substance categories (Soja, Carey,
& Spelke, 1991; Imai, Gentner, & Uchida, 1994; Samuelson & Smith, 1999), that
color tends to be homogeneous within substance categories but heterogeneous within
object categories (Landau et al., 1988; Soja et al., 1991), and that both shape and
texture tend to be homogeneous within animate categories (S. S. Jones, Smith, &
Landau, 1991).
Figure 4-1b shows a hierarchical model with two ontological kinds. The model
includes trees for each kind: the first three categories are grouped into one kind, and
the remaining three categories are grouped into a second kind. There are separate
parameters αk and βk for each ontological kind k, and these parameters capture the
features and the patterns of feature variability that are characteristic of each kind.
For instance, α1 will indicate that categories of the first kind are homogeneous in
shape but not in material, and α2 will indicate that categories of the second kind
are homogeneous in material but not shape. The parameter β1 will indicate that
members of the first kind tend to be solid, and β2 will indicate that members of the
second kind tend not to be solid.
We can develop a model that learns for itself how to partition a set of categories
into ontological kinds. Formally, let each possible partition be represented by a vector
z. The partition in 4-1b has z = [1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2] which indicates that the first three
categories belong to one ontological kind, and the remaining three belong to a second
kind. As before, we assume that feature counts y are observed for one or more
categories. Given these observations, the best set of ontological kinds will correspond
to the z which maximizes P (z|y). This posterior distribution can be written as a
product of two terms:
P (z|y) ∝ P (y|z)P (z).
The first term will be high when z accounts well for the data: in other words, when
categories belonging to the same kind tend to have similar features and similar pat-
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terns of feature variability. The second term captures prior knowledge about the
partition of categories into ontological kinds. We use a prior P (z) that assigns some
probability to all possible partitions, but favors the simpler partitions—those that
use a small number of kinds. Many different priors satisfy this criterion, and we use
a prior induced by the Chinese Restaurant Process (CRP, Aldous, 1985):
p(zi = a|z1, . . . , zi−1) =


na
i−1+γ
na > 0
γ
i−1+γ
a is a new kind
(4.1)
where zi is the kind assignment for category i, na is the number of categories previously
assigned to kind a, and γ is a hyperparameter (we set γ = 0.5). This process prefers
to assign new categories to kinds which already have many members, and therefore
favors partitions that use a small number of kinds.
Using statistical notation, the entire model in Figure 4-1b can be written as fol-
lows:
z ∼ CRP(γ)
αk ∼ Exponential(λ)
βk ∼ Dirichlet(1)
θi ∼ Dirichlet(αziβzi)
yi |ni ∼ Multinomial(θi)
where most components of the model are carried over from our formalization of Fig-
ure 4-1a.
When fitting the model to data (y), our goal is to simultaneously infer the partition
of categories into kinds, along with the αk and βk for each kind k and the feature
distribution θi for each category. If z were already known, the model would reduce
to several independent copies of the model in Figure 4-1a, and model predictions
(including p(θi|z,y)) could be computed using the techniques already described.
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Since z is unknown, we integrate over this quantity:
p(θi|y) =
∑
z
p(θi|z,y)P (z|y). (4.2)
Since we are interested in problems where the number of categories is small, we
compute this sum by enumerating all possible partitions.2
S. S. Jones and Smith (2002) showed that training young children on a handful of
suitably structured categories can promote the acquisition of ontological knowledge.
We gave our model a data set of comparable size. During training, the model saw
two exemplars from each of four categories: two object categories and two substance
categories (Figure 4-9a). Exemplars of each object category were solid, matched
in shape, and differed in material and size. Exemplars of each substance category
were non-solid, matched in material, and differed in shape and size. Second-order
generalization was tested using exemplars from novel categories—one test exemplar
(S) was solid and the other (N) was not (Figure 4-9b). Figure 4-9c shows that the
model chooses a shape match for the solid exemplar and a material match for the
non-solid exemplar.
Figure 4-9d confirms that the model correctly groups the stimuli into two onto-
logical kinds: object categories and substance categories. This discovery is based on
the characteristic features of ontological kinds (β) as well as the patterns of feature
variability within each kind (α). If kind k includes only the object categories, then
αk will indicate that shape is homogeneous within categories of this kind, and βk
will indicate that categories of this kind tend to be solid. The β parameter, then, is
responsible for the inference that the category including S should be grouped with
the two object categories, since all three categories contain solid objects.
2To compute the sum in Equation 4.2 we use P (z|y) ∝ P (y|z)P (z), where P (z) is the CRP
prior on z. Computing P (y|z) reduces to the problem of computing several marginal likelihoods
P (y′) =
∫
α,β
P (y′|α,β)p(α,β)dαdβ
for the model in Figure 4-1a. We estimate each of these integrals by drawing 10,000 samples from
the prior p(α,β).
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Figure 4-9: Learning a shape bias for solids and a material bias for non-solids. (a)
Training data. (b) Second-order generalization was tested using solid and non-solid
exemplars (S, N). In each case, two choice objects were provided — a shape match
and a material match. (c) The model chooses the shape match given the solid exem-
plar and the material match given the non-solid exemplar. The model makes exact
predictions about the probabilities plotted, and the error bars represent standard
error across 8 estimates of these probabilities. (d) The model groups the categories
into two kinds: objects (categories 1, 2 and 5) and substances (categories 3, 4 and 6).
Entry (i, j) in the matrix is the posterior probability that categories i and j belong
to the same ontological kind (light colors indicate high probabilities).
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The results in Figure 4-9 predict that a training regime with a small number of
categories and exemplars should allow children to simultaneously acquire a shape
bias for solids and a material bias for substances. Samuelson (2002) ran a related
study where she attempted to teach one group of children a precocious shape bias
and another a precocious material bias. Only the shape bias was learned, suggesting
that the shape bias is easier to teach than the material bias, but leaving open the
possibility that the material bias could have been acquired with more training. Si-
multaneously teaching a shape bias for solids and a material bias for substances may
raise some difficult practical challenges, but S. S. Jones and Smith (2002) have shown
that children can simultaneously learn two kind-specific biases. By the end of their
training study, children had learned that names for animate exemplars (exemplars
with eyes) should be generalized according to shape and texture, and that names
for objects (exemplars without eyes) should be generalized only according to shape.
The model in Figure 4-1b accounts for these results: given the data provided to the
children in these experiments, it discovers that there are two ontological kinds, and
makes selective generalizations depending on whether or not a novel exemplar has
eyes.
Related models
The models described in this chapter address tasks that have been previously modeled
by Colunga and Smith (2005). These authors developed a connectionist network that
acquires a shape bias for solid objects and a material bias for non-solid objects. The
network uses a set of hidden nodes to capture high-order correlations between nodes
representing the shape, material, and solidity of a collection of training objects, and
generates results similar to Figure 4-9c when asked to make predictions about novel
objects. The Dirichlet-multinomial model is similar to this connectionist model in
several respects: both models show that abstract knowledge can be acquired, and
both models are statistical, which allows them to deal with noise and uncertainty
and to make graded generalizations. These models, however, differ in at least two
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important respects.
First, the two models aim to provide different kinds of explanations. Our contri-
bution is entirely at the level of computational theory (Marr, 1982), and I have not at-
tempted to specify the psychological mechanisms by which the Dirichlet-multinomial
model might be implemented. Colunga and Smith (2005) describe a process model
that uses a biologically-inspired learning algorithm, but provide no formal description
of the problem to be solved. Their network can probably be viewed as an approx-
imate implementation of some computational theory,3 but the underlying computa-
tional theory may not be ideal for the problem of word learning. For instance, it
is not clear that the network adequately captures the notion of a category. In tests
of second-order generalization (e.g. Figure 4-9c), the Dirichlet-multinomial model is
able to compute the probability that a choice object belongs to the same category as
the test exemplar. Colunga and Smith (2005) compute model predictions by compar-
ing the similarity between hidden-layer activations for the choice object and the test
exemplar. Objects in the same category may often turn out to have similar repre-
sentations, but there are some well-known cases where similarity and categorization
diverge (Keil, 1989; Rips, 1989).
A second limitation of the connectionist approach is that it does not extend nat-
urally to contexts where structured representations are required. So far we have
seen models that generate scalars (α) and vectors (β,θ,y), but hierarchical prob-
abilistic models can generate many other kinds of representations, including causal
models (Chapter 5), graph structures (Chapter 6), ontologies (Schmidt, Kemp, &
Tenenbaum, 2006), parse trees (Perfors, Tenenbaum, & Regier, 2006), and logical
theories (Milch et al., 2005).
Previous researchers have developed Bayesian models of categorization (Anderson,
1991) and word learning (Tenenbaum & Xu, 2000), and our work continues in this
tradition. The hierarchical approach, however, attempts to address a problem raised
by most Bayesian models of cognition. A conventional Bayesian model matches the
3The network used by Colunga and Smith (2005) is related to a Boltzmann machine (Ackley,
Hinton, & Sejnowski, 1985), which is an exact implementation of a known computational theory.
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schema in Figure 2-3a: the elements in its hypothesis space represent level 2 knowl-
edge, and the prior distribution over this space belongs to the collection of background
assumptions. One common reservation about Bayesian models is that different priors
account for different patterns of data, and the success of any given Bayesian model
depends critically on the modeler’s ability to choose the right prior. Hierarchical
models disarm this objection by showing that the prior distribution over level 2 need
not be specified in advance, but can be learned from raw data.
Hierarchical Bayesian models still rely on some background assumptions, includ-
ing a prior distribution over the representations at the highest level. The ultimate
goal, however, is to design models where this prior is simple enough to be unob-
jectionable. The Dirichlet-multinomial model demonstrates that hierarchical models
can sometimes rely on much simpler priors than conventional Bayesian models. If
we were only interested in inferences about level 2 knowledge (inferences about the
θi for each bag i), α and β (Figure 4-1a) would not be essential: in other words,
a conventional Bayesian model could mimic the predictions of our model if it used
the right prior distribution on the set {θi}. If specified directly, however, this prior
would look extremely complicated—much more complicated, for example, than the
prior used by the conventional model in Figure 4-5, which assumes that all of the
θi are independent. We avoided this problem by specifying the prior on {θi} indi-
rectly. We introduced an extra layer of abstraction—the layer including α and β—and
placed simple priors on these variables. These simple distributions on α and β induce
a complicated prior distribution on {θi}—the same distribution that a conventional
Bayesian model would have to specify directly.
Conclusion
This chapter presented our first fully-specified example of a hierarchical Bayesian
model (Figure 4-1a). The model is one of the simplest possible hierarchical models,
and provides a gentle introduction to the hierarchical Bayesian approach. Despite its
simplicity, the model addresses a problem of cognitive interest, and helps to explain
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how people learn simultaneously about the features of individual categories and about
categories in general. Word learners who acquire the shape bias appear to solve an
instance of this problem, and the model helps to account for word-learning data
collected by Smith et al. (2002).
The Dirichlet-multinomial model addresses several psychological phenomena that
we have not explored, but which may repay additional study. When shown a circle
with a diameter of three inches, participants report that the circle is more likely to be
a pizza than a quarter, even though the circle is closer in size to the average quarter
than the average pizza (Rips, 1989). The model suggests that this decision is driven by
knowledge about the variability of the size feature and predicts that people also know
that exemplars of any given currency are usually the same size, but that exemplars of
any given food tend to vary in size. This prediction could be tested using novel foods
and currencies: for instance, a coin and a circular food from a novel country. The
model also accounts for some of Harlow’s experiments on “learning to learn” (Harlow,
1949). Harlow gave monkeys a blocked forced-choice decision task, where the same
object was rewarded within each block regardless of whether it appeared on the left
or the right. After many blocks, Harlow found that his monkeys were almost always
choosing correctly after the second trial in each block. They had evidently learned
that the rewarded objects in each block were homogeneous in shape and color, but
heterogeneous in position.
There are many proposals about constraints that guide word learning, and it will
be important to develop models that acquire constraints other than the shape bias.
Future models can also explore how inferences about novel words differ from infer-
ences about novel properties. It should be possible to develop a single model that
acquires one set of constraints when learning about the extensions of words, and a
different set of constraints when learning about the extensions of properties. Sup-
pose, for instance, that a given set of objects can be organized into two cross-cutting
systems of categories: a taxonomic system and a thematic system (cf. Shafto, Kemp,
Mansinghka, Gordon, and Tenenbaum (2006)). A constraint-learning model might
discover that words tend to pick out the taxonomic categories (a constraint known
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as the taxonomic bias (Markman, 1989)), and that different words are likely to have
different extensions (a constraint known as the principle of contrast (Clark, 1987)).
The same model might discover that properties are subject to different constraints:
properties that respect the thematic categories may be fairly common, and there are
might be many cases where different properties (e.g. “renate” and “chordate”) have
the same extension. As this example suggests, a successful constraint-learning model
should be able to discover how words are different from properties, and should also
serve as a model of property induction.
The most intriguing suggestion to emerge from this chapter is the idea that in-
ductive constraints can be learned relatively fast (Figure 4-8). Constraints that are
present early in development are sometimes thought to be innate, but some of these
constraints might be learned extremely rapidly. Hierarchical Bayesian models predict
that some constraints can be learned given very small amounts of data, and that
some constraints can emerge before more concrete kinds of knowledge are securely
established. Exploring how well these ideas account for developmental data is an
important direction for future work.
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Chapter 5
Learning causal schemata
People often make confident causal inferences given very sparse data. Imagine, for
instance, that you are travelling in the tropics, and on your very first morning you
take an anti-malarial pill and wash it down with guava juice. Soon afterward you
develop a headache and wonder what might have caused it. Suppose that you have
very little direct information about the two potential causes—you have never before
tasted guava juice or taken anti-malarial pills. Even so, you will probably correctly
attribute your headache to the pill rather than the juice.
Accurate inferences from sparse data are often a sign that learners are relying on
strong inductive constraints. In this case, your decision to blame the anti-malarial
pill is probably constrained by knowledge about the causal powers of pills and juices.
Even if you have never come across anti-malarial pills or guava juice, you probably
believe that pills tend to cause headaches but that juices do not. Abstract causal
beliefs of this sort are sometimes called causal schemata (Kelley, 1972) or intuitive
theories.
This chapter describes a hierarchical Bayesian model that helps to explain how
causal schemata are acquired. Part of our task is to formalize the notion of a causal
schema. Suppose that we are interested in a set of objects—for example, a set of pills.
The work in this chapter was carried out in collaboration with Noah Goodman and Joshua
Tenenbaum. An early version of this work was presented at the 29th Annual Conference of the
Cognitive Science Society in 2007.
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We will work with schemata that assign each object to a causal type, and that specify
the causal powers and features of each type. Our pills, for instance, may represent
four causal types—pills of type A cause headaches, pills of type B relieve headaches,
and pills of types C and D neither cause nor relieve headaches. A causal schema may
also specify how causal types interact. For instance, a C-pill and a D-pill may cause
a headache when taken together, even though neither pill causes a headache on its
own.
The work described in this chapter extends previous work on learning a causal
model that captures the relationship between a single object (e.g. a pill) and an effect
(e.g. a headache) (Figure 5-1a). Causal models for several objects can be learned in-
dependently, but this approach ignores any information that should be shared across
objects: for instance, two blood-pressure medications are likely to have similar side
effects, suggesting that a new blood-pressure medication will cause headaches if sev-
eral others already have. To capture the idea that similar objects may have similar
causal powers, we will work with causal schemata that organize a set of objects into
causal types. (Figure 5-1b). This chapter shows how these schemata can be acquired
in settings where learners must learn a schema at the same time as they are learning
causal models for many different objects.
By tracking the characteristic features of causal types, learners can often make
strong predictions about a novel object before it is observed to participate in any
causal interactions. For instance, predictions about a pill with a given color, size,
shape and imprint can be based on the effects produced by previous pills which shared
these features. We will extend the notion of a causal schema by including information
about the characteristic features of each causal type (Figure 5-1c). Although we
begin with cases where at most one object is present at any time, the chapter ends by
discussing cases where multiple objects may be present. We will extend the notion of
a schema one more time by allowing interactions between different types (for instance,
pills of type C may interfere with pills of type D), and will see how these characteristic
interactions can be learned.
Although this thesis focuses on bottom-up learning of inductive constraints, hier-
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archical Bayesian models are valuable in part because they support both top-down
and bottom-up inferences (Griffiths, 2005). Top-down and bottom-up approaches
are sometimes seen as competitors, and causal reasoning is one area where both ap-
proaches have been prominent. The top-down approach (Shultz, 1982; Bullock, Gel-
man, & Baillargeon, 1982) emphasizes inferences that are based on knowledge about
causal powers, and the bottom-up approach emphasizes statistical inferences that are
based on patterns of covariation. As P. W. Cheng (1993) and others have argued,
these perspectives are best regarded as complementary: top-down knowledge about
causal power plays a role in many inferences, and bottom-up statistical learning helps
to explain how this knowledge is acquired. The apparent conflict between these per-
spectives may have developed in part because there is no well-established framework
that accommodates them both. Kelley, for example, argued for both top-down (Kel-
ley, 1972) and bottom-up approaches (Kelley, 1973) to causal reasoning, but did not
develop a single theoretical framework that properly unified his two proposals. This
chapter argues that a hierarchical Bayesian approach provides this missing theoretical
framework, and the model I describe shows how top-down constraints support causal
reasoning, and how these constraints can be acquired by statistical learning.
Learning about a single object
Although we will eventually consider inferences about multiple objects, suppose for
now that we are interested in the relationship between a single object o and an effect
e. Let V represent a set of trials where object o is present or absent on each trial,
and effect e is or is not observed. For instance, if object o is a pill and effect e is a
headache, each trial in V might indicate whether or not a patient takes a pill on a
given day, and whether or not she subsequently experiences a headache. To simplify
our notation, o will denote both the pill and the event of the patient swallowing the
pill.
We will assume that the outcome of each trial is generated from a causal model M
that captures the causal relationship between o and e (Figure 5-3). Having observed
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Figure 5-1: (a) A generative framework for discovering the causal powers of a single
object. (b) A generative framework for learning a schema that guides inferences about
multiple objects. The schema organizes the objects into causal types, and specifies
the causal powers of each type. (c) A generative framework for learning a schema
that includes information about the characteristic features of each type. Concrete
examples of each framework are shown in Figures 5-3a, 5-4, and 5-14.
the trials in V , our beliefs about the causal model can be summarized by the posterior
distribution
P (M |V ) ∝ P (V |M)P (M). (5.1)
We build on the approach of Griffiths and Tenenbaum (2005) and parameterize the
causal model M using four causal variables (Figures 5-2 and 5-3). Let a indicate
whether there is an arrow joining o and e, and let g indicate the polarity of this causal
relationship (g = 1 if o is a generative cause and g = 0 if o is a preventive cause).
Suppose that s is the strength of the relationship between o and e.1 To capture the
possibility that e will be present even though o is absent, we assume that a generative
background cause of strength b is always present. We specify the distribution P (e|o)
by assuming that generative and preventive causes combine according to a network
of noisy-OR and noisy-AND-NOT gates (Glymour, 2001).
Now that we have parameterized model M in terms of the triple (a, g, s) and the
background strength b, we can rewrite Equation 5.1 as
p(a, g, s, b|V ) ∝ P (V |a, g, s, b)P (a)P (g)p(s)p(b). (5.2)
To complete the model we must place prior distributions on the four causal variables.
We use uniform priors on the two binary variables (a and g), and assume that s is
1To simplify the later development of our model, we assume that g and s are defined even if a = 0
and there is no causal relationship between o and e. When a = 0, g and s can be interpreted as the
polarity and strength that the causal relationship between o and e would have if this relationship
actually existed.
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Figure 5-2: Causal graphical models which capture three possible relationships be-
tween an object o and an effect e. a indicates whether there is a causal relationship
between o and e, g indicates whether this relationship is generative or preventive,
and s indicates the strength of this relationship. A generative background cause of
strength b is always present.
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Figure 5-3: (a) Learning a causal model M from event data V (see Figure 5-1a). The
event data specify the number of times the effect was (e+) and was not (e−) observed
when o was absent (∅) and when o was present. The model M shown has a = 1,
g = 1, s = 0.9 and b = 0.2, and is a compact representation of the graphical model
in (b).
drawn from a logistic normal distribution:
logit(s) ∼ N (s¯, σ¯2)
s¯ ∼ N (η, τ σ¯2) (5.3)
σ¯2 ∼ Inv-gamma(α, β)
The priors on s¯ and σ¯2 are chosen to be conjugate to the Gaussian distribution on
logit(s), and we set α = 2, β = 0.3, η = 1 and τ = 10. The background strength b is
drawn from the same distribution as s, and all hyperparameters are set to the same
values except for η which is set to -1. Setting η to these different values encourages b
to be small and s to be large, which matches standard expectations about the likely
values of these variables.
To discover the causal model M that best accounts for the events in V , we can
search for the causal variables with maximum posterior probability according to Equa-
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Figure 5-4: Learning a schema and a set of causal models (see Figure 5-1b). z specifies
a set of causal types, where objects belonging to the same type have similar causal
powers, and a¯, g¯, and s¯ specify the causal powers of each type. Note that the schema
supports inferences about an object (o7) that is very sparsely observed.
tion 5.2. There are many empirical studies that explore human inferences about a
single potential cause and a single effect, and Griffiths and Tenenbaum (2005) show
that a Bayesian approach similar to ours can account for many of these inferences.
Here, however, we turn to the less-studied case where people must learn about many
objects, each of which may be causally related to the effect of interest.
Learning about multiple objects
Suppose that we are interested in a set of objects {oi} and a single effect e. We
begin with the case where at most one object is present at any time: for example,
suppose that our patient has prescriptions for many different pills, but takes at most
one pill per day. Instead of learning a single causal model our goal is to learn a set
{Mi} of causal models, one for each pill (Figures 5-1b and 5-4). There is now a triple
(ai, gi, si) describing the causal model for each pill oi, and we collect these variables
into three vectors, a, g and s. Let Ψ be the tuple (a, g, s, b) which includes all the
parameters of the causal models. As for the single object case, we assume that a
generative background cause of strength b is always present.
One strategy for learning multiple causal models is to learn each model separately
using the methods described in the previous section. Although simple, this strategy
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does not capture the intuition that inferences about sparsely observed objects should
be shaped by experience with previous objects. We can allow knowledge about famil-
iar objects to influence predictions about novel objects by introducing the notion of
a causal schema. A schema specifies a grouping of the objects into causal types, and
indicates the causal powers of each of these types. The schema in Figure 5-4 indicates
that there are two causal types: objects of type t1 tend to prevent the effect, and
objects of type t2 tend to cause the effect. Formally, let zi indicate the type of oi, and
let a¯, g¯, and s¯ be schema-level analogues of a, g, and s: a¯(t) is the probability that
any given object of type t will be causally related to the effect, and g¯(t) and s¯(t) are
the expected polarity and causal strength for objects of type t. Even though a¯ and
g¯ are vectors of probabilities, Figure 5-4 simplifies by showing each a¯(t) and g¯(t) as
a binary variable.
To generate a causal model for each object, we assume that each arrow variable ai
is generated by tossing a coin with weight a¯(zi), that each polarity gi is generated by
tossing a coin with weight g¯(zi), and that each strength si is drawn from the logistic
transform of a normal distribution with mean s¯(zi) and variance σ¯(zi). Let Ψ¯ be the
tuple (a¯, g¯, s¯, σ¯). To complete the model, we specify prior distributions on z and Ψ¯.
As in Chapter 4, we use a Chinese restaurant process prior on z (Equation 4.1) and
set the γ parameter to 0.5. This prior assigns some probability mass to all possible
partitions but favors partitions that use a small number of types. We assume that the
entries in a¯ and g¯ are independently drawn from a Beta(0.1, 0.1) distribution, and
that the means and variances in s¯ and σ¯ are independently drawn from the conjugate
priors in Equation 5.3.
Having defined a generative model, we can use it to learn the type assignments z,
the schema parameters Ψ¯ and the parameters Ψ of the causal models that are most
probable given the events V we have observed:
p(z, Ψ¯,Ψ|V ) ∝ P (V |Ψ)P (Ψ|Ψ¯,z)p(Ψ¯|z)P (z). (5.4)
Figure 5-4 shows how a schema and a set of causal models (top two sections) can be
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simultaneously learned from the events V in the bottom section. All of the variables
in the figure have been set to values with high posterior probability according to
Equation 5.4: for instance, the partition z shown is the z with maximum posterior
probability. Note that learning a schema supports confident inferences about object
o7, which is very sparsely observed (see the underlined entries in the bottom section of
Figure 5-4). On its own, a single trial might not be very informative about the causal
powers of a novel object, but experience with previous objects allows the model to
predict that o7 will produce the effect about as regularly as the other members of
type t2.
To compute the predictions of our model we used Markov chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) methods to sample from the posterior distribution in Equation 5.4. Since
we use conjugate priors on the schema parameters Ψ¯, we can integrate out these
parameters and sample from p(z,Ψ|V ). To sample the schema assignments in z, we
combined Gibbs updates with the split-merge scheme described by Jain and Neal
(2004). We used Metropolis-Hasting updates on the parameters Ψ of the causal
models, and found that mixing improved when the three parameters for a given object
i (ai, gi and si) were updated simultaneously. To further facilitate mixing, we used
Metropolis-coupled MCMC: we ran several Markov chains at different temperatures
and regularly considered swaps between the chains (Geyer, 1991). All of these details,
however, are of little psychological importance. The implementation described here
is not intended as a process model, and the primary contribution of this section is
the computational theory summarized by Equation 5.4.
Experiment 1: One-shot causal learning
The schema-learning model attempts to satisfy two criteria when learning about the
causal powers of a novel object. When information about the new object is sparse,
predictions about this object should be based primarily on experience with previous
objects. Relying on previous objects will allow the model to go beyond the sparse and
noisy observations that are available for the novel object. Given many observations
of the novel object, however, the model should rely heavily on these observations
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(a)
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GO
Figure 5-5: (a) A machine and some blocks. The blocks can be placed inside the
machine, and the machine sometimes activates (flashes yellow) when the GO button is
pressed. The blocks used for each condition of Experiments 1 and 2 were perceptually
indistinguishable. (b) Blocks used for Experiment 3. The blocks are grouped into two
family resemblance categories: blocks on the right tend to be large, blue and spotted,
and tend to have a gold boundary but no diagonal stripe. These blocks are based on
stimuli created by Sakamoto and Love (2004).
and should tend to ignore its observations of previous objects. Discounting past
experience in this way will allow the model to be flexible if the new object turns out
to be different from all of the previous objects.
We designed two experiments to explore this tradeoff between conservatism and
flexibility. Both experiments used blocks and machines like the examples in Figure 5-
5. The machine has a GO button, and may activate and flash yellow when this button
is pressed. Blocks can be placed in the machine, and whether or not the machine is
likely to activate might depend on which block is inside. In terms of the language I
have been using, each block is an object oi, each button press is a trial, and there is
a single effect e which indicates whether the machine activated on a given trial.
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Condition Training data
p = {0.1, 0.9}
p = 0
p = 0.1
p = {0, 0.5}
Figure 5-6: Training data for the four conditions of Experiment 1.
Our first experiment explores the idea that experience with several training blocks
can guide inferences about a sparsely observed test block. The experiment includes
several one-shot learning problems where participants make predictions about a test
block after seeing a single trial involving that block.
Participants
24 members of the MIT community were paid for participating in this experiment.
Materials and Methods
The experiment includes four within-participant conditions, and the training data
for each condition are summarized in Figure 5-6. The first condition (p = {0, 0.5})
includes blocks of two types: blocks of the first type never activate the machine,
and blocks of the second type activate the machine about half the time. The second
condition (p = {0.1, 0.9}) also includes two types: blocks of the first type rarely
activate the machine, and blocks of the second type usually activate the machine. The
remaining conditions each include one type of block: blocks in the third condition
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(p = 0) never activate the machine, and blocks in the fourth condition (p = 0.1)
activate the machine rarely.
At the start of each condition, participants are shown an empty machine and asked
to press the GO button 10 times. The machine fails to activate on each occasion.
One by one, the training blocks are introduced, and participants place each block in
the machine and press the GO button one or more times. The outcomes of these
trials are summarized in Figure 5-6. After the final trial for each block, participants
are asked to imagine pressing the GO button 100 times when this block is inside the
machine. They then provide a rating which indicates how likely it is that the total
number of activations will fall between 0 and 20. All ratings are provided on a 7 point
scale where 1 indicates “very unlikely” and 7 indicates “very likely.” Ratings are also
provided for four other intervals: between 20 and 40, between 40 and 60, between
60 and 80, and between 80 and 100. After the training phase, two test blocks are
introduced, again one at a time. Participants provide ratings for each block before it
has been placed in the machine, and after a single trial. One of the test blocks (o+)
activates the machine on this trial, and the other (o−) does not.
The set of four conditions is designed to test the idea that inductive constraints
and inductive flexibility are both important. The first two conditions test whether
experience with the training blocks allows people to extract constraints that are useful
when making predictions about the test blocks. Conditions three and four explore
cases where these constraints need to be overruled, since test block o+ is surprising
given that the training blocks in these conditions activate the machine rarely if at all.
To encourage participants to think about the conditions separately, machines and
blocks of different colors were used for each condition. The order in which the condi-
tions were presented was counterbalanced, and the order of the training blocks and
the test blocks within each condition was also counterbalanced.2
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Figure 5-7: Experiment 1: predictions of the schema-learning model. Each subplot
shows the posterior distribution on the causal power of a test block.
Model Predictions
Figure 5-7 shows predictions when the schema-learning model is applied to the data
in Figure 5-6. Each plot shows the posterior distribution on the activation strength
of a test block: the probability p(e|o) that the block will activate the machine on a
given trial.3 Since the background rate is zero, this distribution is equivalent to a
distribution on the causal power (P. Cheng, 1997) of the test block.
The plots in the first row show predictions about a test block before it is placed in
the machine. The first plot indicates that the model has discovered two causal types,
and expects that the test block will activate the machine either very rarely or around
half of the time. The two peaks in the second plot again indicate that the model
2There was one exception: in condition 3, test block o+ was always presented second, since this
block is unlike any of the training blocks, and may have had a large influence on predictions about
any block which followed it.
3Recall that participants were asked to make predictions about the number of activations expected
across 100 trials. If we ask the model to make the same predictions, the distributions on the
total number of activations will be discrete distributions with shapes similar to the distributions in
Figure 5-7.
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has discovered two causal types, this time with strengths around 0.1 and 0.9. The
remaining two plots are unimodal, suggesting that only one causal type is needed to
explain the data in each of the p = 0 and p = 0.1 conditions.
The plots in the second row show predictions about a test block (o−) that fails
to activate the machine on one occasion. All of the plots have peaks near 0 or 0.1.
Since each condition includes blocks that activate the machine rarely or not at all,
the most likely hypothesis is always that o− is one of these blocks. Note, however,
that the first plot has a small bump near 0.5, indicating that there is some chance
that test block o− will activate the machine about half of the time. The second plot
has a small bump near 0.9 for similar reasons.
The plots in the third row show predictions about a test block (o+) that activates
the machine on one occasion. The plot for the first condition peaks near 0.5, which
is consistent with the hypothesis that blocks which activate the machine at all tend
to activate it around half the time. The plot for the second condition peaks near
0.9, which is consistent with the observation that some training blocks activated the
machine nearly always. The plot for the third condition has peaks near 0 and near
0.9. The first peak captures the idea that the test block might be similar to the
training blocks, which activated the machine very rarely. Given that none of the
training blocks activated the machine, one positive trial is enough to suggest that the
test block might be qualitatively different from all previous blocks, and the second
peak captures this hypothesis. The curve for the final condition peaks near 0.1, which
is the frequency with which the training blocks activated the machine.
Results
The four columns of Figure 5-8a show the results for each condition. Each participant
provided ratings for five intervals in response to each question, and these ratings can
be plotted as a curve. Figure 5-8a shows the mean curve for each question. The first
row shows predictions before the first test block has been placed in the machine, and
the second and third rows show predictions after a single trial for test blocks o− and
o+.
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Figure 5-8: Each column shows results for one of the four conditions in Experiment
1. (a) Mean responses across 24 participants. Each subplot shows predictions about
a new object that will undergo 100 trials, and each bar indicates the probability
that the total number of activations will fall within a certain interval. The x-axis
shows the activation strengths that correspond to each interval, and the y-axis shows
probability ratings on a scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 7 (very likely). Error bars for
this plot and all remaining plots show the standard error of the mean. (b) Individual
responses classified by curve shape. The y axis shows the number of participants who
gave responses of 7 different types, including flat curves (−), curves that increase (upslope)
or decrease (Â) monotonically, unimodal curves (⌢), and bimodal curves (⌣, ∼, ∽).
The ? category includes all curves that did not match any of these shapes.
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Note first that the plots in the third row are rather different from each other.4
Each plot shows predictions about a test block (o+) that has activated the machine
exactly once, and the differences between these plots confirm that experience with
previous blocks shapes people’s inferences about a sparsely observed novel block. Note
also that all of the plots in this row peak in the same places as the curves predicted
by the model (Figure 5-8a).
The plots in the second row are all decaying curves, since each condition includes
blocks that activate the machine rarely or not at all. Again, though, the differences
between the curves are interpretable, and match the predictions of the model. For
instance, the p = 0 curve decays more steeply than the others, which makes sense
since the training blocks for this condition never activate the machine.
The curves in the first row are again different from each other, and the curves for
p = 0 and p = 0.1 suggest that participants realize that blocks in these conditions
rarely activate the machine. The curves for the first two conditions show the most
substantial discrepancy between model predictions and human judgments. The model
predicts that both curves should be bimodal, and there is a trend in this direction
for the p = {0, 0.5} condition, but the p = {0.1, 0.9} curve is flat or unimodal. This
result is consistent with previous findings that participants expect distributions to
be unimodal, and may need to observe many samples from a distribution before
concluding that it is bimodal (Flannagan, Fried, & Holyoak, 1986). An alternative
interpretation is that learners rely on deterministic rules: they distinguish between
blocks that never produce the effect and blocks that sometimes produce the effect,
but not between blocks that produce the effect with different strengths. The first
interpretation seems more plausible, and we predict that people will recognize the
existence of two types in the p = {0.1, 0.9} condition when many blocks are observed
of each type. Our third experiment supports this prediction, although it does not
test it directly.
4We analyzed the results summarized in the third row using a two factor ANOVA with repeated
measures. There is no significant main effect of interval (F (4, 92) = 0.46, p > 0.5), but there is a
significant main effect of condition (F (3, 69) = 4.20, p < 0.01) and a significant interaction between
interval and condition (F (12, 276) = 6.90, p < 0.001).
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In all cases except one, the average responses in Figure 5-8a are consistent with
the responses of some individual participants. In Figure 5-8b, the curves provided by
individual participants have been grouped into eight categories based on their shapes.
In the p = {0, 0.5} condition, for instance, most participants generate a descending
curve (Â) after observing o− fail to activate the machine once, and most participants
generate an inverted-U curve (⌢) after observing o+ activate the machine once. Both
responses match the shape of the mean curves shown in Figure 5-8a. Given no trials
for the test block, however, some participants (−) appear unwilling to make inductive
predictions, others (Â and ⌢) appear to guess whether the test block will be a 0 block
or a 0.5 block, and a minority give a response (∽) that matches the mean curve and
indicates that the block could be a 0 block or a 0.5 block.
Although the responses of individual participants are revealing, I will focus on the
mean response, which indicates the consensus opinion about the causal strength of
a test block. Consider for instance the inference about test block o+ in the p = 0
condition, which is the only case where no participant gives a response that matches
the mean curve. Some participants seem confident that the o+ block will activate
the machine rarely, and that the single positive trial is an aberration. Others seem
confident that the test block will activate the machine most of the time. Even though
no single participant appears to entertain both hypotheses, the mean curve captures
the finding that both hypotheses are plausible. A model that generates a similar
curve has captured both of the hypotheses considered sensible by people.
Predicting the responses of individual participants is also a worthy challenge, and
future models may wish to address this problem. An accurate model of individual
behavior will need to consider some issues that we have been able to ignore. Individual
responses, for instance, are likely to have been influenced by the order in which blocks
were presented: a participant in the p = {0, 0.5} condition might reason that the last
block she saw was a 0 block, and that the next block will probably be similar. Some
models of categorization can capture order effects (Anderson, 1991; Love, Medin,
& Gureckis, 2004), and future work can explore how these effects play out in the
experimental paradigm we have chosen. We decided, however, to ignore these effects
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by counterbalancing presentation order across participants and by focusing on the
mean response.
Experiment 2: Learning about new causal types
Although a single observation of a new object is sometimes enough to overrule expec-
tations based on many previous objects, several trials may be required before learners
are confident that a new object is unlike any of the previous objects. We designed a
second experiment where participants receive increasing evidence that a new object
is different from all previous objects.
Participants
16 members of the MIT community were paid for participating in this experiment.
Materials and Methods
The experiment includes two within-participant conditions (p = 0 and p = 0.1) that
correspond to conditions 3 and 4 of Experiment 1. Each condition is very similar
to the corresponding condition from Experiment 1 except for two changes. Seven
observations are now provided for the two test blocks: for test block o−, the machine
fails to activate on each trial, and for test block o+ the machine activates on all test
trials except the second. Participants rate the causal strength of each test block after
each trial, and also provide an initial rating before any trials have been observed. As
before, participants are asked to imagine placing the test block in the machine 100
times, but instead of providing ratings for five intervals they now simply predict the
total number of activations out of 100 that they expect to see.
Model Predictions
Figure 5-9 shows the results when the schema-learning model is applied to the tasks
in Experiment 2. In both conditions, predictions about the test blocks track the
105
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0
50
100
o
−
: −−−−−−−
p =0
e
xp
ec
te
d
fre
qu
en
cy
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0
50
100
o
+
: +−+++++
trial
e
xp
ec
te
d
fre
qu
en
cy
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0
50
100
p =0.1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0
50
100
trial
Figure 5-9: Experiment 2: predictions of the schema-learning model.
observations provided, and the curves rise after each positive trial and fall after each
negative trial.
The most interesting predictions involve test block o+, which is qualitatively dif-
ferent from all of the training blocks. The o+ curves for both conditions attain similar
values by the final prediction, but the curve for the p = 0 condition rises more steeply
than the curve for the p = 0.1 condition. Since the training blocks in the p = 0.1
condition activate the machine on some occasions, the model needs more evidence
in this condition before concluding that block o+ is different from all of the training
blocks.
The predictions about test block o− also depend on the condition. In the p = 0
condition, none of the training blocks activates the machine, and the model predicts
that o− will also fail to activate the machine. In the p = 0.1 condition, each training
block can be expected to activate the machine about 15 times out of 100. The curve
for this condition begins at around 15, then gently decays as o− repeatedly fails to
activate the machine.
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Figure 5-10: Average learning curves for Experiment 2.
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Results
Figure 5-10 shows the average learning curves across 16 participants. The curves
are qualitatively similar to the model predictions, and as predicted the o+ curve for
the p = 0 condition rises more steeply than the corresponding curve for the p = 0.1
condition.5 Note that a simple associative account might predict the opposite result,
since the machine in condition p = 0.1 activates more times overall than the machine
in condition p = 0. Learning curves for individual participants are summarized in
Figure 5-11. In the p = 0 condition, six participants show learning curves for o+ that
match the shape of the mean curve (∼), but curves that increase monotonically (upslope)
are more common. The preference for increasing curves is even more pronounced in
the p = 0.1 condition.
Alternative models
As mentioned already, our experiments explore the tradeoff between conservatism
and flexibility. When a new object is sparsely observed, the schema-learning model
assumes that this object is similar to previously encountered objects (Experiment
1). Once more observations become available, the model may decide that the new
object is different from all previous objects, and should therefore be assigned to its
own causal type (Experiment 2). We can compare the schema-learning model to
two alternatives: a reactionary model that is overly conservative, and a revolutionary
model that is overly flexible. The reactionary model assumes that each new object
is just like one of the previous objects, and the revolutionary model ignores all of its
previous experience when making predictions about a new object.
We implemented the revolutionary model by assuming that the causal power of a
test block is identical to its empirical power—the proportion of trials on which it has
activated the machine. Predictions of this model are shown in Figure 5-12. When
5Since we expect that the p = 0 curve should be higher than the p = 0.1 curve from the second
judgment onwards, we ran a two factor ANOVA with repeated measures that excluded the first
judgment from each condition. There are significant main effects of condition (F (1, 15) = 6.11,
p < 0.05) and judgment number (F (6, 90) = 43.21, p < 0.01), and a significant interaction between
condition and judgment number (F (6, 90) = 2.67, p < 0.05).
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Figure 5-12: Predictions of the revolutionary model. (a) Experiment 1 (b) Experiment
2.
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applied to Experiment 1, the most obvious failing of the revolutionary model is that
it makes identical predictions about all four conditions. Note that the model does
not make predictions about the first row of Figure 5-7a, since at least one test trial is
needed to estimate the empirical power of a new block. When applied to Experiment
2, the model is unable to make predictions before any trials have been observed for
a given object, and after a single positive trial the model leaps to the conclusion
that test object o+ will always activate the machine. Neither prediction matches the
human data, and the model also fails to predict any difference between the p = 0 and
p = 0.1 conditions.
We implemented the reactionary model by assuming that the causal power of each
training block is identical to its empirical power, and that each test block is identical
to one of the training blocks. The model, however, does not know which training
block the test block will match, and makes a prediction that considers the empirical
powers of all training blocks, weighting each one by its proximity to the empirical
power of the test block. Formally, the distribution dn on the strength of a novel block
is defined to be
dn =
∑
iwidi∑
iwi
(5.5)
where di is the distribution for training block i, and is created by dividing the interval
[0, 1] into eleven equal intervals, setting di(x) = 11 for all values x that belong to the
same interval as the empirical power of block i, and setting di(x) = 0 for all remaining
values. Each weight wi is set to 1− |pn − pi|, where pn is the empirical power of the
novel block and pi is the empirical power of training block i. As Equation 5.5 suggests,
the reactionary model is closely related to exemplar models of categorization (D. L.
Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1986).
Predictions of the reactionary model are shown in Figure 5-13. The model ac-
counts fairly well for the results of Experiment 1, but is unable to account for Exper-
iment 2. Since the model assumes that test object o+ is just like one of the training
objects, it is unable to adjust when o+ activates the machine more frequently than
any previous object.
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Figure 5-13: Predictions of the reactionary model. (a) Experiment 1 (b) Experiment
2.
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Overall, neither baseline model can account for our results. As their names sug-
gest, the revolutionary model is too quick to throw away observations of previous
objects, and the reactionary model is unable to handle new objects that are qualita-
tively different from all previous objects. Other baseline models might be considered,
but we are aware of no simple alternative that will account for all of our data.
Our first two experiments deliberately focused on a very simple setting where
causal schemata are learned and used, but real world causal learning is often more
complex. The rest of this chapter will address some of these complexities: in partic-
ular, I show that our framework can incorporate perceptual features and can handle
contexts where objects interact to produce an effect.
Learning causal types given feature data
Imagine that you are allergic to nuts, and that one day you discover a small white
sphere in your breakfast cereal—a macadamia nut, although you do not know it. To
discover the causal powers of this novel object you could collect some causal data—
you could eat it and wait to see what happens. Probably, however, you will observe
the features of the object (its color, shape and texture) and decide to avoid it since
it is similar to other allergy-producing foods you have encountered.
A hierarchical Bayesian approach can readily handle the idea that instances of a
given causal type tend to have similar features (Figures 5-1c and 5-14). Suppose that
we have a matrix F which captures many features of the pills in our study, including
their sizes, shapes, colors, and imprints. We assume that objects belonging to the
same type have similar features. For instance, the schema in Figure 5-14 specifies
that objects of type t2 tend to have features f1 through f4, but objects of type t1
tend not to have these features. Formally, let the schema parameters Ψ¯ include a
matrix F¯ , where f¯j(t) specifies the expected value of feature fj within causal type
t.6 Building on previous models of categorization (Anderson, 1991), we assume that
6To apply Equation 5.6 we need to specify a prior distribution p(F¯ ) on this matrix. We assume
that all entries in the matrix are independent draws from a Beta(0.5, 0.5) distribution.
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Figure 5-14: Learning a schema and a set of causal models given event and feature
data (see Figure 5-1c). Objects belonging to the same type have similar causal powers
and similar features, and f¯i specifies the expected value of feature fi within each type.
The event and feature data shown are similar to the data used for Experiment 3.
the value of fj for object oi is generated by tossing a coin with bias f¯j(zi). Our goal
is now to use the features F along with the events V to learn a schema and a set of
causal models:
p(z, Ψ¯,Ψ|V, F ) ∝ P (V |Ψ)P (F |Ψ¯,z)p(Ψ|Ψ¯,z)p(Ψ¯|z)P (z). (5.6)
There are many previous models for discovering categories of objects with simi-
lar features (Anderson, 1991), and feature-based categorization is sometimes pitted
against causal categorization (Gopnik & Sobel, 2000). The schema-learning model
is based on the idea that real-world categories are often distinguished both by their
characteristic features and their characteristic causal interactions. More often than
not, one kind of information will support the categories indicated by the other, but
there will also be cases where the causal data and the feature data conflict. In cases
like this, the schema-learning model may discover the feature-based categories, the
causal categories, or some combination of both—the categories preferred will depend
on the relative weights of the statistical information present in the two kinds of data.
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Figure 5-15: (a) Features used in our simplified version of the Lien and Cheng (2000)
task. Feature f7 is shared by all and only the first eight objects, and f9 is shared only
by the first four objects. (b) Causal data for two conditions. 10 trials were shown for
each of the first 12 objects. In the horizontal condition, each object with feature f7
produces the effect on 8 out of 10 trials. In the vertical condition, only objects with
f1 regularly produce the effect.
condition o13 o14 o15
Human horizontal 6 24 43
vertical 73 90 98
Model horizontal 4 5 7
vertical 83 86 88
Preference for f1-match
Figure 5-16: Predictions for the sorting task of Lien and Cheng (2000). The first
two rows show the percentage of participants who grouped a novel object (o13, o14
or o15) with the f1-match (o1) rather than the f8-match (o10). Only participants in
the vertical condition tend to sort according to f1. The model predictions represent
the relative probability that each novel object belongs to the same causal type as the
f1-match.
Lien and Cheng data
Lien and Cheng (2000) ran several experiments that explore how perceptual features
and causal observations can both inform causal judgments. The schema-learning
model appears to handle all of their tasks, but here I will focus on a simplified version
of their first task. The effect of interest is whether a certain kind of plant blooms,
and the potential causes are 15 chemicals (objects o1 through o15). Figure 5-15a
shows that the features of these objects (f1 through f14) support two systems of
categorization. The first system is based on color: each object has a cool color (f7)
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or a warm color (f8), and the warm-colored objects are either yellow (f11), red (f12)
or orange (f14). The second system is based on shape: each object has an irregular
shape (f1) or a regular shape (f2) and there are three kinds of irregular shapes (f13,
f3 and f4).
The schema-learning model is shown 10 trials for each of the first 12 objects,
and Figure 5-15b summarizes the results of these trials. In the horizontal condition,
each object with a cool color (f7) causes blooming on 8 out of 10 occasions, and
the remaining objects lead to blooming less often. In the vertical condition, objects
with irregular shapes (f1) are the only ones that tend to cause blooming. In both
conditions, the model is shown that blooming occurs on 2 out of 10 trials when no
chemicals are applied.
The model can be tested by requiring it to reason about three objects (o13, o14
and o15) for which no trials were observed. Object o13 has a novel shape, o15 has a
novel color, and o14 is a novel combination of a known shape and known color. Each
novel object was presented as part of a trio that also included o1 and o10, and we
computed whether the model preferred to group each novel object with the shape
match (o1) or the color match (o10).
7 In the horizontal condition, the model prefers
to sort each trio according to color (f8), but in the vertical condition the model sorts
each trio according to shape (f1) (see Figure 5-16). Note that the feature data and
the causal data must be combined to produce this result: a model that relied on the
features alone would predict no difference between the two conditions, and a model
that used only the causal data would be unable to make useful predictions about the
three novel objects.
Since we modeled a simplified version of the Lien and Cheng task, the quantitative
predictions of the schema-learning model are not directly comparable to their results,
but Figure 5-16 shows that the model captures the main qualitative patterns in their
data.8 Note first that corresponding pairs of numbers fall on the same side of 50%:
7We implemented this sorting task by computing the posterior distribution p(z|V, F ), and com-
paring the probability that the novel object and its color match belong to the same causal type with
the probability that the novel object is grouped with the shape match.
8Lien and Cheng report that a handful of participants did not group the novel objects with
either the shape match or the color match. These participants were dropped before computing the
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in other words, the model prefers to sort according to shape (f1) only in the cases
where people show the same preference. Note also that the numbers for both people
and the model increase from left to right. For instance, out of the three novel objects,
participants and the model are most confident that o15 belongs with the f1-match.
This result makes sense since o15 is the only novel object with features that are more
similar to the f1-match (o1) than the f8-match (o10).
Although the schema-learning model accounts well for the Lien and Cheng data,
their task suggests an extension of our approach that is worth exploring. The schema-
learning model assumes that all features are weighted equally, and tends to prefer sets
of categories that account at least partially for all of the features. There are situations,
however, where some features correlate with the causal types but others should be
treated as noise. Each condition of the Lien and Cheng task is one of these situations:
in the horizontal condition, the shape features are uninformative, and in the vertical
condition, the color features are uninformative. To better capture cases like these we
can define a model that learns and uses weights for each feature. There is a chicken-
or-egg problem here: features with high weights should correlate well with the causal
types, and causal types are determined in part by the features with high weights.
Bayesian methods, however, can deal with this problem, and we can define a model
that simultaneously learns a set of causal types and an appropriate set of feature
weights.9
Neither of the baseline models described earlier can account for the data collected
by Lien and Cheng. The revolutionary model has no basis for making predictions
about the causal powers of the novel objects, (o13, o14 and o15) since no trials have
been observed for any of these objects. The reactionary model can be extended by
defining weights wi (Equation 5.5) such that wi is high if the empirical power of a
novel object is close to the empirical power of object oi and if these two objects have
similar features. This model, however, is also unable to account for the data. In the
vertical condition, object o13 has features that are more similar to the color match
percentages in Figure 5-16.
9See, for instance, work on Bayesian feature selection (E. I. George & McCulloch, 1993) and
automatic relevance determination (R. M. Neal, 1996).
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(o10) than the shape match (o1), yet people prefer to group o13 with the shape match
rather than the color match.
Lien and Cheng describe an alternative approach that does account for their data.
As we have seen, their experiment uses stimuli that can be organized into one or more
hierarchies, and where there are perceptual features that pick out each level in each
hierarchy. Each perceptual feature is assumed to be a potential cause of blooming, and
the probabilistic contrast for each cause c with respect to effect e is P (e|c)− P (e|c¯).
Lien and Cheng suggest that the best explanation of the effect is the cause with
maximum probabilistic contrast. The theoretical problem addressed by this principle
of maximum contrast is somewhat different from the problem of discovering causal
types. Lien and Cheng appear to assume that a learner already knows about several
overlapping causal types, where each type corresponds to a subtree of one of the
hierarchies. They do not discuss how these types might be discovered in the first
place, but they provide a method for identifying the type that best explains a novel
causal relation. We have focused on a different problem: the schema-learning model
does not assume that any causal types are known in advance, but shows how a single
set of non-overlapping types can be discovered.
The schema-learning model goes beyond the Lien and Cheng approach in at least
one important respect. Our model handles cases like Figure 5-14 where the features
provide a noisy indication of the underlying causal types, but the Lien and Cheng
approach can only handle causal types that correlate perfectly with an observable
feature. Although observable features are often a good guide to category membership,
many categories appear not to have defining features, and if defining features do exist,
they may not be easily observable. Two metal bars, for instance, may appear identical
on the surface, even though only one has micro-properties that make it a magnet. Our
first two experiments have already suggested that people discover causal types in the
absence of defining perceptual features. To further explore this claim, we developed
a task where the features of a set of objects correlate roughly with the underlying
causal types, but where there is no single feature that perfectly distinguishes these
types.
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Figure 5-17: Training data for Experiment 3.
Experiment 3: Combining causal and feature data
Participants
24 members of the MIT community were paid for participating in this experiment.
Experiment 3 was run immediately after Experiment 1, and the same participants
completed both tasks.
Materials and Methods
Participants are initially shown an empty machine that activates on 10 out of 20 trials.
10 blocks then appear on screen, and the features of these blocks support two family
resemblance categories (see Figures 5-5 and 5-17). Before any of the blocks are placed
in the machine, participants are informed that the blocks are laid out randomly, and
are encouraged to drag them around and organize them in a way that will help them
predict what effect they will have on the machine. Participants then observe 20 trials
for blocks o1 through o8, and see that blocks o1 through o4 activate the machine
rarely, but blocks o5 through o8 activate the machine most of the time. After 20
trials for each block, participants respond to the same question used in Experiment
1: they imagine 100 trials involving the block, and indicate how likely it is that the
total number of activations will fall into each of 5 intervals. After this training phase,
participants answer the same question for test blocks o− and o+ without seeing any
trials involving these blocks. Experiment 1 explored one-shot learning, and this new
task might be described as zero-shot learning. After making predictions for the two
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Figure 5-18: Results for Experiment 3. (a) Predictions of the schema-learning model.
(b) Mean responses across 24 participants. (c) Ratings for individual participants
classified by curve shape.
test blocks, participants are asked to sort the blocks into two categories “according
to their effect on the machine,” and to explain the categories they chose.
Model predictions
Predictions of the schema-learning model are shown in Figure 5-18a. Each plot shows
the posterior probability that a test block will activate the machine on any given
trial.10 Both plots have two peaks, indicating that the model has discovered two
causal types, but is not certain about the type assignments of the test blocks. The
plots are skewed in opposite directions: based on the features of the test blocks, the
model predicts that o− will activate the machine rarely, and that o+ will activate the
machine often.
Predictions about the sorting task are summarized in Figure 5-19a. The top
three sorts are included, and the most probable solution according to the model is
the family resemblance sort. Although the model allows sorts with any number of
10Unlike Experiment 1, the background rate is non-zero, and these posterior distributions are not
equivalent to distributions on the causal power of a test block.
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categories (including one, three or more), the probabilities shown in Figure 5-18a are
calculated with respect to the class of all two-category solutions.
Results
Mean responses for the two test blocks are shown in Figure 5-18b. Both plots are
U-shaped curves, suggesting that participants realize that some blocks activate the
machine rarely and others activate the machine often, but that few blocks activate
the machine half the time. As predicted, the curves are skewed in opposite direc-
tions, indicating that o+ is considered more likely to activate the machine than o−.11
Responses made by individual participants are summarized in Figure 5-18b. Most
participants chose U-shaped curves, but the next most popular choices are decreasing
curves (for o−) and increasing curves (for o+).
The U-shaped curves in Figure 5-18b resolve a question left open by Experiment 1.
Responses to the s¯ = {0.1, 0.9} condition of the first experiment did not indicate that
participants had identified two causal types, but the U-shaped curves in Figure 5-
18b suggest that participants recognized two types of blocks. All of the blocks in
Experiment 3 produce the effect sometimes, and the U-shaped curves suggest that
participants can use probabilistic criteria to organize objects into causal types. Two
differences between Experiment 3 and the second condition of Experiment 1 seem
particularly important. In Experiment 3, more blocks are observed for each type
(4 rather than 3), and more trials are observed for each block (20 rather than 10).
Experiment 3 therefore provides more statistical evidence that there are two types of
blocks.
Responses to the sorting task are summarized in Figure 5-19b. All sorts that
were chosen by two or more participants are shown, and there are eight additional
sorts that were chosen by one participant each. The most popular sort organizes
the blocks into the two family resemblance categories, and is chosen by 8 out of 24
11We ran a two factor ANOVA which compared ratings for the first (0-20) and last (80-100)
intervals across the two test blocks. There is no main effect of interval (F (1, 23) = 0.056, p > 0.5)
or of test block (F (1, 23) = 1.50, p > 0.1), but there is a significant interaction between interval and
test block (F (1, 23) = 6.90, p < 0.05).
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Figure 5-19: Sorts for experiment 3. (a) Relative probabilities of five sorts according
to the schema-learning model. Each sort is represented as a vector that specifies
category assignments for the ten objects in Figure 5-17. The model prefers the family
resemblance sort. (b) Top five sorts chosen by participants. Any sort not shown was
chosen by at most one participant.
participants. Studies of feature-based categorization have consistently found that
family resemblance sorts are rare, and that participants prefer instead to sort objects
according to a single dimension (e.g. size or color) (D. L. Medin, Wattenmaker, &
Hampson, 1987). Figure 5-19b therefore suggests that the causal information provided
in Experiment 3 overcomes the strong tendency to form categories based on a single
perceptual dimension.
Note that the sorting task is relatively demanding, and that participants who do
not organize the blocks carefully as they go along are likely to forget how many times
each block activated the machine. Even though participants were asked to sort the
blocks according to their effect on the machine, only 13 out of 24 assigned blocks
o1 through o4 to one group and blocks o5 through o8 to the other group. Some of
the remaining participants may have deliberately chosen an alternative solution, but
others gave explanations suggesting that they had lost track of the training trials.
The schema-learning model accounts well for our results, but other models will
make similar predictions. For instance, a feature-based version of the reactionary
model predicts that o+ is likely to activate the machine, since this test block has
features similar to blocks that have previously activated the machine. The schema-
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Figure 5-20: Learning about interactions between objects. The schema specifies the
causal powers of each type and of each pair of types (the pair t1+t2 is not shown).
The collection of causal models includes a model for each pair of objects. The event
data are inspired by the experiment of Shanks and Darby (1998). The model groups
the objects into two types: objects belonging to type t1 cause the effect on their own
but not when paired with each other, and objects belonging to type t2 cause the effect
only when paired with each other.
learning model is not alone in accounting for Experiment 3, but this experiment does
rule out approaches (such as the principle of maximal contrast) which assume that
causal types have defining features.
Discovering interactions between causal types
So far we have considered problems where at most one object oi can be present at a
time. Suppose now that multiple objects can be present on any trial. For instance,
consider the problem of discovering which drugs produce a certain allergy—two drugs
which are innocuous on their own may produce the allergy when combined. Our goal
is to discover a schema and a set of causal models that allow us to predict whether
any given combination of drugs is likely to produce an allergic reaction. Formally, we
would like to learn a causal model M for each possible combination of objects.
We assume that each combination of objects corresponds to a conjunctive cause
that may be generative or preventive, and extend Ψ to include an arrow a, a polarity
g and a strength s for each combination of objects. We extend the schema in a
similar fashion, and include schema parameters a¯, g¯, s¯ and σ¯ for each combination
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of causal types. The causal model parameters for sets of objects are generated, as
before, from the schema parameters for the corresponding set of types. For instance,
Figure 5-20 shows how the causal model for o13+o14 is generated from the schema-level
knowledge that pairs of objects drawn from type t2 tend, in combination, to generate
the effect with strength 0.9. As before, we assume that a generative background cause
of strength b is always present.
There are several possible strategies for handling conjunctive causes and our ap-
proach makes several simplifying assumptions. For instance, we assume that the
causal power of a conjunction of objects is independent of the causal powers that
correspond to any subset of these objects. Future work can aim to relax these simpli-
fying assumptions, and to combine the schema-learning model with a sophisticated
approach to conjunctive causality. As an initial step, it should be relatively straight-
forward to combine our framework with the model of conjunctive causality developed
by Novick and Cheng (2004).
Shanks and Darby data
Shanks and Darby (1998) ran an experiment which suggests that humans can acquire
abstract knowledge about interactions between causal types. These authors used a
task where the potential causes were foods, and the effect of interest was an allergic
reaction. The data observed by participants in their second experiment are shown in
Figure 5-20.12 When supplied with these data, the schema-learning model discovers
two causal types: foods of type t1 (o1 through o8) produce the allergy on their own,
but foods of type t2 (o9 through o16) do not. The model also discovers that two foods
of type t2 will produce the allergy when eaten together, but two foods of type t1 will
not (Figure 5-20).
Shanks and Darby were primarily interested in predictions about cases which
had never been observed in training—the cases underlined in the bottom section of
Figure 5-20. Their participants can be divided into two groups according to their
scores when tested on the training data. Learners in the high group (learners who
12Different participants saw different amounts of training data, but we overlook this detail.
123
scored well on the test) tended to make the same predictions as our model: for
instance, they tended to predict that o7 and o8 produce the allergy when eaten in
isolation, that o15 and o16 do not, that the combination of o13 and o14 produces the
allergy, and that the combination of o5 and o6 does not. Learners in the low group
tended to make the opposite predictions: for instance, they tended to predict that
o7 and o8 do not produce the allergy when eaten in isolation. Since the schema-
learning model does not suffer from memory limitations or lapses of attention, it is
not surprising that it accounts only for the predictions of learners who absorbed the
information provided during training.
Conclusion
This chapter described a hierarchical Bayesian model (Figure 5-1c) for learning causal
schemata. Each schema organizes a set of objects into causal types, and specifies the
causal powers and characteristic features of each type. The schema-learning model
supports several kinds of inferences. We focused on bottom-up inferences and saw
that the model helps to explain how a causal schema and a set of specific causal
models can be simultaneously learned given event data and feature data. If the
causal schema is known in advance, then the model serves as a computational theory
of top-down causal inference, and explains how inferences about a set of causal models
can simultaneously draw on low-level event data and high-level knowledge.
The schema-learning model exploits the fact that probabilistic approaches are
modular and can be composed to build integrated models of inductive reasoning.
The model in Figure 5-1c can be created by combining three models: probabilistic
causal models (Pearl, 2000) specify how the event data are generated given a set of
causal models, the infinite relational model (Kemp, Tenenbaum, Griffiths, Yamada,
& Ueda, 2006) specifies how the causal models are generated, and Anderson’s rational
approach to categorization (Anderson, 1991) specifies how the features are generated.
Since all three models work with probabilities it is straightforward to combine them
and create a single integrated framework for causal reasoning.
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We saw that the schema-learning model helps to explain some aspects of the data
collected by Lien and Cheng (2000) and Shanks and Darby (1998), and it also ac-
counts for several other results in the literature. Waldmann and Hagmayer (2006)
showed that a known set of categories can influence future causal learning, and the
model predicts a similar result if we fix the causal types z then use the model to
discover a set of causal models given event data. Our approach can also model ex-
periments carried out using the blicket detector (Gopnik & Sobel, 2000) or causal
blocks world (Tenenbaum & Niyogi, 2003) paradigms. Many aspects of these ex-
periments have been previously modeled, but the schema-learning model captures
phenomena that are not addressed by most existing models. For instance, the model
suggests why two identical looking blocks might both be categorized as blickets even
though a handful of observations suggest that they have different effects on a blicket
detector (Gopnik & Sobel, 2000).
Our experiments used adult participants but some of the most fundamental causal
schemata are probably acquired relatively early in development. Several studies con-
firm that young children know that objects of certain types tend to have certain kinds
of effects: for instance, children know that flashlights generate spots of light (Shultz,
1982), and that hammers can break brittle objects (R. Gelman, Bullock, & Meck,
1980). It is less clear how this knowledge emerges, but experiments similar to ours
might be able to trace the developmental course of schema acquisition. Experiments
using blicket detectors (Gopnik & Sobel, 2000) have been used to study the causal
knowledge of preschoolers, and the tasks I described rely on a very similar paradigm.
Several extensions of the schema-learning model may be worth exploring. We re-
stricted ourselves to problems where the distinction between a set of potential causes
and a set of effects13 is known in advance, but in some cases this distinction may
need to be learned (Mansinghka, Kemp, Tenenbaum, & Griffiths, 2006). A second
limitation is that we focused on cases where feature data and contingency data rep-
resent the only input to our model. Human learners are sometimes directly supplied
13This chapter has focused on problems where there is a single effect, but our approach also
handles problems with multiple effects, and can group these effects into types.
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with abstract causal knowledge—for example, a science student might be told that
“pineapple juice is an acid, and acids turn litmus paper red.” Statements like these
correspond to fragments of a causal schema, and future experiments should explore
how schemata are learned when parts of these schemata are directly supplied.
Causal inferences are guided by many kinds of constraints, and the schemata
discussed in this chapter only capture some of these constraints. The schemata I con-
sidered are closely related to the grouping schemata described by Kelley (1972), but
Kelley also discusses some other kinds of schemata. Some of these schemata specify
the manner in which multiple causes interact: for instance, a schema for multiple suf-
ficient causes indicates that any of several causes is sufficient to produce an effect, and
a schema with additive effects indicates that the strength of the effect is determined
by the cumulative strength of the relevant causes. Other causal constraints specify
the temporal properties of causal interactions, and one basic example is a constraint
which specifies that causes precede effects. Still other constraints may indicate the
expected properties of interventions: for instance, Pearl’s “do-calculus” can be seen
as a set of constraints on causal reasoning. Although this chapter has focused on one
class of causal constraints, many different constraints can be captured by hierarchical
Bayesian models, and future work can explore how some of these constraints might
be learned.
Top-down and bottom-up approaches to learning are sometimes seen as competi-
tors, and the debate between these approaches is especially prominent in the literature
on causal learning. More often than not, competing accounts of a phenomenon both
capture some element of the truth, and situations like this can be handled by building
unified models that subsume the two competing views. This chapter described a hi-
erarchical Bayesian model that unifies top-down and bottom-up approaches to causal
reasoning. The model recognizes that abstract causal knowledge is crucial for making
inferences about objects that are sparsely observed, and suggests how this knowledge
is acquired by bottom-up learning. Similar conflicts between top-down and bottom-up
approaches are found in other areas of cognitive science, and the hierarchical Bayesian
approach can help to resolve these conflicts wherever they occur.
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Chapter 6
The discovery of structural form
The previous chapters described models which incorporate two kinds of represen-
tations: category structures (Chapters 4 and 5) and graph structures (Chapter 5).
Neither kind of representation is especially complex, but these models do demon-
strate that the hierarchical Bayesian approach can handle structured representations
(Table 1.2b). One reason why structured representations matter is that they capture
inductive constraints which guide inferences about different domains. Grammars
guide inferences about sentences (Chomsky, 1965), folk taxonomies guide inferences
about living kinds (Atran, 1998), and causal graphical models (Pearl, 2000) guide
inferences about the causal consequences of actions. Since different domains call for
different representations, we are faced with the problem of form discovery : how can a
learner discover which form of representation is best for a given domain? This chapter
describes a hierarchical Bayesian model that addresses a special case of this problem.
Some of the clearest examples of form discovery come from the history of science.
For centuries, Europeans believed that the natural representation for biological species
was the “great chain of being,” a linear structure in which every living thing found a
place according to its degree of perfection (Lovejoy, 1970). In 1735, Linnaeus famously
proposed that relationships between plant and animal species are best captured by a
The work in this chapter was carried out in collaboration with Joshua Tenenbaum. A very
preliminary version of this work was presented at the 26th Annual Conference of the Cognitive
Science Society in 2004.
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tree structure (Figure 6-1b), setting the agenda for all biological classification since.
Mendeleev made a similar breakthrough when he recognized the periodic structure
of the chemical elements and proposed a specific representation with this form—his
periodic table of 1869.
Scientific breakthroughs like these occur relatively rarely, but children may make
analogous discoveries when learning about the structure of different domains. Chil-
dren may learn, for example, that social networks are often organized into cliques,
that temporal categories such as the seasons or the days of the week can be arranged
into cycles, that comparative relations such as “longer than” or “better than” are
transitive (Piaget, 1965; Shultz, 2003), and that category labels can be organized
into hierarchies (Rosch, 1978). Structural forms for some cognitive domains may
be known innately, but many appear to be genuine discoveries. When learning the
meanings of words, children initially seem to organize objects into non-overlapping
clusters, with one category label allowed per cluster (Markman, 1989): hierarchies
of category labels are recognized only later (Rosch, 1978). When reasoning about
comparative relations, children’s inferences respect a transitive ordering by the age
of seven but not before (Shultz & Vogel, 2004). In both of these cases, structural
forms appear to be learned, but children are not explicitly taught to organize these
domains into hierarchies or dimensional orders.
A learner who discovers the structural form of a domain has acquired a powerful
set of inductive constraints. The story of Mendeleev includes a compelling example
of the inductive leverage that structural forms can provide. Mendeleev used his pe-
riodic table to predict both the existence and the properties of several undiscovered
elements, and to demonstrate that some of the atomic weights he had been using were
inaccurate. Children make inferences that are analogous, if somewhat less dramatic.
Discovering the clique structure of social networks can allow a child to predict the out-
come of interactions between individuals who may never have interacted previously.
Discovering the hierarchical structure of category labels allows a child to predict that
a creature called a “chihuahua” might also be a dog and an animal, but cannot be
both a dog and a cat.
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Figure 6-1: Discovering the structure that best accounts for a matrix of binary fea-
tures. (a) A conventional model (cf. Figure 2-3a) which assumes that the form of
the structure is fixed in advance (here assumed to be a tree). Two possible trees are
shown: traditional taxonomies group crocodiles with lizards, snakes and turtles, but
contemporary phylogenies assert that crocodiles are better grouped with birds (Purves
et al., 2001). (b) A hierarchical model (cf. Figure 2-3b) that simultaneously discovers
the form and the structure that best account for the data. Three possible pairs of
forms and structures are shown. The tree is inspired by the Linnaean taxonomy, and
the chain is inspired by Bonnet’s version of the “great chain of being” (C. White,
2001). A ring structure might not seem suitable for the species shown here, but has
recently been proposed as the best model of relationships between microbes (Rivera
& Lake, 2004).
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This chapter argues that the hierarchical Bayesian approach helps to explain how
humans discover the best kind of representation for a domain. The problem of form
discovery is not addressed by conventional models of learning, which search only for
structures of a single form that is assumed to be known in advance (Figure 6-1a). Clus-
tering or competitive-learning algorithms (Anderson, 1991; D. Rumelhart & McClel-
land, 1986) assume that the data fall into some number of disjoint groups, algorithms
for hierarchical clustering (Duda, Hart, & Stork, 2000) or phylogenetic reconstruc-
tion (Huelsenbeck & Ronquist, 2001) assume that the data are tree-structured, and
algorithms for dimensionality reduction (Pearson, 1901; Spearman, 1904) or multidi-
mensional scaling (Torgeson, 1965) assume that the data have an underlying spatial
geometry. Unlike these algorithms, our model simultaneously discovers the structural
form and the instance of that form that best explain the data (Figure 6-1b). Our ap-
proach can handle many kinds of data, including attributes, relations, and measures
of similarity, and I will show that it successfully discovers the structural forms of a
diverse set of real-world domains.
Here we make the simplifying assumption that there is a single best representa-
tion for each data set that we consider. Often, however, a single domain will have
several useful representations (Moray, 1990; Heit & Rubinstein, 1994; Shafto et al.,
2006). For instance, a taxonomic tree might capture the anatomical relationships
between a set of animals, but a set of ecological categories (including land animals,
sea animals, predators and prey) might be a better representation of the ecological
relationships between the animals. The problem of learning multiple representations
for a given data set can be approached in several ways (see Shafto et al. (2006) for
one example), and some of these approaches can be incorporated into future models
of form discovery.
A hypothesis space of structural forms
Any algorithm for form discovery must specify the space of structural forms it is able
to discover. We represent structures using graphs, and use graph grammars (En-
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Structural Form Generative process
Partition ⇒
Chain ⇒
Order ⇒
Ring ⇒
Hierarchy ⇒
Tree ⇒
Grid Chain × Chain
Cylinder Chain × Ring
(b)
(c)
(d)
(a)
⇒
⇒
⇒
⇒
⇒
⇒
⇒
⇒
⇒
⇒
Figure 6-2: A hypothesis space of structural forms. (a) Eight structural forms and
the generative processes that produce them. Open nodes represent clusters of objects:
a hierarchy has clusters located internally, but a tree may only have clusters at its
leaves. The first six processes are node-replacement graph grammars. Each grammar
uses a single production, and each production specifies how to replace a parent node
with two child nodes. The seed for each grammar is a graph with a single node (in
the case of the ring, this node has a self-link). (b)(c)(d) Growing chains, orders and
trees. At each step in each derivation, the parent and child nodes are shown in grey.
The red arrows in each production represent all edges that enter or leave a parent
node. When applying the order production, all nodes that previously sent a link to
the parent node now send links to both children.
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gelfriet & Rozenberg, 1997) as a unifying language for expressing a wide range of
structural forms (Figure 6-2). Of the many possible forms, we assume that the most
natural are those that can be derived from simple generative processes (Leyton, 1992).
Each of the first six forms in Figure 6-2a can be generated using a single context-free
production that replaces a parent node with two child nodes, and specifies how to con-
nect the children to each other and to the neighbors of the parent node. Figures 6-2b,
6-2c and 6-2d show how three of these productions generate chains, orders and trees.
In each case, we grow a representation by starting with a seed graph and repeatedly
splitting nodes according to the grammar. For all forms except the ring, the seed is
a graph with one node and no edges. For the ring, the seed is a single-node graph
with a self link. The remaining forms in Figure 6-2—the grid and the cylinder—can
be expressed as products of simpler forms. A grid is the Cartesian graph product
of two chains, and a cylinder is the product of a ring and a chain.1 We grow grids
by representing the two dimensions separately, and using the chain grammar to grow
each dimension. Cylinders are generated similarly.
It is striking that the simple grammars in Figure 6-2a generate many of the struc-
tural forms discussed by psychologists (Shepard, 1980) and assumed by algorithms
for unsupervised learning or exploratory data analysis. Partitions (Anderson, 1991;
Fiske, 1992), chains (Guttman, 1944), orders (Fiske, 1992; Inhelder & Piaget, 1964;
Bradley & Terry, 1952), rings (Guttman, 1954; Wiggins, 1996), trees (Inhelder & Pi-
aget, 1964; Sneath & Sokal, 1973; Huelsenbeck & Ronquist, 2001), hierarchies (Collins
& Quillian, 1969; Carroll, 1976) and grids (Kohonen, 1997) appear again and again
in formal models across many different literatures. To highlight just one example, In-
helder and Piaget (1964) suggest that the elementary logical operations in children’s
thinking are founded on two forms: a classification structure that can be modeled as a
tree, and a seriation structure that can be modeled as an order. The popularity of the
forms in Figure 6-2 suggests that they are useful for describing the world, and that
1A two dimensional Euclidean space can be generated as the regular Cartesian product of two
chains, where each chain is viewed as a continuous dimension rather than a graph. Our generative
model for feature data extends naturally to continuous spaces, but here we consider only graph
structures.
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Figure 6-3: Generating graph grammars from a meta-grammar. (a) A meta-grammar:
the six grammars in Figure 6-2 correspond to subsets of the production shown here.
(b)(c)(d) Subsets of the meta-grammar that grow chains, orders and trees.
they spring to mind naturally when scientists seek formal descriptions of a domain.
Although we focus on the eight forms in Figure 6-2, it is natural to consider other
possibilities. I have suggested that graph grammars provide a unifying language
for expressing many different structural forms, and ultimately it may be possible to
develop a “universal structure grammar” (cf. Chomsky (1965)) that generates all and
only the cognitively natural forms. As an initial step towards this goal, it is useful
to recognize that all of the grammars in Figure 6-2 can be generated as subsets of
the meta-grammar in Figure 6-3. This meta-grammar generates grammars for many
other structural forms, some of which (although certainly not all) are likely to be
useful for structure discovery. In principle, a learning system could begin with just
this meta-grammar and go on to discover any form that is consistent with the meta-
grammar.
Each of the grammars we consider uses a single production, but additional forms
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Figure 6-4: Cluster graphs and entity graphs. (a) A cluster graph that is incompatible
with the grid form, since the middle node will be empty if the graph is projected onto
the vertical axis. (b) A cluster graph that is compatible with the grid form. (c) An
entity graph corresponding to the cluster graph in (b).
can be generated if we allow grammars with multiple productions, and productions
where the edges on the right hand side are chosen probabilistically. This chapter
will focus on simple grammars that generate some of the most frequently used forms,
but further exploration of the space of grammars is an important direction for future
work.
Now that we have a hypothesis space of structural forms, the problem of form
discovery can be posed. Given a data set D that contains information about a set of
entities, we wish to find the form F and the structure S of that form that best capture
the relationships between these entities. We approach this problem by defining a
hierarchical Bayesian model (Figure 6-1) and searching for the structure S and form
F that maximize the posterior probability
P (S, F |D) ∝ P (D|S)P (S|F )P (F ). (6.1)
To complete the model we must formally specify the terms on the right hand side
of Equation 6.1. P (F ) is a uniform distribution over the forms under consideration,
and the remaining two terms are described in the next sections.
134
Generating structures from structural forms
Suppose that we are working with a set of n entities.2 Let S be a cluster graph, or a
graph where the nodes correspond to clusters of entities. S is compatible with F if S
can be generated by the generative process defined for F , and if S contains no empty
nodes when projected along any of its component dimensions (Figure 6-4).3 There is
a finite collection of structures that are compatible with a given form F , and P (S|F )
is non-zero only for graphs in this collection. To encourage the model to choose the
simplest adequate representation for a domain, we weight each structure according
to the number of nodes it contains:
P (S|F ) ∝


0 S is incompatible with F
θ(1− θ)|S| otherwise
(6.2)
where |S| is the number of nodes in S.4
The parameter θ determines the extent to which graphs with many clusters are
penalized, and is fixed for all of our experiments. We set θ = 1−e−3, which means that
each additional node reduces the log probability of a structure by 3. The normalizing
constant for P (S|F ) depends on the number of structures compatible with a given
form, and ensures that simpler forms are preferred whenever possible. For example,
any chain Schain is a special case of a grid, but P (Schain|Fchain) > P (Schain|Fgrid) since
there are more possible grids than chains given a fixed number of entities. Computing
the normalizing constant for P (S|F ) requires some simple combinatorics, and details
are provided in an appendix.
2There are methods for learning partitions (Escobar & West, 1995) and trees (R. Neal, 2003)
when the set of entities is countably infinite, and future work should consider whether these methods
can be used to develop a framework for learning many kinds of forms.
3In the case of trees, internal nodes are required to be empty, but we do not allow empty leaf
nodes.
4If S is a tree, since entities may only appear at its leaves, we adopt the convention that |S| is
equal to the number of leaf nodes in S.
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Feature data
The remaining term in Equation 6.1, P (D|S), measures how well the structure S
accounts for the data D. Its definition depends on whether the data are feature
values, similarity ratings or relations. We consider all three cases, but we assume first
that D is a feature matrix where the (i, j) entry in the matrix indicates the value of
entity i on feature j (see Figure 6-1).
When working with feature data, we represent the structure of a set of entities
using undirected entity graphs. Cluster graphs are converted to entity graphs by
adding a node for each entity, connecting each entity to the cluster node that contains
it, and replacing each directed edge with an undirected link (Figure 6-4). We set
P (D|S) = P (D|Sent) where Sent is the entity graph corresponding to cluster graph
S.5
Given an entity graph Sent, P (D|Sent) should be high if the features in D vary
smoothly over the graph—that is, if entities nearby in Sent tend to have similar feature
values. In Figure 6-1a, for instance, feature f1 is smooth over both trees, f3 is smoother
over the left tree than the right tree, and f6 is smooth over neither tree. We capture the
expectation of smoothness by assuming that the features are independently generated
by a zero-mean Gaussian process over the graph Sent (Zhu, Lafferty, & Ghahramani,
2003). Under this model, each candidate graph Sent specifies how entities are expected
to covary in their feature values, and the distribution P (D|Sent) favors graphs that
capture as much of this covariance as possible. A more detailed description of the
model is provided in the appendix.
Now that we have fully specified a hierarchical model we can use it for several
purposes. If the form of a data set is already known, we can search for the structure
S that maximizes P (S|F ) (Figure 6-1a). If the form of the data is not known,
at least two strategies might be tried. For some applications it may be desirable
to integrate over the space of structures S and compare forms according to their
posterior probabilities P (F |D). We chose, however, to search for the structure S and
5Note that an order becomes a fully connected graph when directed edges are converted to
undirected edges.
136
form F that jointly maximize P (S, F |D) (Equation 6.1). Two factors motivate this
approach. First, we are interested in discovering the structure S that best accounts for
the data. Maintaining a posterior distribution over structures may lead to optimal
predictions about unobserved features, but human learners often appear to choose
just one representation for a problem. Second, even if we wanted to integrate over
the space of structures, computing the integral P (F |D) =
∫
P (F, S|D)P (S|D)dS is
a difficult challenge. Future research should attempt to address this challenge, since
integrating over structures may prove useful when applying the form-discovery model
to machine learning problems.
Experiments
We generated synthetic data to test the form-discovery algorithm on cases where the
true structure was known. Figure 6-5 shows graphs used to generate five data sets,
and the structures found by fitting five different forms to the data. The final column
in Figure 6-5 compares the scores for the five forms, and shows that the true form
is correctly recovered in each case. Special-purpose learning algorithms already exist
for several of these forms, including partitions and trees (Shepard, 1980; Duda et al.,
2000). The form-discovery model subsumes many of these previous algorithms, and
discovers in addition which form is best for each data set.
Animals
Next we applied the model to several real-world data sets, in each case considering
all forms in Figure 6-2. The first data set is a matrix of animal species and their
biological and ecological properties. It consists of human judgments about 33 species
and 106 features, and amounts to a larger and noisier version of the data set shown
schematically in Figure 6-1. We collected the data by asking a single subject to
make binary decisions about whether 106 features applied to 60 animal species. The
data include perceptual features (is black), anatomical features (has feet), ecological
features (lives in the ocean) and behavioral features (makes loud noises). The data
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Figure 6-5: Structure discovery results for synthetic data. Five sets of features were
generated over the graphs in the left column, and five forms were fit to each dataset.
The structures found are drawn so that entity positions correspond to positions in
the picture of the true structure. Each entity has been connected to the cluster node
to which it belongs: for instance, all graphs in the top row have six clusters. The
final column shows log posteriors log(P (S, F |D)) for the best structures found, and
the best scoring structure is marked with an asterisk. The difference between the
scores for the top two structures ranges from 0.63 (indicating that the chain is about
twice as likely as the grid on the chain-structured data) to 2245 (indicating that the
grid is many orders of magnitude more likely than the ring on the grid-structured
data). Each plot has been scaled so that the worst performing structure receives a
score close to zero.
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analyzed here include 33 species (the species in Figure 6-6a) that were chosen to be
representative of the full set.
Given these biological data the model concludes that the best scoring form is
the tree. This result is consistent with the finding that cultures all over the world
appear to organize living kinds into tree-structured representations (Atran, 1998).6
The ultimate reason why trees are useful for representing relationships between living
kinds is that species were generated by a branching process—the process of evolution.
The best tree found by the model (Figure 6-6a) includes subtrees that correspond to
categories at several levels of resolution, including mammals, primates, rodents, birds,
insects, and flying insects.
Scores for each form on the biological data set are shown in Figure 6-7. Since
our search algorithm is not deterministic, these figures were generated by running
the algorithm 10 times and choosing the best structure found. Note that the scores
in Figure 6-7 represent log probabilities: for instance, the best tree-structured rep-
resentation for the biological data is around 10 times more probable than the best
hierarchy, and around 150 times more probable than the best chain. Recall that a
hierarchy is a tree where entities (here animals) are located both at the leaves and
at the internal nodes. Since the tree and the hierarchy can both capture branch-
ing structures, it makes sense that both forms provide a relatively good account of
biological data.
Judges
The second data set is a matrix of votes from the United States Supreme Court,
including 13 judges and their votes on 1596 cases. The data include all cases heard
between October 1987 and June 2005.7 This period covers all of the Rehnquist natural
6Given that folk taxonomies appear to be systems of nested categories, it is interesting that
scientists took so many years to formalize this idea. One possible explanation is that the hierarchical
structure of folk taxonomies is only implicit, and that it took a Linnaeus to make this structure
explicit.
7The unit of analysis is the case citation (ANALU=0), and we included cases where DEC TYPE
equals 1 or 5 (Spaeth, 2005). Voting behaviors were converted to binary values: regular concurrence
(3) and special concurrence (4) were converted to majority votes (1), and non-participation (5) was
treated as missing data. Any case with a voting behavior other than 1 through 5 was removed from
139
courts except the first. Since at most 9 judges voted on any of the cases, the data
include many missing entries. We assume that the unobserved entries are missing
completely at random, and integrate over all possible values for these entries.8
Some political scientists (Grofman & Brazill, 2002) have argued that a unidimen-
sional structure best accounts for variation in Supreme Court data and in political
beliefs more generally, although other structural forms (including higher-dimensional
spaces (Wilcox & Clausen, 1991) and sets of clusters (Fleishman, 1986)) are also
considered. Consistent with the unidimensional hypothesis, the model identifies the
chain as the best-scoring form, and the best chain (Figure 6-6b) organizes the thirteen
judges from liberal (Marshall and Brennan) to conservative (Thomas and Scalia). The
next best form is the hierarchy, which is not surprising since each chain is a special
case of a hierarchy.
Even though our generative model for features assumes that the data are contin-
uous, Figures 6-6a and 6-6b were learned from binary features. If possible, it would
be better to analyze these data sets using a generative model for binary data. Gen-
erative models analogous to Equation 2 can be defined for binary features (Ackley
et al., 1985), but structure learning becomes more difficult: in particular, computing
P (D|S) is challenging when S is multiply connected. Future models can attempt to
address the computational challenges we have avoided by working with a Gaussian
generative process.
Similarity data
If similarity is assumed to be a measure of covariance, the feature-based model can
also discover structure in similarity data. Under the generative model for features, the
the analysis.
8In general, we cannot simply ignore the missing data when learning structural forms. If two
judges never sat on the same court, there are no features observed for both of them, which encourages
the model to assign them to the same node in the structure if their ideological positions are even
roughly similar. (Given fully observed data, two entities will usually be assigned to the same node
only if they are highly similar.) Groupings of this sort can affect the relative scores of different
structural forms. We excluded the first Rehnquist court since Kennedy and Powell (who sat only
on that court, and whom Kennedy replaced in 1988) tended to be assigned to the same node, and
this grouping appears to be heavily influenced by the fact that these judges never served together.
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Figure 6-6: Structures learned from (a) biological features, (b) Supreme Court votes,
(c) judgments of the similarity between pure color wavelengths, (d) Euclidean dis-
tances between faces represented as pixel vectors, and (e) distances between world
cities. For (a)-(c), the edge lengths represent maximum a posteriori edge lengths
under the generative model in Equations 3 and 5.
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Figure 6-7: Scores for eight structural forms on feature and similarity data. (a) Each
score represents log(P (S, F |D)) where S is the best structure found for form F . The
scores have been translated that the lowest score in each case is close to zero. Recall
that a connected structure is the same as an undirected order. (b) Relative scores
for the top four forms for each data set. The differences between these scores are the
same as the differences in (a).
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equation for P (D|S) includes only two components that depend on D: the number of
features observed (m), and the covariance of the data ( 1
m
DDT). As long as m and the
covariance matrix are provided, our approach to structure discovery can be used even
if none of the actual features is observed. This insight allows us to learn structural
forms from similarity data, if we assume that a given (symmetric) similarity matrix
is a covariance matrix.9 Additional details can be found in the appendix.
Experiments
Color
We applied the similarity model to a matrix containing human judgments of the
similarity between all pairs of 14 pure-wavelength hues (Ekman, 1954). The ring in
Figure 6-6c is the best structure for these data, and corresponds to the color circle
described by Newton. Configurations similar to Figure 6-6c have been found using
multidimensional scaling to locate the colors in two dimensions (Shepard, 1980), but
a ring provides more appropriate constraints on inductive inference. The ring implies
that other pure-wavelength hues will be located somewhere along the ring, but if a
two-dimensional configuration were chosen, other hues would be incorrectly expected
to fall in any region of the space.
Faces
Next we analyzed a similarity data set where the entities are faces that vary along two
dimensions: masculinity and race. We created 16 faces using the FaceGen program.
The program includes dimensions for race and gender, and we used four possible values
along each dimension. The dissimilarity between faces was defined as the Euclidean
distance between their pixel vector representations. Given these data, the model
chooses a grid structure that recovers the two underlying dimensions (Figure 6-6d).
9In many cases the similarity matrix will already be positive definite, but if not we make it so by
replacing all negative eigenvalues with zeroes.
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Cities
As a final demonstration of the similarity model we analyzed a data set of distances
between 35 world cities. Dissimilarity was defined as distance along the surface of the
earth. Assuming that the earth is spherical, these distances can be calculated using
the latitude and longitude of each city. Given these data, the model chooses a cylinder
where the chain component corresponds roughly to latitude, and the ring component
corresponds roughly to longitude. A spherical representation would presumably score
even better than a cylinder, but note that a sphere does not currently appear in the
hypothesis space of structural forms.
Relational data
The framework already described can be used to discover structure in relational data
if we modify the distribution P (D|S) appropriately. We define two generative models,
one for frequency data and the other for binary relations. Suppose first that D is a
square frequency matrix with a count dij for each pair of entities (i, j). If the entities
are people, for example, dij may indicate the number of times that person i spoke to
person j. We define a generative model where P (D|S) is high if the large entries in D
correspond to edges in the cluster graph S. A more detailed description is provided
in the appendix.
A similar approach can be used to analyze binary relations. Suppose that D is
a square binary matrix where dij is 1 if the relation holds between i and j and 0
otherwise. In a social setting, for instance, dij may capture whether i gives orders to
j. We define a generative model where P (D|S) is high if the non-zero entries in D
tend to correspond to edges in the cluster graph S. Again, details can be found in
the appendix.
When working with relational data, for convenience we restrict the analysis to
graphs where each node represents a non-empty cluster of entities. Trees, grids and
cylinders allow nodes to be empty, and we remove these from our collection of struc-
tural forms, leaving five forms in total. Given a relation it is important to discover
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no self−links
self−links
self−links
no self−links
Figure 6-8: The four chain-structured forms used for relational data.
whether the relation tends to hold between elements in the same cluster, and whether
the relation is directed or not. The forms in Figure 6-2 use nodes without self-links,
and therefore assume that the relation does not hold within clusters. We create a
set of 10 forms by supplementing each form with an alternative that uses nodes with
self-links, but is otherwise identical. Each of these 10 forms uses directed edges, and
for each we include an additional form with undirected edges. In total, then, the hy-
pothesis space of relational forms includes 20 candidates.10 The four chain-structured
forms in this hypothesis space are shown in Figure 6-8.
Experiments
Mangabeys
We applied the relational model to a matrix of interactions among a troop of sooty
mangabeys. The data represent interactions where one animal submitted to another.
Range and Noe¨ (2002) consider two types of submissive behavior: in the first, “the
actor jumps or walks away from an approaching individual,” and in the second, “the
actor leans aside or shifts body position in response to another individual that ap-
proaches or walks by.” These data were recoded so that a count in the (i, j) cell of
the matrix indicates that i caused j to submit.
Scores for each form on this data set are shown in Figure 6-10. As expected,
the model concludes that a directed order is the most appropriate form, and the two
10Only 17 of these forms are actually distinct. A partition (with or without self-links) remains
the same when converted to an undirected graph. An undirected order with self links is a fully
connected graph, and is very similar to a partition graph without self links (a graph with no edges).
In both cases, all clusters stand in the same relationship to each other.
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Figure 6-9: Structures learned from relational data (top row), and the raw data
organized according to these structures (bottom row). (a) Dominance relationships
among a troop of sooty mangabeys. The sorted data matrix has most of its entries
above the diagonal, indicating that animals tend to dominate only the animals below
them in the order. (b) A hierarchy representing relationships between members of
the Bush administration. (c) Social cliques representing friendship relations between
prisoners. The sorted matrix has most of its entries along the diagonal, indicating
that prisoners tend only to be friends with prisoners in the same cluster. (d) The Kula
ring representing armshell trade between New Guinea communities. The positions of
the communities correspond roughly to their geographic locations.
kinds of directed order (one with self-links, the other without) score better than the
other forms. A fragment of the best-scoring order is shown in Figure 6-9a, and this
order is consistent with the dominance hierarchy inferred by primatologists studying
this troop.
Bush Cabinet
Next we explored whether the model could discover the structural form of a human
organization. The data set D is now a matrix of interactions between members of
George W. Bush’s first-term administration. Entry Dij in the matrix is the number of
Google hits for the phrase “i told j,” where i and j vary over 13 members of the Bush
administration.11 Although there are some hits for phrases like “Bush told Bush,”
11These Google searches were carried out on January 26, 2006.
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we set all counts along the diagonal to zero.
When applied to these data, the model concludes that the best form is an undi-
rected hierarchy. The best hierarchy found (Figure 6-9b) closely matches an orga-
nizational chart built by connecting individuals to their immediate superiors, and
the undirected nature of this representation indicate that information travels in both
directions along each link in the hierarchy. Studying the raw data in Figure 6-9b
indicates that the undirected hierarchy cannot be recovered by simply thresholding
the matrix D. For instance, “Libby told Bush” has a higher weight than “Whitman
told Bush,” even though Bush is directly connected to Whitman but not Libby in
the representation chosen by the model. Heuristics like thresholding may discover
interpretable structure in some cases, but probabilistic approaches are useful when
dealing with noisy real-world data.
Prisoners
Next we analyzed a relational matrix D that represents friendships between 67 prison
inmates. The inmates were asked “What fellows in the tier are you closest friends
with?” (MacRae, 1960). Each inmate mentioned as many friends as he wished, and
entry Dij is set to 1 if inmate i listed inmate j. Clique structures are often claimed
to be characteristic of social networks (Girvan & Newman, 2002), and the model
discovers that a partition (a set of cliques) provides the best account of the data.
Armshell Trade
Our final relational example considers trade relations between New Guinea commu-
nities (Hage & Harary, 1991). The 20 communities in the data set belong to the Kula
ring, an exchange structure first described by Malinowski (1922). The raw data are
represented as a matrix D where entry Dij in the data matrix is set to 1 if community
i sends mwali (armshells) to community j. As expected, the model concludes that a
directed ring provides the best account of these data.
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Figure 6-10: Scores for eighteen structural forms on relational data. U indicates an
undirected form, and S indicates a form with self links (see Figure 6-8). The scores
have been translated that the lowest score in each case is close to zero.
Related models
Although there have been few comprehensive studies of form discovery, our model is
related to several lines of previous work. Our general approach can be viewed as an
application of statistical model selection (Kass & Raftery, 1995). From a Bayesian
perspective, model selection can be achieved by describing a hypothesis space of
models (for us, each model is a pair (S, F )) and using Bayesian inference to choose
between them. Other approaches are sometimes proposed: Pruzansky, Tversky, and
Carroll (1982) decide whether a similarity matrix is better described by a tree or a
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two dimensional space by finding the best instance of each form, and choosing the
structure that accounts for the most variance. Several authors (Waller & Meehl, 1998;
Boeck, Wilson, & Acton, 2005) have proposed methods for distinguishing between
cluster structures and dimensional structures.
A key feature of a Bayesian approach is that it automatically penalizes unneces-
sarily complex models. Some such penalty is essential when considering structural
forms of different complexities, since complex forms (e.g. fully connected graphs) can
easily mimic simpler forms. Each chain, for example, is a special case of a grid, and
it follows that the best grid Sgrid will account for any data set D at least as well as
the best chain Schain: P (D|Sgrid) ≥ P (D|Schain). The approach of Pruzansky et al.
(1982) will therefore never choose the simpler model class, even when the data D
were actually generated over a chain.12
Feature data
The feature-based model is related to previous work on learning the structure of
graphical models (Dempster, 1972; J. Whittaker, 1990; Dobra, Jones, Hans, Nevins,
& West, 2004). Previous models usually belong to one of two families. The first
family includes models that impose no strong constraints on the form of the graph
structures that are learned. Bayesian approaches within this family generally use a
prior that includes all possible graph structures, and the prior over this space is usually
relatively simple—for example, Dobra et al. (2004) use a prior that favors graphs with
small numbers of edges. Models in the second family assume strong constraints on
the form of the graph to be discovered, but these constraints are fixed from the
start, not learned from data. Approaches in this second family include algorithms for
phylogenetic reconstruction (Huelsenbeck & Ronquist, 2001) that attempt to discover
tree-structured graphical models.
Our form-discovery model falls in the little-explored territory between these two
12Pruzansky et al. (1982) recognize the importance of model complexity, and justify their approach
by arguing that the complexity of trees is approximately equal to the complexity of two dimensional
spaces.
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families of models. Instead of working with generic priors over the set of all possible
graph structures, we developed an approach that concentrates the prior probability
mass on graphs that correspond to one of a small number of structural forms.13 The
ultimate argument for such a prior is that it captures background assumptions that
are well-matched to the problems we wish to solve. The need for suitable background
assumptions is most pressing when dealing with sparse data, and sparse data are the
rule rather than the exception in both cognitive development and scientific discovery.
Relational data
The relational model also builds on previous approaches to structure learning (H. C.
White, Boorman, & Breiger, 1976; Nowicki & Snijders, 2001; Taskar, Segal, & Koller,
2001; Girvan & Newman, 2002). As for the feature-based case, previous approaches
to relational learning usually belong to one of two families. Consider, for instance,
the many previous models for relational clustering, or identifying clusters of entities
that relate to each other in predictable ways. The first family includes models that
impose no strong constraint on the form of the structures to be discovered. Stochastic
blockmodels (Wang & Wong, 1987; Kemp et al., 2006) are one example: they do not
incorporate the notion of structural form, and cannot conclude that a set of clusters is
organized into a simple form like a ring, or a set of cliques. The second family includes
models that assume that the structural form is known in advance. For instance, there
are several algorithms for discovering community structures in networks (Girvan &
Newman, 2002; Kubica, Moore, Schneider, & Yang, 2002). These approaches usually
assume that the data are organized into a set of cliques, and that individuals from
any given clique tend only to be related to others from the same clique. The form-
discovery model again occupies the little-explored territory between these two families
of approaches.
13Even though the notion of structural form is the most distinctive aspect of our model, this model
differs from previous structure learning models in at least three other respects. First, standard
methods for learning the structure of Gaussian graphical models do not allow latent nodes. Second,
these methods make no attempt to cluster the nodes. Third, these methods allow graphs where
some of the edges capture negative covariances. For the generative model in Equation 3, an edge
between two entities always encourages the entities to have similar feature values.
150
Learning from sparse data
So far I have argued that structural forms can be learned, but we have seen few
concrete examples of the inductive benefits that form discovery can bring. The in-
ductive constraints provided by structural forms seem especially relevant to two kinds
of problems: problems where a novel entity is sparsely observed, and problems where
an entire system of entities is sparsely observed.
Novel entities
Inductive constraints are most important when data are sparse, and inferences about
novel entities are often based on very sparse data. Suppose, for example, that the 20
mangabeys in Figure 5a are confronted by a new animal—mangabey X. Mangabey X
has interacted with the troop on only one occasion, when he challenged and dominated
mangabey 1. A learner who knows that the troop is organized into a dominance
hierarchy can predict that mangabey X will dominate every other animal in the
troop. A learner with a diffuse prior over graphs, however, will be unable to draw
any conclusion from the single observation involving the new animal.
Similar problems arise when the data are features rather than relations. Suppose
that you glimpse a novel animal at the zoo, and you think you see that it has the head
of a bird and the body of a dog. If you know that biological species are organized into
a tree, you should begin to doubt what you saw, since there is no way of extending
your current tree so that the new animal is close to both the birds and the dogs. A
model with a diffuse prior over graphs, however, will happily create a new graph by
connecting the new animal to both the birds and the dogs.
Novel systems of entities
Structural forms are useful when new entities are encountered one at a time, but
form discovery also supports inferences about entire systems of new entities (Novick,
1990). Suppose, for example, that a primatologist has spent several months studying
one troop of mangabeys, and has discovered that the group is well described by a
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dominance hierarchy. Knowing that mangabeys organize themselves into dominance
hierarchies should allow her to quickly figure out the social structure of the next
troop she studies, but a scientist who has not discovered the structural form of the
first troop may take substantially longer.
Similar problems arise when the data are features rather than relations. Consider
the case of Joseph Banks, the botanist on Cook’s first voyage to the Pacific. As a
young man, Banks studied the works of Linnaeus and presumably concluded that
the species belonging to any given continent could be organized into a tree. Given
this knowledge, a relatively small number of observations should have been enough
for Banks to develop a tree-structured representation of the Australian species he
encountered. A naturalist who had not read Linnaeus might have taken much longer
to discover an adequate representation for the odd-looking animals he observed.
Form discovery in the laboratory
Structural forms are useful in part because they support inductive inferences, but we
can turn this relationship around and use inductive inferences to diagnose whether a
learner has successfully discovered the structural form of a domain. Two inductive
tasks were described in the previous section: tasks where learners make inferences
about new members of a known system, and tasks where learners make inferences
about entirely new systems of entities. We developed experiments based on both
tasks.
Experiment 1: Transfer to novel systems
In the first experiment, we trained participants on the structure of one relational
system and asked them to generate two additional systems with similar structures.
Identifying the form of the training system should allow learners to generate further
instances of this form.
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Figure 6-11: The six training systems used in Experiment 1. The first five systems
are instances of simple structural forms.
Participants
12 members of the MIT community were paid for participating in this experiment.
Materials and Methods
The experiment included six within-participant conditions. In each condition, par-
ticipants learned a single system (the training system) and generated two additional
systems (the transfer systems). The six training systems are shown in Figure 6-11: the
first five are instances of simple structural forms, and the final system was intended
to be a more random kind of structure.
The task was introduced as follows:
Mr Cheeryble is an eccentric billionaire who owns many small companies
across many different industries. Cheeryble strongly believes that com-
panies in the same industry should be organized similarly, although com-
panies in different industries can be organized differently. He also firmly
believes that important documents should be enclosed in red envelopes.
As a management consultant, you have been hired to secretly observe the
organization of five of Mr Cheeryble’s companies, each from a different
industry. You will begin your investigation in the mailroom and observe
how red envelopes are exchanged within each company.
The experiment was carried out on a computer, and during the learning phase
the interface had a single button labeled “Observe.” Upon clicking this button,
participants were told about an event corresponding to one of the edges in the current
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training system: they might be told, for example, that “John sends a red envelope to
Bill” (employee names were randomized across participants). After some number of
observations, participants were given a test which included a yes/no question about
each pair of employees (e.g. “Does John send red envelopes to Bill?”). Participants
continued to observe edges in the training system until they were able to answer all
of the test questions correctly.
Figure 6-11 shows that each training system included four or five nodes. After
participants had learned the training system, they were asked to write a brief descrip-
tion of the organization of this company. Participants were then told that “Cheeryble
has another company in the same industry with six employees,” and asked to “indi-
cate one way in which the company might be organized.” After generating the first
transfer system (a six node system), participants were asked to generate a transfer
system with seven nodes. Since participants were provided with only a single training
system for each condition, each of their inferences is an instance of one-shot learning.
Results
The six-node transfer systems are shown in Figure 6-12. The collection of seven-node
transfer systems is qualitatively similar, although not described in this thesis. For
each of the first five conditions, Figure 6-12 shows that at least five of the twelve
participants generated a transfer system that was consistent with the form of the
training system (counts for consistent systems are circled). These results support
the idea that humans are able to discover the abstract organizing principles of a
relational system. Responses for the random condition were more diverse, and no
transfer system was chosen more than twice. Note that the random system is similar
in many respects to the other training systems—for example, it has about the same
number of nodes and edges as the other systems. The random system, however, has
no recognizable structural form, which appears to explain the lack of consensus in
this condition.
The verbal descriptions of the training systems provide further evidence that par-
ticipants were able to discover the structural forms of the first five systems. When
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Figure 6-12: Transfer systems. Each row represents one of the conditions of experi-
ment 1. The number above each system is the number of participants (out of twelve
in total) who generated that structure. Circled numbers indicate systems that are
consistent with the structural form of the training system, and numbers with asterisks
indicate cases where the training system was simply reproduced. Only eight of the
ten systems generated for the random condition have been shown.
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describing the chain, one participant wrote:
There is an obvious chain of command. It goes from top to bottom through
two middle men.
The same participant described the ring as follows:
There is no clear ‘boss’. Envelopes are sent in a one directional circle that
cycles through the employees of the company.
and gave this description of the partition:
It appears that this company has two sections, a three man group and
a two man group. Within each group, everyone can send envelopes to
everybody. However, the one group does not send envelopes to the another
[sic].
Like all one-shot inferences, generating a transfer system is a problem that is
highly underconstrained. Although most participants appeared to rely on the notion
of structural form, many other strategies are logically possible. For each condition
except the chain condition, a handful of participants generated a transfer system that
was identical to the training system except that it had some extra, isolated nodes.
These generalizations are marked with asterisks in Figure 6-12. Simply reproducing
the training system is a sensible response to the transfer task, and the fact that so
many participants generated a structure different from the training system suggests
that the notion of structural form is relatively intuitive.
Some of the less popular responses suggest that participants may have detected
regularities in the training systems other than the regularities we had in mind. In
the partition condition, most participants appeared to interpret the training system
as a pair of cliques, but one participant may have represented it as a pair of rings, as
suggested by the fourth transfer system for this condition (Figure 6-12). In the order
condition, one participant may have interpreted the training system as a four-level
structure where multiple nodes can belong at each level. This interpretation is con-
sistent with the second transfer system for this condition (Figure 6-12), which is a
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Figure 6-13: The five training systems used for experiment 2. In each condition,
participants were initially trained on a structure with up to six nodes (a through
f). After training, two new nodes were introduced (x and y) and two interactions
involving these nodes were provided (the links shown in red). Participants then
predicted how x and y would interact with all of the nodes in the training system.
four-level structure with three nodes at the bottom level. Since there are many reg-
ularities that participants might have picked up, it is revealing that most responses
were consistent with the structural forms we had in mind when designing the ex-
periment. This result suggests that the structural forms indicated by the labels in
Figure 6-11 are psychologically natural—more natural, for instance, than the many
other regularities that are consistent with each training system in Figure 6-11.
Experiment 2: Predictions about novel entities
Structural forms allow knowledge to be transferred from one system to another, but
should also support inductive predictions about new members of a known system. In
a second experiment, we trained participants on the structure of a system then asked
them to make inferences about new members of this system.
Participants
Ten members of the MIT community were paid for participating in this experiment.
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Figure 6-14: Experiment 2: modal predictions. The number above each subplot
represents the number of participants (out of ten in total) who gave that response.
For each of the first four conditions, the modal prediction is consistent with the
structural form of the training system.
Materials and Methods
Experiment 2 was very similar to Experiment 1. There were five conditions: in each of
these conditions, participants learned a training system and generated a seven-node
transfer system. The training systems are shown in Figure 6-13. After each transfer
system had been generated, participants were told that
Two additional employees (x and y) were away on vacation when you
started in the mailroom. Now they are back at work, and you observe one
interaction involving x and another involving y.
Entities x and y and the observations associated with each are shown in Figure 6-13.
Participants were then asked to predict how x and y would interact with all of the
remaining nodes in the training system, and were asked in addition to explain their
responses.
Results
Predictions about the new entities x and y are shown in Figures 6-14 and 6-15.
For each of the first four conditions, the modal prediction was consistent with the
structural form of the training system, and was made by at least half of the ten
participants. In the order condition, for example, node x sends a link to the node
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Figure 6-15: Experiment 2: mean predictions.
that was previously at the top of the order, which suggests that x will send a link to
each of the remaining nodes. Node y receives a link from the node that was previously
at the bottom of the order, which suggests that y will receive links from all of the
other nodes.
Alternative explanations may account for the results observed in some of the five
conditions, but it is difficult to explain the full pattern of results in Figure 6-14
without invoking the notion of structural form. Since x has been observed only to
send a link to a, a simple baseline model might assume that x is just like a, and
participates in a given relationship only if a does. This model accounts fairly well for
the modal predictions in the order and partition conditions, but does not capture the
modal responses in the chain and hierarchy conditions (Figure 6-16). Other baseline
models might be considered, but there appears to be no simple alternative that will
account for all of the behavioral data.
The verbal descriptions provided by participants provide further evidence that
their inferences were often based on the notion of structural form. In the order con-
dition, for instance, one participant gave the following justification for his predictions
about x:
If x can send to a, x must be in the highest position. x can therefore send
to all the other employees.
and explained his predictions about y as follows:
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Figure 6-16: Experiment 2: predictions of a baseline model which assumes that nodes
x and y are just like the nodes they are linked to.
If d sends to y, y must be the most downstream employee. Therefore,
y will receive red envelopes from all the employees, but cannot send to
anyone.
Taken together, our two experiments support the idea that humans can discover
the structural form of a relational system, and can use this knowledge to make predic-
tions about new or sparsely observed entities. There are several promising directions
for future experiments to pursue. The inductive tasks we chose are inspired by real-
world problems that human learners must solve, but other experimental paradigms
may also be worth exploring. For instance, participants should be faster to learn an
instance of a simple structural form than a random system with a comparable number
of edges (DeSoto, 1960). Errors made by participants should also be revealing: when
learning a noisy instance of a given structural form, for instance, errors should tend
to “regularize” the structure, or transform it into a better instance of the underlying
form (Freeman, 1992).
Modeling cognitive development
Both of our experiments used adult participants, but some of the most impressive
feats of form discovery may occur as children learn about the structure of the world.
I predict that the ability to discover structural forms will be found relatively early
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in development, but testing this prediction may raise some interesting experimental
challenges. To motivate future work in this direction, I present one of the develop-
mental predictions made by the form-discovery model.
As children learn more about a domain, their mental representations appear to
undergo qualitative transitions that have been likened to paradigm shifts in sci-
ence (Carey, 1985a; Kuhn, 1970). The form-discovery model shares this ability to
move between qualitatively different representations of a domain. Given a small
amount of data, the model typically chooses a form that is simple, but that does not
capture the true structure of the domain. As more data arrive, the model should
reach a point where the true structural form is preferred.
To demonstrate a qualitative shift in biological knowledge, we presented the model
with more and more features of the animals in Figure 6-6a. We could have run this
simulation by randomly sampling smaller data sets from the full feature matrix, but
the results might have been influenced by idiosyncratic properties of the small data
sets sampled. To avoid this problem, we directly specified the covariance of each data
set and worked with the similarity version of the model. We analyzed data sets where
the effective number of features was 5, 20, or 110, and the similarity matrix in each
case was the covariance matrix for the full set of animal features. Even though the
similarity matrices are identical, increasing the effective number of features should
allow the model to discover more complex representations. When only 5 features are
provided, the model should attempt only to fit the broad trends in the data, but given
110 features, the model should attempt to explain some of the more subtle variation
in the data.
Figure 6-17 shows the representations chosen by the model for each data set. At
first, the simplest form is preferred, and the model chooses a set of clusters. Given
20 features, the tree form is preferred, but the chosen tree is simpler than the tree
in Figure 6-6a. The final tree is identical to the tree in Figure 6-6a: note that a
similarity data set with 110 features is effectively identical to the data set that led to
Figure 6-6a.
The developmental shift in Figure 6-17 is reminiscent of a trajectory that children
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Figure 6-17: Two kinds of developmental change. Given only 5 features, the model
chooses a partition (a set of clusters). As the number of features grows from 5 to 20,
the model makes a qualitative shift between a partition and a tree. As the number of
features grows even further, there is incremental change and the tree becomes more
complex.
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appear to follow as they learn the meanings of words. Early in development, children
respect the assumption of mutual exclusivity: they organize objects into a set of non-
overlapping clusters, with one category label allowed per cluster (Markman, 1989).
Eventually, however, children realize that objects can be organized into taxonomic
hierarchies. Figure 6-17 suggests that this insight may be driven in part by the
amount of data available to older children.
The ability to learn from raw data may support some of the earliest and most
fundamental shifts in children’s thinking. Bottom-up learning, however, can only ex-
plain some aspects of cognitive development, and explicit instruction may contribute
to the majority of developmental shifts once children have become proficient language
users. Although I have focused on learning representations from raw data, hierarchi-
cal approaches can naturally handle linguistic input at multiple levels of abstraction,
including all three levels in Figure 6-1. Linguistic input can provide new features (e.g.
“whales breathe air”), and can also provide direct information about a structure S
(e.g. “whales belong with the mammals rather than the fish”) or a form F (e.g. “the
theory of evolution implies that animals should be organized into a tree”). Modeling
learning when input is simultaneously provided at several levels of abstraction is an
important goal for future work.
Conclusion
This chapter presented a hierarchical Bayesian model (Figure 6-1) that helps to ex-
plain how humans discover the structural form of a domain. I showed that the model
discovers interpretable structure in several real-world data sets, and described two
experiments which support the idea that humans can discover the best kind of rep-
resentation for a domain.
The form discovery model is broader in scope than the hierarchical models de-
scribed in Chapters 4 and 5. Word learning and causal learning are important areas
of study, but both of these areas are relatively self contained. Knowledge represen-
tation is a more general topic that is relevant to virtually every area of cognitive
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science: for instance, theories of language, perception, action, and reasoning must all
make claims about the structure of mental representations. By addressing a topic as
general as knowledge representation, this chapter demonstrated several key features
of the hierarchical Bayesian approach.
First, hierarchical Bayesian models help to explain how domain-specific constraints
can be acquired. A typical nativist view recognizes that inductive inference relies
on domain-specific constraints but assumes that these constraints are innately pro-
vided (Chomsky, 1980; Atran, 1998; Kant, 2003). Chomsky (1980), for instance, has
suggested that “the belief that various systems of mind are organized along quite
different principles leads to the natural conclusion that these systems are intrinsically
determined, not simply the result of common mechanisms of learning or growth.” The
form discovery model offers an alternative view, and suggests that domain-specific
constraints can be acquired using domain-general statistical inference. This per-
spective has been previously emphasized by connectionist modelers, who argue that
“domain-specific representations can emerge from domain-general architectures and
learning algorithms” (Elman et al., 1996).
Models that learn about many domains point the way towards unified accounts of
human learning. There are many special-purpose models in the literature, including
models of word learning (Chapter 4), grammar learning, causal learning (Chapter 5),
concept learning, perceptual learning, and motor learning. Each kind of learning is
distinctive in its own way, but there may be general principles that help to explain all
of these different abilities. The hierarchical Bayesian approach provides a natural way
to combine the insights behind several special-purpose models. Given several models
that are somewhat related, we can introduce a new level of abstraction that captures
their commonalities, and can treat each special-purpose model as a component of
a single, more general model. The form discovery model, for instance, shows how
models that learn trees, rings, chains, and partitions can be absorbed into a single
general framework for structure learning.
Connectionist models can also handle problems from many domains, but the form
discovery model departs from the connectionist approach in one particularly im-
164
portant respect. Standard methods for learning connectionist networks (Rogers &
McClelland, 2004) use the same generic class of representations for every task, in-
stead of attempting to identify the distinctive kinds of structures that characterize
individual domains. Without these structural constraints, connectionist models can
require unrealistically large quantities of training data to learn even very simple con-
cepts (Geman et al., 1992). The form discovery model recognizes that different kinds
of representations are appropriate for different domains, and that the right kind of
representation is crucial for explaining how learning can succeed given sparse data.
Structured representations are important in part because of the inductive constraints
that they capture, and a comprehensive theory of learning (Table 1.2b) should aim
to incorporate many kinds of representations.
Our current model can be extended in several ways to provide a more compre-
hensive account of form discovery. A natural first step is to implement the idea that
the structure grammars used by the model are generated from a single underlying
meta-grammar. The meta-grammar in Figure 6-3 is one initial proposal, but there
may be important classes of graphs (e.g. small-world graphs) that are not generated
by this meta-grammar, and it will be important to consider alternative schemes for
generating graph structures. A longer term goal is to extend the model to handle
structured representations other than graphs. To mention only two possibilities, log-
ical representations are useful for capturing some aspects of semantic knowledge, and
Markov decision processes are useful for modeling action and decision making.
Even though I have focused on graph structures, the basic idea behind the form-
discovery model should apply more generally. Given a set of structure grammars, a
learner can identify the grammar that provides the best account of a data set, and
this approach can be pursued regardless of whether the grammars generate graph
structures, logical representations, or other kinds of representations. As mentioned
earlier, the ultimate goal is to develop a “universal structure grammar” that fully
characterizes the representational resources available to human learners. This uni-
versal grammar, for instance, might specify a set of representational units and a set
of rules for combining these units to create structure grammars of various kinds, in-
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cluding grammars that generate graphs, logical representations, Markov decision pro-
cesses, and many other families of representations. The notion of a universal structure
grammar is highly speculative at present, but attempts to characterize this universal
grammar should provide some insight into the growth of mental representations.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
Inductive inferences depend critically on constraints. Some of these constraints must
be innate, but I have suggested that hierarchical Bayesian models help to explain how
the rest are acquired. Hierarchical Bayesian models include representations at multi-
ple levels of abstraction, and the representations at the upper levels place constraints
on the representations at the lower levels. Statistical inference over these hierarchies
helps to explain how the constraints at the upper levels are learned.
To demonstrate the psychological relevance of this approach I described models
that address three aspects of high-level cognition: categorization (Figure 2-2c), causal
reasoning (Figure 2-2e), and knowledge representation (Figure 2-2f). Each of these
models can be developed further and subjected to additional experimental tests, but
more important than any single model is the general theoretical framework I de-
scribed. Here I expand on four of the most important lessons that can be learned
from this framework. First, inductive constraints are often considered as prerequisites
for learning, but constraints can themselves be learned. Second, constraints can be
learned fast: in particular, constraints can be learned from small amounts of data, and
constraints can be learned before the hypotheses they constrain are securely in place.
Third, a statistical approach to constraint learning also explains how constraints are
used for induction. Fourth, working with abstraction hierarchies is a useful general
strategy for understanding the acquisition of human knowledge.
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Lesson 1: Inductive constraints can be learned
Constraints and learning mechanisms are sometimes seen as competing explanations
for cognitive abilities. Researchers who focus on constraints often adopt a nativist
approach and assume that these constraints are innately provided. Researchers who
focus on learning often adopt an empiricist approach and explore how much can be
achieved by mechanisms that are relatively unconstrained. The hierarchical Bayesian
framework suggests that inductive constraints and inductive learning can and should
be studied together. Constraints are critical for explaining how humans acquire knowl-
edge so quickly and from such sparse data. Learning can explain how some of these
constraints are acquired in the first place.
The formal framework developed in this thesis helps to explain the acquisition
of epistemic constraints, or constraints that correspond to forms of abstract knowl-
edge. Some constraints (such as memory limitations) do not qualify as epistemic con-
straints, but the set of epistemic constraints is relatively broad and includes examples
of domain-specific constraints, domain-general constraints, soft constraints, and hard
constraints. Despite this generality, the notion of an epistemic constraint helps to
clarify what it means to learn an inductive constraint. Any epistemic constraint is
potentially a target for learning frameworks including the framework developed here,
but it makes little sense to ask how non-epistemic constraints could be learned.
The framework I described relies on Bayesian inference, and suggests that epis-
temic constraints can be acquired in the same way that any other kind of knowledge
can be acquired. Given principles that generate a hypothesis space of epistemic con-
straints, a Bayesian learner can select the constraint in this space that best accounts
for a body of observed data. Loosely speaking, a Bayesian learner should increase
its degree of belief in a hypothesis to the extent that the data are compatible with
that hypothesis, and incompatible with most alternative hypotheses. The same ap-
proach goes through regardless of whether the hypotheses correspond to epistemic
constraints or other kinds of knowledge. This view of learning suggests that there is
nothing particularly special about the acquisition of inductive constraints, and that
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the same fundamental principles that explain other kinds of learning can also explain
how inductive constraints are acquired. To put the same idea in a more positive light,
I began with a problem that seemed mysterious at first—the problem of learning in-
ductive constraints—and showed how it can be handled by familiar computational
techniques.
Although this thesis has argued that constraints can be learned, I do not claim
that this learning takes place in the absence of any background assumptions. Any
Bayesian account will rely on prior knowledge, and each of our hierarchical models
assumes that the prior at the topmost level is fixed in advance, and that the process
by which each level is generated from the level immediately above is also known. We
can think about relaxing some of these assumptions, but any learning framework will
rely on initial knowledge of some sort. The hierarchical Bayesian framework helps to
explore how much initial knowledge is required, and what form this knowledge must
take.
Lesson 2: Inductive constraints can be learned fast
An important challenge for constraint-learning models is to explain how constraints
are learned fast enough to be useful. A word-learning model, for instance, does
not seem illuminating if it must acquire thousands of words before it discovers con-
straints like the shape bias. Constraints like the shape bias are supposed to support
word learning: instead of being extracted from a large database of words, they are
supposed to explain how these words could be learned in the first place. We saw two
ways to understand how word-learning constraints might be learned rapidly. First,
some constraints (including the shape bias) can be learned given just a few examples
from just a few categories. Second, abstract-to-concrete learning might explain how
children acquire word-learning constraints before they are confident about the mean-
ing of any single word. The same two ideas may help to explain how many other
constraints are rapidly acquired.
When abstract knowledge is available very early in development, it is natural to
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conclude that this knowledge is innate. Versions of this argument have been used to
support nativist claims about several of the domains in Table 1.1 (E. S. Spelke, 1990;
Wynn, 1992). The hierarchical Bayesian approach suggests an alternative view: in
some cases, abstract knowledge may appear to be innate only because it is acquired
much faster than knowledge at lower levels of abstraction. Exploring this possibility
will be critical when deciding which of the constraints in Table 1.1 might be learned
rather than innate.
There is some debate in the developmental literature about whether abstract
knowledge is acquired before more concrete knowledge, or vice versa (Keil, 1998;
Mandler, 2003). Hierarchical Bayesian models suggest that statistical inference can
lead to both patterns of development, and that the pattern which emerges in any given
case will depend on the task in question. Even though both patterns of development
are discussed in the literature, most computational models of development focus on
concrete-to-abstract learning. The work described here is one of the first formal
attempts to understand how abstract knowledge can be acquired before more concrete
knowledge is securely in place.
Lesson 3: Bottom-up and top-down inferences
It is possible that the acquisition and use of inductive constraints might turn out
to be two rather different problems. Perhaps, for instance, we need one theory to
explain how constraints are learned, and a second theory to explain how constraints
guide inductive inferences. We saw, however, that the acquisition and use of inductive
constraints can both be viewed as statistical inferences over a hierarchical architecture.
Cases where knowledge at lower levels supports inferences at higher levels can be seen
as instances of constraint learning. Cases where high-level knowledge guides inferences
at lower levels help to explain how constraints support induction.
Although I focused on the acquisition of inductive constraints, I described several
cases where constraints guide inductive inferences. We saw, for instance, how a con-
straint similar to the shape bias supports inferences about novel categories (Chap-
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ter 4), how causal schemata support inferences about the causal powers of novel
objects (Chapter 5), and how structural forms support inferences about new mem-
bers of a relational system (Chapter 6). In each case, the relevant constraints were
learned from prior observations, but we can also develop hierarchical models where
the constraints at the upper levels are thought to be innate.
Like all human beings, psychology researchers are attracted to binary oppositions,
and top-down and bottom-up approaches are sometimes presented as incompatible
approaches to induction. The hierarchical Bayesian approach provides a unifying
account which suggests that both kinds of inference are needed to account for cogni-
tive development. Early in development, inductive constraints are learned by making
bottom-up inferences based on observable data, and once established these constraints
guide top-down inferences about novel contexts (Figure 4-8). As this trajectory sug-
gests, bottom-up and top-down inferences are both needed to explain how knowledge
is acquired and used.
Lesson 4: A method for understanding induction
As shown in Figure 2-3, a conventional Bayesian model makes inferences at two levels
of abstraction, but the models in this thesis support inferences at three levels of
abstraction. Moving from two to three levels might not seem like such a big step, but
the important development is that we can now introduce as many levels as we need
for a particular problem.
The ability to build models with multiple levels of abstraction suggests a general
strategy for understanding inductive inference. I illustrate by describing how we came
to develop the model described in Chapter 6. Suppose that we want to understand
how a certain kind of inference can be made. Chapter 6 grew out of our interest
in problems where people learn a handful of facts about a novel property (e.g. dol-
phins have property P) and make inferences about the distribution of the property
(are seals or cows more likely to have P?). Inferences about biological properties can
be explained if biological species are mentally organized into a tree-structure, and if
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people know that nearby species in this tree tend to have similar properties (Kemp &
Tenenbaum, 2003). This approach, however, introduces a second problem: how might
people learn a tree structure that captures the similarity between animal species? This
structure can be learned by observing physical, behavioral and ecological properties
of different species and constructing a tree such that species with similar properties
are close to each other. Again, though, our proposed solution opens up another ques-
tion. Learning a tree from observed properties seems plausible, but how can learners
know in advance that they should construct a tree rather than some other kind of
representation? The model presented in Chapter 6 provides a possible solution: if
learners start with structure grammars that characterize a space of possible represen-
tations, they can identify the representation that best accounts for the data they have
observed. The sequence of questions does not stop here: as mentioned in Chapter 6,
it is natural to ask how learners might acquire a set of structure grammars, and we
can speculate about the conceptual resources that might be needed to construct this
set.
This case study suggests a general strategy that can be applied to many cogni-
tive problems. The general theme is that inductive inferences can be explained by
identifying the knowledge on which they depend. That knowledge, in turn, can be
acquired by relying on a body of knowledge that is even more abstract, and we can
iterate this procedure and build models where knowledge is acquired at many levels of
abstraction. Each time we add a level to a model there is an explanatory gain, since
the new level helps to explain how knowledge at the second-highest level is acquired,
and the modified model can potentially handle many phenomena that require differ-
ent representations at this level. There is also an explanatory cost, since the modified
model must know how representations at the second-highest level are generated given
a representation at the highest level, and must include a prior distribution over the
representations at the highest level. Each level of the form discovery model provides
an explanatory gain that appears to outweigh its cost, and similar arguments can be
made for the levels used by the other models in this thesis.
Adding levels can increase the explanatory power of a model, but this process must
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stop at some level of abstraction. The stopping point will be reached when any addi-
tional level incurs a cost that outweighs any explanatory gain it might provide. This
stopping point might alternatively be characterized as a point where the background
assumptions about the highest level are simple enough or general enough that they
can be plausibly assumed to be innate. If the assumptions about the highest level do
not meet this criterion, then it is necessary to ask how they might be acquired, and
the answer is likely to involve another level of abstraction. I do not claim that any of
our current models has reached a stage where the assumptions about the highest level
can be taken for granted. We might, however, approach this goal by supplementing
the form discovery model with an extra level which indicates how graph grammars
can be generated from a set of very basic concepts including objects (nodes), rela-
tions (edges) and the concept of recursive rule application. The knowledge at this
new level might be general enough to generate grammars that support linguistic and
visual inferences (Chomsky, 1965; Han & Zhu, 2005) as well as the graph grammars
needed by our form discovery model.
Building models with many levels of abstraction should allow us to work towards
unifying frameworks that account for many aspects of cognition. Many models of
learning are designed to address a narrow family of phenomena: for instance, I pre-
sented a model of word learning (Chapter 4) and a separate model of causal reasoning
(Chapter 5). People, however, are capable of many kinds of learning and reasoning,
and eventually psychologists should aim to develop formal frameworks that are simi-
larly broad in scope. The hierarchical Bayesian approach suggests one way to proceed.
If we can identify the basic assumptions shared by several special-purpose models,
we can introduce a level of abstraction that captures these assumptions, and can ab-
sorb the special-purpose models into a single general framework. In Chapter 6, for
instance, we saw how methods for learning trees, rings, chains, and partitions can be
combined to create a general framework for structure learning.
It is natural to construct a hierarchical model by adding levels of increasing ab-
straction, but we can also think about growing a model in the opposite direction and
adding levels that become increasingly concrete. The form discovery model has a ma-
173
trix of features at its lowest level, but some of these features correspond to complex
concepts in their own right (e.g. “is smart,” “is fierce,” and “lives in groups.”) By
adding a lower level to the model we can capture the idea that these complex features
are constructed out of more primitive microfeatures. Several psychologists have made
similar proposals about features and how they might be learned (Schyns, Goldstone,
& Thilbaut, 1998). The hierarchical Bayesian approach suggests how these propos-
als can be incorporated in a unified framework that addresses inductive questions
at many levels, including questions about the origin of features and the origin of
inductive constraints.
Developmental implications
This entire thesis has been motivated by developmental questions, and the lessons
just described are of obvious relevance to the study of development. Most sections in
this concluding chapter will touch on developmental themes, but this section brings
conceptual development into the foreground.
Models of learning and theories of cognitive development should have a great
deal to contribute to each other. Early childhood is the time when children acquire
the foundational concepts that will serve them for the rest of their lives, and the
most impressive feats of human learning probably occur during this period. Formal
models of learning can help to explain how children acquire so much knowledge so
quickly, and empirical studies of development can help to identify the main principles
that state-of-the art learning systems should aim to incorporate. Some approaches
to development have already established relationships with ideas from the modeling
literature. There are close ties, for instance, between the dynamic systems approach
to development (Thelen & Smith, 1996) and the literature on connectionist modeling.
Other perspectives on development have been pursued with very little input from the
modeling community. One influential approach that has largely resisted formalization
is known as the “theory theory” (Carey, 1985a; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997).
The hierarchical Bayesian approach may help to build a bridge between researchers
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who work on formal models and researchers who study the emergence of intuitive
theories. I have focused on inductive constraints rather than theories, but many of
the constraints in Table 1.1 emerge from intuitive theories, and hierarchical Bayesian
models help to explain how these theories can be learned (Tenenbaum et al., 2006).
Although many models of development take a connectionist approach (Shultz, 2003;
Rogers & McClelland, 2004), there are several reasons why this approach is not ideal
for exploring the development of intuitive theories. One problem is that connectionist
models do not incorporate structured representations, and cannot naturally capture
the rich systems of knowledge discussed by many developmental psychologists. A
second problem is that most connectionist models do not incorporate multiple levels
of abstraction, and cannot clearly explain how learning proceeds at these different
levels. These criticisms suggest that connectionism suffers from many of the same
shortcomings as traditional learning theory (Table 1.2a), and new theories of learning
(Table 1.2b) are needed to explain how rich systems of knowledge are acquired and
used.
The hierarchical Bayesian approach is consistent with all four principles in Ta-
ble 1.2b, and can perhaps become the foundation of a comprehensive account of
cognitive development. There is more to development than learning, of course, but
models of learning provide ways to explore some developmental proposals that have
previously resisted formalization. I argued, for instance, that hierarchical Bayesian
models can capture abstract-to-concrete learning, (Chapter 4), can explain how lin-
guistic input shapes causal attributions (Chapter 5) and can capture developmental
shifts between qualitatively different representations (Chapter 6).
To establish the developmental relevance of the hierarchical Bayesian approach it
will be necessary to apply it to developmental problems from many domains. We made
a start in this direction by applying the shape bias model to data collected by Smith
et al. (2002), and Chapters 5 and 6 mention several developmental predictions of the
remaining two models. Much more work is needed before the hierarchical Bayesian
approach can be assessed as a serious theory of development, but our results so far
suggest that this direction is worth pursuing.
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Limitations
Each model presented in this thesis is limited in several respects. The Dirichlet-
multinomial model assumes that each object is represented as a feature vector where
one dimension represents shape, another color, and so on. Explaining how visual
input might be parsed in this way is a problem that the current model does not
address. The schema-learning model assumes that each object belongs to a single
type, but some objects belong to multiple types. For instance, Bill Clinton is a male,
a politician and a physical object and displays the causal powers and characteristic
features of each type: he can grow a beard, he can charm a crowd, and he can break
a pane of glass when moving at high speed. The form discovery model assumes that
each data set has a single underlying structure, but different parts of the data may be
explained by very different representations. As mentioned previously, some biological
features are consistent with a taxonomic tree, but others are more consistent with
a set of ecological categories (Shafto et al., 2006). Other limitations of our models
might be listed, but it should come as no surprise that these models are limited in
many ways.
Any psychological model can be improved and extended in many ways, and our
models are no exception. Many limitations of these models can be addressed within
the hierarchical Bayesian framework, including all of the limitations mentioned above.
The real question is whether there are limitations that are intrinsic to my general
approach: limitations that cannot be addressed by any hierarchical Bayesian model,
no matter how sophisticated.
It is hard to imagine how the hierarchical component of my framework introduces
any fundamental limitations, but the Bayesian component will raise questions in
some readers’ minds. The value of Bayesian approaches to cognition has been vigor-
ously debated (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Anderson, 1990; Simon, 1991; Oaksford
& Chater, 2007) and most criticisms of Bayesian approaches fall under two broad
headings. Some researchers feel that Bayesian models can do too much: they argue
that there will be a Bayesian model to account for any conceivable pattern of data,
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and that the approach therefore offers little explanatory value. Others argue that
Bayesian models can do too little: in particular, they suggest that Bayesian models
will never be able to account for the many cases where people’s inferences depart
from normative standards.
The general claim that Bayesian models are too powerful may seem curious at
first. Psychologists and machine learning researchers have explored many different
models, but none comes close to matching the abilities of a five year old. None of these
models can compete with humans at tasks like recognizing the objects in a scene, or
answering commonsense questions about the narrative in a storybook. The first-order
task for psychologists should be to address the vast limitations of our current models,
not to develop models that achieve even less.
Concerns about the power of Bayesian models arise more naturally in specific
contexts. A Bayesian model relies on a set of background assumptions that formalize
the nature of the task and the prior expectations that the learner brings to the task.
A researcher interested in a specific problem such as associative learning or property
induction may worry that any conceivable pattern of data can be explained by adjust-
ing these assumptions appropriately (Shanks, 2006). Although understandable, this
concern seems motivated by some questionable views about the nature of scientific
explanation. There will always be multiple theories that account for a given set of
observations, including multiple theories that perfectly predict all of the observations.
Competing theories must therefore be assessed according to several criteria. Account-
ing for empirical data certainly matters, but simplicity and consistency with our best
current explanations of other scientific phenomena are also important. If background
assumptions of arbitrary complexity are permitted, a Bayesian modeler may be able
to account for any pattern of data.1 If the background assumptions must be plausible,
however, there will be many conceivable data sets that are not well explained by any
Bayesian account.
1Cases where people give probability judgments that do not form a coherent probability distri-
bution may appear to pose a problem, but our modeler can assume, for instance, that there is a
time-dependent process which switches the inductive context every second, and that each probability
judgment is accurate at the time it is given but soon out of date.
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Since Bayesian models cannot explain everything, it is natural to ask how well
they account for the human abilities we wish to explain. The Bayesian approach
has provided insight into many aspects of cognition (Anderson, 1990; Oaksford &
Chater, 2007), but there are some well-known cases where human behavior appears
to diverge from normative standards (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). These cases can
be organized into at least three categories. In some cases, the proposed normative
standard does not capture the true structure of the task, and people’s behavior turns
out to be consistent with a Bayesian account once the true structure of the task is
recognized (Hertwig & Gigerenzer, 1999; McKenzie, 2003). In other cases, people’s
responses may be best explained as rational responses to an real-world problem that
is slightly different from the problem posed by the experimenter (Tenenbaum & Grif-
fiths, 2001). A third set of cases includes findings that a purely Bayesian analysis will
be unable to explain. At present there is no clear consensus about the findings that
belong to each category, but it seems likely that many cases will end up in the third
category.
There are good reasons to expect that some empirical findings will resist a sim-
ple Bayesian explanation. Bayesian methods are useful for developing computational
theories of cognition (Marr, 1982), but a complete account of cognition will also need
to describe the psychological mechanisms that carry out the computations required
by these theories. Since the computational resources of the mind are limited, some
computational theories will be implemented only approximately, and these approx-
imations may lead to patterns of behavior that have no adequate explanation at
the level of computational theory. In order to explain everything that psychologists
wish to explain, Bayesian models will need to be supplemented with insights about
psychological and neural mechanisms.
Understanding processing mechanisms and developing computational theories are
two separate projects, but successful computational theories can guide investigations
of processing mechanisms. Psychologists and neuroscientists have discussed how prob-
abilistic computations could be approximated by the mind (Anderson, 1990) and the
brain (Ma, Beck, Latham, & Pouget, 2006), and there are proposals about how hier-
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archical Bayesian approaches in particular could be implemented by the brain (Lee &
Mumford, 2003). Although there are reasons to believe that the mind and brain are
capable of approximating Bayesian computations, it is possible that different learning
mechanisms are used for different tasks. Detailed studies are needed to understand
the nature of these mechanisms, the settings in which they operate, and the extent
to which each one is compatible with a Bayesian approach.
The distinction between computational theories and mechanistic models may not
be as sharp as I have suggested, but some version of this distinction is essential for
understanding the strengths and the limitations of the hierarchical Bayesian approach.
This approach is a paradigm for developing computational theories of cognition, and
does not appear to suffer from any fundamental limitations when applied in this
way. The study of cognition, however, is more than just the pursuit of computational
theories, and my framework is not intended to answer the many questions that emerge
from the study of psychological and neural mechanisms.
Future directions
My framework opens up two general areas for further work. First, the framework
can be applied as it stands to several kinds of problems from psychology and other
disciplines. Second, the framework can be extended and improved in several ways.
Psychological applications
We saw that the hierarchical Bayesian approach can address three problems solved
by human learners, but in order to establish the generality of this approach it will
be necessary to develop hierarchical models that account for the acquisition of con-
straints in many different domains. Table 1.1 lists some of the constraints that have
been proposed by psychologists, and that are potential targets for constraint-learning
models. It is far from clear that all or even most of these constraints are learned by
humans. All of these constraints, however, could be learned in principle, and hierar-
chical Bayesian models allow us to explore whether they are learnable given the data
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available over the course of cognitive development.
Although I focused on cases where hierarchical Bayesian models learn something
interesting, cases where Bayesian models fail to learn can be just as important. Since
these models rely on rational statistical inference, any failure to acquire an inductive
constraint cannot be attributed to a faulty learning mechanism. Instead, failures
to learn indicate that the prior knowledge assumed by the model is too weak, or
that the data provided to the model is too sparse, or both. If the data provided are
representative of the data available to human learners, then models which fail to learn
provide important evidence about constraints which need to be available from the
start in order for learning to succeed. Gildea and Jurafsky (1996) provide a concrete
example of this research strategy, and describe a model for learning phonological rules
that succeeds only when some linguistically-motivated constraints are included.
Each model described in this thesis includes representations at several levels of
abstraction, and there are at least three ways to test the psychological reality of these
hierarchies. One strategy focuses on inferences at the bottom level of the hierarchy.
Experiment 1 in Chapter 5 explored one-shot causal learning, and I argued that the
upper levels of the schema-learning model explain how people make confident infer-
ences given very sparse data about a new object. A second strategy is to directly
probe what people learn at the upper levels of the hierarchy. Experiment 3 in Chap-
ter 5 asked participants to sort objects into groups, and the resulting sorts provide
evidence about the representation captured by the top level of our hierarchical model.
A third strategy that I did not explore is to provide participants with information
about the upper levels of the hierarchy, and to test whether this information guides
subsequent inferences. Chapter 5, for instance, mentioned the case of a science stu-
dent who is told that “pineapple juice is an acid, and acids turn litmus paper red.”
When participants are sensitive to abstract statements of this sort, we have additional
evidence that their mental representations are similar to the abstraction hierarchies
used by our models.
Of the three strategies just described, strategy one can be applied to learning
problems from any domain, but strategies two and three need to be applied more
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selectively. A language learner, for instance, may have acquired a grammar for her
native language even if she is unable to describe it (strategy two) or to incorporate
additional rules that might be provided by a linguist (strategy three). Although
strategies two and three are less general than strategy one, they are critical in many
cases of interest, since they help to explore the cultural transmission of inductive
constraints. Language allows abstract knowledge to be described and directly supplied
to others, and hierarchical models are valuable in part because they allow a role for
linguistic input. Testing this aspect of my approach is an important direction for
future work.
Natural language can capture inductive constraints that are much more sophis-
ticated than any of the examples I considered. Some of these constraints may be
best described as constraints that emerge from intuitive theories (Carey, 1985b; Keil,
1991), and a comprehensive attempt to explore the acquisition of inductive constraints
must therefore explore the acquisition of intuitive theories. The hierarchical Bayesian
approach can help to explain the acquisition of many kinds of abstract knowledge,
including scripts, schemata, and intuitive theories. The causal schemata discussed
in Chapter 5 may qualify as simple theories, since they specify the concepts (i.e.
causal types) that exist in a domain and the law-like regularities that relate these
concepts (cf. Carey (1985b)). Modeling the acquisition of more complex theories is
an important challenge for the future.
Applications to other fields
Philosophers of science have long been interested in theory formation, and computa-
tional accounts of theory acquisition can address the discovery of scientific theories
and intuitive theories alike. Many philosophers have argued that scientific theories
occupy different levels of abstraction, and that the development of specific theories
is guided by more abstract theories that are sometimes called paradigms (Kuhn,
1970) or research programs (Laudan, 1977). Henderson, Goodman, Tenenbaum, and
Woodward (2007) argue that a hierarchical Bayesian approach can incorporate scien-
tific theories at different levels of abstraction, and can help to explain how paradigms
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or research programs are created and eventually abandoned.
Inductive inference is particularly relevant to the philosophy of science, but is
also a topic of broader philosophical interest. The hierarchical Bayesian approach
provides a general-purpose account of inductive reasoning, and can be developed as
a contribution to the formal study of epistemology. In Chapter 4 I described one
of the most obvious connections between the hierarchical Bayesian approach and
the philosophical literature. Goodman (1955) argues that our degree of belief in
specific hypotheses will often depend on more abstract overhypotheses. The model in
Chapter 4 suggests how overhypotheses can be learned, and can perhaps be developed
into a comprehensive formal account of Goodman’s approach to induction.
Fields like machine learning and statistics can be seen as modern attempts to de-
velop a science of inductive inference. The hierarchical Bayesian approach is widely
used in both fields, and the approach in Chapter 4 is based on a well-known model—
the Dirichlet-multinomial model—that has been applied to many other problems.
The remaining two models may also find applications to machine learning problems.
Causal models have been applied to scientific problems in many fields (Spirtes, Gly-
mour, & Scheines, 2001), and models that incorporate causal types may be better
able to capture the structure of many real-world problems. Form discovery is a prob-
lem that has previously received little attention, but automated approaches to this
problem can address questions faced by biologists (Rivera & Lake, 2004; Doolittle
& Bapteste, 2007), ecologists (R. H. Whittaker, 1967), linguists (Ben Hamed, 2005),
psychiatrists (Waller & Meehl, 1998), and scientists from many other fields.
Theoretical challenges
My framework opens up several theoretical questions for further study. We previously
saw how hierarchical models can be built by starting at a relatively concrete level and
adding representations that occupy levels of increasing abstraction. This approach
is a useful strategy for model-builders to pursue, but note that I provided no formal
guidelines for choosing how many levels to introduce or deciding how each level is
generated from the level immediately above. Automating the process of building
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hierarchical models is a worthy challenge for at least two reasons. First, an automatic
model builder may reduce the time needed to apply the hierarchical approach to
new domains. Second and more important, an automatic model builder serves as a
hypothesis about how hierarchical architectures might be constructed in the mind.
In principle, a Bayesian approach can explain how hierarchical models are learned
for novel domains. The two components required are a prior distribution over a
space of possible models, and a set of assumptions about how data are generated
from the true underlying model. The prior over models will include a prior over
architectures that captures expectations about the number of levels and the kinds of
representations that are found at each level. The prior over models will also include
a prior over the distributions which specify how each level is generated from the level
immediately above. One method for defining this prior might make use of a set of
basic elements that can be composed in many ways to construct representations and
generative processes. Chapter 6 described a meta-grammar that can generate many
kinds of graph structures, and an expanded meta-grammar might also be able to
generate several other kinds of representations. I have not explored the possibility
of a meta-grammar for generating probability distributions, but one initial step is to
explore simple schemes for generating distributions that belong to the exponential
family (Bishop, 2006).
An automatic model builder is the natural culmination of the modeling approach
pursued in this thesis. I introduced this approach by suggesting that some of the
background assumptions required by conventional models might be learned. We saw,
for instance, that assumptions about the representations considered by a two-level
model (Figure 2-3a) can be learned by introducing an extra level of abstraction (Fig-
ure 2-3b). Any hierarchical model will rely on its own set of background assumptions,
including assumptions about the number of levels and the nature of these levels, but
an automatic model builder can explain how these assumptions might be acquired.
Background assumptions of some variety will still be required, but the ultimate goal
is to minimize the number and specificity of these assumptions. An automatic model
builder, for instance, may need to start with little more than a very general hypothesis
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space of representations and probability distributions, a preference for simple models,
and the ability to carry out Bayesian inference.
Implementing a fully general version of this model builder will demand solutions
to many difficult technical and conceptual problems. More limited implementations
of the basic idea, however, should be tractable. For instance, our model for discov-
ering ontological kinds (Chapter 4) can be viewed as a relatively simple method for
discovering the structure of a hierarchical model. Learning the number of ontologi-
cal kinds amounts to learning the structure of the hierarchical model in Figure 2-2b,
since there is a tree in this model for each ontological kind introduced. It may also
be relatively straightforward to learn the structure of a hierarchical model when all
of the conditional probability distributions are assumed to take a simple parametric
form (e.g. all distributions are Gaussian), and the main problem is to decide how
many levels to introduce.
A second direction for future theoretical work is to explore the relative difficulty of
learning at different levels of abstraction. When hierarchical models make simultane-
ous inferences at multiple levels, we saw that learning can proceed faster at some levels
than others. Future work can explore the conditions under which different patterns
of learning should be expected. It may be possible, for instance, to identify general
conditions under which learning at the upper levels will be faster than learning at the
lower levels. Progress in this area is likely to be particularly relevant to the study
of cognitive development. In some developmental settings, concrete knowledge is ac-
quired before more abstract knowledge emerges, but abstract-to-concrete trajectories
are observed in other cases. We saw that hierarchical Bayesian models can capture
both developmental patterns, but more work is needed to understand the principles
that determine which pattern applies in any given case.
Towards a modern theory of learning
Formal models have been part of psychology from the beginning (Ebbinghaus, 1885;
Thurstone, 1919; Hull, 1943) and have played a central role in the development of
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traditional learning theory. I identified four principles that go beyond traditional
learning theory (Table 1.2b), and a modern learning theory should explore how these
principles can be formally realized. This thesis focused on the first principle, and
showed how the hierarchical Bayesian approach can account for learning at multiple
levels of abstraction. The hierarchical Bayesian approach, however, is also consistent
with the remaining principles in Table 1.2b. Bayesian models can naturally incorpo-
rate structured representations (principle two), and this thesis described models that
learn graphs and causal networks. Richer representations will be needed to account
for some aspects of human knowledge, but representations of arbitrary complexity
can be incorporated within a Bayesian framework. Principles three and four are re-
lated: learning can succeed given sparse and noisy data as long as the learner relies
on strong background knowledge. Bayesian approaches rely on prior distributions,
and these priors can capture the sophisticated, domain-specific knowledge that often
supports learning.
The demise of traditional learning theory was due in part to an intellectual move-
ment that has been called the cognitive revolution (Bruner, 2004). It may be time
for a second revolution that leads to a modern theory of learning, and it is possible
that the computational foundations of this theory are already in place. Empirical
work over several decades has described many psychological phenomena that raise
challenges for traditional models of learning, but research in computer science and
statistics has led to computational approaches (including the hierarchical Bayesian
approach) that address some of these challenges. Young children are still much bet-
ter learners than even the best machine learning systems, but modern computational
techniques can help to close this gap between minds and machines.
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Appendix: Form discovery model
This appendix provides some of the technical details needed to fully specify the form
discovery model in Chapter 6. I also describe some issues that arise when implement-
ing this model.
Generating structures from structural forms
The normalizing constant for the distribution in Equation 6.2 is the sum
∑
S
P (S|F ) =
∑
S is compatible with F
θ(1− θ)|S|.
To compute this quantity we must consider all possible ways of putting n entities
onto a graph of form F . Let S(n, k) be the Stirling number of the second kind: the
number of ways to partition n elements into k nonempty sets. Let C(F, k) be the
number of F -structures with k occupied cluster nodes. Expressions for C(F, k) for all
forms except the grid and the cylinder are shown in Table 1. The number of n-entity
structures with form F is
n∑
k=1
S(n, k)C(F, k).
For all forms F except the grid and the cylinder, the normalizing constant for Equa-
tion 6.2 is
∑
S is compatible with F
θ(1− θ)|S| =
n∑
k=1
S(n, k)C(F, k)θ(1− θ)k. (1)
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Form F C(F, k)
Partition 1
Directed Chain k!
Undirected Chain k!
2
Order k!
Connected 1
Directed Ring (k − 1)!
Undirected Ring (k−1)!
2
Directed Hierarchy kk−1
Undirected Hierarchy kk−2
Tree (2k − 5)!!
Table 1: Number of k-cluster structures for several different forms.
Equation 1 groups the F -compatible structures into classes that share the same
partition of the entities. To compute the normalizing constant for product structures
like the grid and the cylinder, it is more convenient to group the F -compatible struc-
tures into classes that share the same basic topology. Let G(n, i, j) be the number of
ways to put n entities on an undirected i by j grid so that no dimension of the grid
remains unoccupied. The normalizing constant for grids is now
∑
i≤j≤n
G(n, i, j)θ(1− θ)ij.
Similarly, if Y (n, i, j) is the number of ways to put n entities on an undirected i by
j cylinder so that no dimension remains unoccupied, the normalizing constant for
cylinders is ∑
i≤n,j≤n
Y (n, i, j)θ(1− θ)ij.
G(·, ·, ·) can be computed using the function L(·, ·), where L(n, i) is the number of
ways to put n entities on an undirected i node chain so that no node remains empty:
L(n, i) =


1 i = 1
i!
2
S(n, i) i > 1
where S(n, i) is the Stirling number of the second kind.
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We now have
G(n, i, j) =


L(n, i)L(n, j) i 6= j
L(n,i)2+L(n,i)
2
i = j
In the case where i = j, we have accounted for the fact that the grid can be rotated
without changing the configuration.
The counts for undirected cylinders can be computed similarly. Define
R(n, i) =
L(n, i)
i
where R(n, i) is the number of ways to put n entities on an i node ring so that no
node remains empty. Then
Y (n, i, j) = L(n, i)R(n, j).
Generating data from structures
Chapter 6 applies the form discovery model to feature data, similarity data, and
relational data. To handle each kind of data, we define a distribution P (D|S) which
indicates how data D are generated from an underlying structure S.
Feature data
Suppose that S is a graph that captures the relationships between a set of entities,
and that D is a feature matrix where the (i, j) entry in the matrix indicates the value
of entity i on feature j. The graph provides a good account of the feature data if the
features tend to be smooth over the graph: in other words, if nearby entities in the
graph tend to have similar feature values. We formalize this idea by assuming that
the features are generated by a Gaussian process over the graph.
Let Sent be a graph with n + l nodes, where the first n nodes correspond to
entities and the remaining l nodes are latent. Let f be a feature vector which assigns
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a continuous value fi ∈ R to each node i in the graph. Let W be a n + l by n + l
weight matrix, where wij =
1
eij
if nodes i and j are joined by an edge of length eij
and wij = 0 otherwise. We now define the graph Laplacian ∆ = E −W where E
is a diagonal matrix with entries ei =
∑
j wij. A generative model for f that favors
features which are smooth over the graph Sent is given by
P (f |W ) ∝ exp(−
1
4
∑
i,j
wij(fi − fj)
2) = exp(−
1
2
fT∆f) (2)
Zhu et al. (2003) point out that Equation 2 can be viewed as a Gaussian prior
over f with zero mean and covariance matrix ∆−1. This prior, however, is improper.
Note that any feature vector f has the same probability when shifted by a constant,
which effectively means that the variance of each fi is infinite. We obtain a proper
prior by assuming that the feature value fi at any entity node has an a priori variance
of σ2:
f |W∼ N (0, ∆˜−1) (3)
where ∆˜ = ∆ + V , and V is a diagonal matrix with 1
σ2
appearing in the first n
positions along the diagonal and 0 elsewhere.2
Equation 3 specifies how to generate a single feature only. Typically the data D
include multiple features, and we assume that the features are conditionally indepen-
dent given Sent.
3 To complete the generative model we place priors on the branch
lengths eij and the variance σ
2. Both are drawn from exponential distributions with
2Zhu et al. (2003) use a matrix V that has 1
σ2
everywhere along the diagonal. We prefer the
approach described here because it allows empty nodes to be added to a weighted graph W without
changing the likelihood P (D|W ). Suppose that we convert graph W to W ′ by adding an empty node
k to the edge between i and j so that dij = d
′
ik +d
′
kj . Our model implies that P (D|W ) = P (D|W
′),
but this result does not hold for the approach of Zhu et al. (2003).
3We treat all features equally, but it is possible to introduce weights λj for each feature. Equa-
tion 3 then becomes P (f j) ∝ exp(−λ
j
2
fT∆f), where f j is the jth feature. Once we place a prior
on the feature weights (for example, a prior that encourages most weights to be small), we can
simultaneously discover the structure S and the weights for each feature. The weights will measure
the extent to which a feature is smooth over S—the features that match the structure best will end
up with the highest weights.
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hyperparameter β:
σ | β ∼ Exponential(β) (4)
eij |Sent, β ∼ Exponential(β) if sij = 1 (5)
For all analyses we set β = 0.4.
Even though we introduced edge weights wij, we are primarily interested in the
best graph topology Sent given the dataD. The likelihood P (D|Sent) can be computed
by integrating out σ and the edge weights:
P (D|Sent) =
∫
P (D|Sent,W, σ
2)P (W |Sent)P (σ
2)dWdσ2
We can approximate this integral using the Laplace approximation. Since the
weights wij and the variance σ are both required to be positive, we map them to a
log scale before computing the Laplace approximation. To find modal values of the
transformed variables, we run a gradient-based search using the ‘Large Scale’ option
available as part of MATLAB’s unconstrained minimization routine.
Throughout this section we have not been careful to distinguish between proba-
bility density functions and probability distributions. Since we defined a generative
model for continuous vectors f , P (f |W ) should strictly be written as a probability
density function p(f |W ). In practice, however, f is only observable to some level of
accuracy, and we can quantize each feature vector:
P (f |W ) =
∫
|f−u|<ǫ
p(u|W )du (6)
where ǫ is a small constant. Equation 6 can be approximated as
P (f |W ) ≈ p(f |W )
∫
|f−u|<ǫ
du ∝ p(f |W ) (7)
where the constant of proportionality does not depend on the structure or the form
under consideration, and can be dropped from our calculations.
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Similarity data
According to the Gaussian model in Equation 3, the probability of feature matrix D
given a weighted graph W is
log(P (D|W,σ)) = −
mn
2
log(2π)−
m
2
log |∆˜−1| −
1
2
tr(∆˜DDT).
Note that the feature matrixD influences this distribution only through the number of
features (m) and the covariance matrix 1
m
DDT. As long as both of these components
are provided, the model for feature data can be applied even if none of the actual
features is observed. This insight is related to the “kernel trick” discussed by machine
learning researchers (Scho¨lkopf & Smola, 2001).
Relational data
Suppose now that the data D specify relationships between entities rather than fea-
tures of the entities. We define two distributions P (D|S), one for frequency data and
another for binary relations.
Frequency data
Let D be a square frequency matrix with a count dij for each pair of entities (i, j).
Suppose that S is a graph which specifies the relationships between a set of clusters.
We define a generative model where P (D|S) is high if the large entries inD correspond
to edges in the cluster graph S. Formally, let |a| be the number of entities in cluster
a. Let C be a matrix of between-cluster counts, where Cab is the total number of
counts observed between entities in cluster a and entities in cluster b. Our model
assumes that P (D|S) = P (D,C|S) = P (D|C)P (C|S), and that C is generated from
a Dirichlet-multinomial model:
θ |S, β0, β1 ∼ Dirichlet(α)
C | θ, nobs ∼ Multinomial(θ)
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where αab = β0|a||b| if Sab = 0, αab = β1|a||b| if Sab = 1, and nobs is the total
number of observations. The pair (β0, β1) is drawn from a discrete space: β0 + β1 is
drawn uniformly from { 1
16
, 1
8
, 1
4
, 1
2
, 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32} and β0
β0+β1
is drawn uniformly from
{0.05, 0.15, . . . , 0.45}. A count matrix C is assigned high probability under this model
if the large entries in C tend to correspond to edges in the cluster graph S.
As for the feature model, we integrate out the parameters:
P (C|S) =
∫
P (C|S, β0, β1)P (β0, β1)dβ0dβ1
=
1
50
∑
(β0,β1)
P (C|S, β0, β1)
where
P (C|S, β0, β1) =
∫
P (C|θ)p(θ|S, β0, β1)dθ
can be computed analytically, since the Dirichlet prior on θ is conjugate to the multi-
nomial P (C|θ).
Given C, we assume that the Cab counts are distributed at random between all
pairs (i, j) where i belongs to cluster a and j belongs to cluster b:
P (D|C) =
∏
a,b
(
1
|a||b|
)Cab
.
Binary data
Suppose now that D is a binary relation represented as a square matrix where dij is
1 if the relation holds between i and j and 0 otherwise. We define a generative model
where P (D|S) is high if the large entries in D correspond to edges in the cluster
graph S. Let zi denote the cluster assignment for entity i. Suppose that there is a
parameter θab for each pair of clusters, and that dij is generated by tossing a coin
with bias θzizj . We place a prior distribution on the parameters θab that depends on
the edges in the cluster graph, and encourages dij to be true when there is an edge
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between cluster zi and cluster zj. The model can be written as:
θab |S, α0, β0, α1, β1 ∼


Beta(α0, β0), if Sab = 0
Beta(α1, β1), if Sab = 1
dij | θ ∼ Bernoulli(θzizj)
The hyperparameters α0, β0, α1 and β1 are drawn from a four-dimensional grid
where α0 + β0 and α1 + β1 belong to {
1
16
, 1
8
, 1
4
, 1
2
, 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32} and β0
α0+β0
and β1
α1+β1
belong to {0.05, 0.15, . . . , 0.95}. We sample uniformly from all points on this grid
where β0
α0+β0
≤ β1
α1+β1
, which captures the assumption that relation D is most likely
to be true of pairs (i, j) that correspond to edges in graph S.
As for the frequency model, we integrate out the parameters:
P (D|S) =
∑
(α0,β0,α1,β1)
P (D|S, α0, β0, α1, β1)P (α0, β0, α1, β1)
=
∑
(α0,β0,α1,β1)
P (D0|α0, β0)P (D1|α1, β1)P (α0, β0, α1, β1)
where D1 represents the entries in D that correspond to edges in the graph S, and
D0 represents the remaining entries in D. As before, the terms P (D0|α0, β0) and
P (D1|α1, β1) are computed by integrating out θ:
P (D1|α1, β1) =
∫
P (D1|θ1)p(θ1|α1, β1)dθ1
where θ1 is a vector containing parameters θab for all pairs (a, b) such that there is an
edge between cluster a and cluster b. P (D0|α0, β0) is computed similarly.
Model implementation
The mathematical assumptions of the form discovery model have now been described,
but there are some practical issues that arise when implementing this model.
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Feature data
Given a matrix D with m features, we apply a linear transformation so that the mean
value in D is zero, and the maximum entry in 1
m
DDT is one. The first property is
useful since our model assumes that the features have zero mean. The second property
means that it should make sense to use the same value of the hyperparameter β for
both feature and similarity data (as mentioned above, we set β = 0.4). If D contains
missing entries, we group the features so that any two features in a given group are
observed for precisely the same set of entities. Suppose that the largest group has
j features. Consider the reduced matrix Dˆ that is created by including only these j
features, and the enties for which these features are observed. We scale the data so
that the mean value in D is zero, and the maximum entry in 1
j
DˆDˆT is 1.
Our method for identifying the S and F that maximize P (S, F |D) involves a
separate search for each form. Since the prior on the space of forms is uniform, the
winning structure is the best candidate encountered in any of these searches. Each
search starts out with all the entities in a single cluster, then uses graph grammars
like those in Figure 6-2 to split the entities into multiple clusters. When a cluster node
is split, the entities previously assigned to this cluster must be distributed between
the two new cluster nodes. We choose two of these entities at random, assign one to
each of the new clusters, then go through the remaining entities in a random order,
making a greedy assignment for each one. Since this procedure for splitting a cluster
node is not deterministic, the search algorithm as a whole is not deterministic. At
each iteration, we attempt to split each cluster node several times, and of all splits
considered we accept the candidate that improves the score most. After each split, the
algorithm attempts to improve the score using several proposals, including proposals
that move an entity from one cluster to another, and proposals that swap two clusters.
The search concludes once the score can no longer be improved.
The structures encountered early on in the greedy search can be seen as low-
resolution versions of the structure that will eventually be identified as the best. This
perspective explains why a greedy search will often perform well. If we take some true
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structure and construct a sequence of representations at increasingly low resolutions,
this sequence should provide a path by which a greedy search can proceed from the
lowest-resolution version (a structure with all the entities in one cluster) to the true
structure.
Relational data
A greedy search which moves from low-resolution structures to high-resolution struc-
tures should work well when fitting some structural forms (including partitions and
dominance hierarchies) to relational data. For other forms, however, a greedy search
will fail badly. Consider the case where the true structure is a ring, and each entity
sends a link to only one other entity. There is no low-resolution version of this struc-
ture that seems acceptable: we can group the entities into clusters and organize those
clusters into a ring, but the entities in each cluster will tend not to send links to the
entities in the next cluster along.
When analyzing relational data, we therefore rely on two initialization strategies.
The first is the strategy used for feature data: we begin with a graph where all the
entities are assigned to a single cluster. The second strategy uses the best clusters
found for one of the simplest structural forms: partitions with no self-links.4 These
clusters are then used to build initial configurations for each of the remaining struc-
tural forms. For example, when searching for rings, we start by connecting the two
clusters with the strongest link between them. We continue adding clusters to the
ends of this chain until we have a chain including all the clusters, then join the ends
of this chain to create the ring that will initialize the greedy search for the best ring
structure.
4When fitting this form, we initialize the search using the first strategy.
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